Someone will say, “let’s discuss everything”. Okay. Firstly, though, you need time for discussion – and time is going to be in short supply. And secondly, discussing the issues doesn’t mean reaching agreement on them. Right now, we don’t know what the position of the other side will be. After everything that’s happened between Russia and Ukraine under Putin – and, more widely, between Russia and the West – there will not be a great desire on the other side to seek a compromise. It’s more likely that Russia will come up against very strong pressure. At least, this is what the experience of the 1990s tells us. No one proposed a “Marshall Plan” for Russia then, and it’s highly unlikely that anyone will suggest one now. This all leads to the idea that the restoration of justice, that may appear to be a logical step, will be of benefit to some, while others will regard it as a shock and an injustice.
Now let’s look at the second part of the question of rebuilding: the political one. Is this likely to be popular in Russian society, even in that section of society that is prepared to support the temporary government in its efforts to dismantle the Putin regime? Probably not. Especially if the humanitarian aspects of a swift and unconditional rebuilding become immediately obvious. It seems inevitable that this will lead to a sharp rise in discontent, something that the forces of reaction will quickly try to use to their advantage. If this is so, the temporary government won’t last more than a few months. Politics is the art of the possible. Extricating ourselves easily from Putin’s war with the West – acknowledging that we were wrong and trying to return everything to the way it was – will, most likely, not be possible.
Many of those who believe in simple solutions refer to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, that the Bolsheviks signed with Germany when Russia withdrew from the First World War. They suggest that after the regime has been dismantled, Russia should conclude similar agreements with all those against whom Putin has been waging war. But the Peace of Brest-Litovsk is a bad example to choose. The Bolsheviks acted under conditions of an extreme force-majeure, when had they taken any other decision they would simply have lost power. And they were ready to break all the terms of the agreement at the first opportunity, which is exactly what they did after just a few months when a revolution took place in Germany. Taking advantage of the confusion this caused, the Moscow government seized back everything they had given away, including wiping out Ukraine’s independence that had been accepted on the fringes of the Brest-Litovsk agreements. Had it not been for the revolution in Germany, the Bolsheviks’ gamble may have had completely different consequences.
When all things are considered, the only possible scenario will be to move forwards, not backwards. Naturally, it calls for courage to admit one’s mistakes and call a spade a spade, including acknowledging crimes as crimes. Those who have committed these crimes must bear full responsibility for them and accept the consequences. But the way out of this situation must be found in keeping with the new reality as things are now. This is no simple task. In each specific case a balance must be sought between restoring the old justice and the creation of a new injustice; between acknowledging what is essential politically and turning away from what is politically impossible.
Returning to the most pressing problem, that of Crimea and the other occupied territories, then here we have two key moments in my opinion. First of all, we cannot simply ignore the issue and say that we’ve got rid of Putin but Crimea will be ours nonetheless. If we don’t solve this problem, the war will never end. Secondly, for the reasons cited above it’s also impossible simply to return Crimea to Ukrainian jurisdiction. Mainly because in practice it will be impossible to avoid violence on the peninsula after it’s restored to Ukraine. It'll be necessary to find some complicated solutions involving a gradual restitution with a third country as a guarantor.
Rejecting Putin’s legacy does not mean, unfortunately, that we can simply ignore it. The war represents the new reality, and the way out of it must be organised and properly thought through. In doing so, certain important principles must be observed, namely:
Old problems can never be solved simply by creating new ones.
Separate what is politically desirable from what is politically possible.
Understand clearly where the interests of Putin’s regime lie and where Russia’s national interests begin, and don’t solve the problem of de-Putinisation by damaging Russia’s national interests.
Approach each point separately, noting the unique difficulties of each one; don’t rush to find a universal, standard solution.
History has demonstrated that ways of solving many of life’s problems simply don’t exist yet; they have to be worked out afresh.
Time and political will are needed in order to solve many problems.
Chapter 7. How to Defeat an Internal Counter-Revolution:
Purge the Old Guard or Try to Correct Them?
Russia has gone through a difficult return to its Soviet past. It’s already passed the point of no return. There’s no turning back. The chain of events was thus:
Yeltsin pushed forward Putin as his successor
Putin gradually took over total power
There were creeping counter-reforms
The return (in effect) of state control over the economy, but indirectly – it’s less “the state” than “the mafia” (in other words, the situation’s worse than in Soviet times).
Taken together, this means that over a quarter of a century after Gorbachev’s perestroika, Russia has not only returned to the starting point of his reforms, but in many ways has gone back to a time many decades before this.
This Soviet restoration poses the practical question about the strength of these reactionaries, who are trying to extinguish any kind of reform or revolution and reinstate themselves in power. Putin and his closest circle are representatives of the second and third levels of the Soviet nomenklatura (the highest level have already pretty well disappeared and, in any case, wouldn’t be in a position to reinstate themselves to their previous positions). These people from the second and third levels slipped into the background, yet were waiting there, ready to carry out an ambush. When the opportunity arose, they came to the fore and tried to turn back the clock to restore the old ways of ruling, which they remembered well from their youth. Naturally, they did this by adapting to contemporary conditions, which meant first and foremost that they considered it essential to make themselves as rich as possible.
This is not a unique situation, of course. When a temporary government comes to power, forces linked to the old regime never disappear instantaneously from the face of the earth. Some of them will be eased out, but many will remain in place. And they won’t just remain in place; they’ll stay there with their money, their families, and with the old connections that they’ve built up along with their economic and social capital. They – or, to be more precise, already their second and third level officials – will also be awaiting the opportunity to establish themselves in position. This is why any new group in power always has to try to avoid being crushed by representatives of the old power. But how they can achieve this? How do they define the borders that are so essential for their political defence? How do they avoid going too far in defending themselves against the old terror without giving rise to a new terror? Where do you draw the line of reasonable sufficiency when it comes to suppressing an internal counter-revolution?