Naturally, though, this is not enough. If you simply exclude the “first disciples”, then pretty quickly the second and third disciples will be striving to become the first. Therefore, a ban on the preaching of unacceptable social and political actions should be added to measures designed to combat internal counter-revolution, because such actions are inextricably linked to mass violations of human rights and freedoms. The processes of de-communisation and de-Stalinisation showed specifically the desire to do this. Many consider that these were two possibilities that were missed in the 1990s. This is partly true; but it’s not as simple as that.
In the 1990s, it was thought that outlawing the activities of the Communist Party should be the first thing to do under the banner of de-communisation. Yet this was a genuine political force that to this day is still supported by millions of people. Trying to do this inevitably divided society. Exactly the same thing would happen today, and it’s unlikely that it would succeed.
The fact is, terror is not an essential element in the basic idea of Communism. It’s just one of the possible ways in which it can develop, and one that, unfortunately, became the reality in Russia. Rather than splitting society by just outlawing labels, it’s important to strictly suppress attempts to spread and popularise the practices that are hidden behind these labels. When we’re talking about Communist ideas, what this means is roughly the following: preventing attempts to justify the great terror (and terror in general), to preach the violent expropriation of property, and to carry out genocide based on social or national grounds; in other words, everything that went to make up the dark pages of Russian history in the twentieth century. In some senses this is similar to the Chinese approach to de-Maoisation. Without actually attacking the figure of Mao himself (indeed, it’s still difficult for them to make an unambiguous assessment of him as a national leader), the Chinese Communist Party had to condemn very severely the extremes of the Maoist terror, including the so-called Cultural Revolution and the twists and turns in the battle against private ownership.
So it’s essential to strike a balance. On the one hand, we have to defend the new authorities and not allow for yet another return to the previous regime; but at the same time, we also have to avoid a split in society and a civil war, that would, in any case, lead to the return of the regime, albeit somewhat later. Carrying out a purge is not a dogma but a general idea; and how it’s done has to be in accordance with the situation at a given time and place. A purge for its own sake doesn’t lead to anything positive, nor does it protect you from a counter-revolution.
Chapter 8. How to Control the Man with a Gun:
a Task for the Party or for the Secret Services?
At times of stable development, the work of genuine or even ornamental institutions hides the violent nature of any state. But its true nature never actually goes away. When it comes down to it, even when the state is complicated and multi-functionary it remains a machine for violence. To be more precise, it’s a machine for legitimised violence, since it’s only the legitimacy of the violence that it employs that differentiates the state from just any armed group that enforces its will on those around it by force. But when a time of change replaces that political stability, and when the old way of life collapses but has yet to be replaced by something new, the violent nature of state power comes to the fore.
So an enormous problem faces any temporary government in the very first days of its existence: how do you control “the man with a gun”, or, as we’re used to saying these days, the siloviki? Today, they’re wrapped up in an enclosed system, where they all keep a beady eye on each other, and Putin himself watches them all at once like a hawk. But once Putin goes, the circle will break, and dozens, if not hundreds, of scattered armed and organised groups will be left to their own devices. They might recognise the authority of the temporary government, or they might place themselves on the side of the reactionaries; or they may even try to take power themselves, although this last one is unlikely as there’s never been a tradition in Russia of this happening.
If events turn out this way, they will inevitably have a whole host of negative consequences, the most serious of which could be a counter-revolutionary uprising or a slide into civil war with the potential for the state to split apart. Thus, from the first moment it becomes a task of the greatest urgency for the temporary government to encourage the senior and middle-ranking commanders in the power structures to join them. It’s no less than a matter of life or death. However well set up the system is of democratic institutions, it would take only the slightest failure for this question to become the most urgent. All we need do is look back to the day in Washington when Trump’s supporters stormed the Capitol Building and remember how great were the efforts of both sides in the democratic USA to cooperate with the leadership of the Department of Defence and the Chiefs of the General Staff when they were deciding whether or not to call out the National Guard.
This question of having control over “the man with a gun” was in the background of every change of leader in a totalitarian state such as the USSR, too, with its well-established system of the ideological inheritance of power. The success of the coup against Lavrenty Beria in 1953 was greatly helped by the army remaining loyal to the Party and Soviet leadership represented by Nikita Khrushchev and Georgy Malenkov. Khrushchev’s fall from power nine years later was in no small way aided by his being betrayed by the then leadership of the USSR KGB, which supported Leonid Brezhnev, who was already heavily backed by the army. A significant factor that assisted Mikhail Gorbachev when he came to power in 1985 was that he was seen as the protégé of the former head of the KGB, Yury Andropov. In his early days this guaranteed the loyalty of the KGB leadership, helped by the neutral position adopted by senior army officers. The refusal of the KGB’s Group Alpha to storm the White House in August 1991 was the death knell for the plans of the State Committee for the State of Emergency – the GKChP – to turn back the clock to hardline Communism. One way or another, any change of power has inevitably involved the question of who controls the men with the guns. You won’t find this question widely discussed in text books about democracy, but there isn’t a single democracy in the world that would have managed to survive if, in each instance, this matter hadn’t been decided beforehand.
In Russia this has happened in accordance with its centuries-old traditions and way of life. As a rule, this involves preventative violence, sometimes very clearly displayed, at others more behind the scenes. In 1953, the conflict reached an intense phase, and Beria and his closest supporters were effectively eliminated with no investigation and no trial. The situation with the GKChP passed off without bloodshed; after being arrested and imprisoned briefly, those who took part in the coup attempt were released and were even given the chance to take part in the new Russia’s political life. If the forces are successfully aligned, the issue can be settled by simply replacing the old leadership with a new, more loyal one. But it can be difficult to put in place such an arrangement.
In any case, within a matter of hours of its being in power, the temporary government has to carry out a “vote of confidence” among the siloviki, demanding from them total acknowledgement of the government’s legitimacy. If such an acknowledgement is forthcoming, the problem is removed and it allows time for a gradual strengthening of political control over the structures of power. However, should there be any doubt expressed, or, worse still, any opposition, the temporary government has to act harshly, even physically neutralising those who refuse to acknowledge its authority (in the best case, this would be by carrying out arrests; but even this may prove to be difficult). All of this is possible, though, it’s all been done before on a number of occasions, and there is no other way of accomplishing this. Either the new authorities show who’s boss, or they’ll be destroyed; if not immediately, then soon afterwards. Politics is a cruel business, and if you don’t acknowledge this then you’re simply not telling it as it is. I believe that this is unacceptable, because ruthless honesty must be the basis of the new politics.