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If we put to one side any ideas for “a quick fix” based on the general dislike of the old regime (and experience shows that such dislike doesn’t last long), then all that’s left is to put into action a “left-wing plan” that would at least satisfy the fundamental economic demands of the majority of the population. It’s essential that the majority believes that the government’s actions strategically match their own long-term economic interests. Only then will the people be prepared to back the government in its difficult journey through the period of transition. In other words (and many people still fail to accept this) there’s a fairly simple calculation that has to be done that will limit any deep change in Russia: it will have to be carried out along with a “left-wing plan”. By “left-wing plan”, what I mean is that it must be geared towards the social and economic needs of the people; as opposed to the “right-wing plan” that satisfies the needs of the minority. Had the reformers in the 1990s not ignored the social needs of the majority of the people, it is quite possible that today we would not be trying to solve the problem of Putinism. If those who have set themselves the task of carrying out a political battle with the regime once again ignore the social and economic needs of the majority, they will never achieve their political goals.

Nowadays, everyone understands this. There are now no opposition forces that wouldn’t promise the Russian people social benefits and economic well-being along with political freedom and a state governed by the rule of law. Nevertheless, people don’t rush to believe such promises. For some, it’s because the 1990s are still fresh in their minds; for others, it’s because there are few concrete details in such promises, and much of what is said is unrealistic with the current state of the economy.

In order to win enough trust from the majority to carry out far-reaching changes, people shouldn’t be given promises of a wonderful life in some far-off future, but guarantees that will work right now. Strange as it may seem, such guarantees exist now, and can be presented to the people by a temporary government in exchange for long-term support of a reformist path. This involves returning to the people what was taken from them in the 1990s: namely benefitting from the extraction of natural resources, known as resource rent, and a fair distribution of property.

Resource rent is the principle source of wealth in Russia, both privately and publicly. Officially, resource rent today is controlled by the state; but in reality, it’s controlled by the mafia cabal that’s replaced the state. All ideas that are put forward regarding the fate of resource rent come back to one point: whatever force replaces the Putin regime has to ensure that the distribution of resource rent is done more fairly than it is today. In other words, the people will receive more than they do now. But since the Russian population has grown used to regarding anything related to the state with deep mistrust, they don’t believe in this crock of gold at the end of the rainbow, either.

But a completely different approach can be taken, one which excludes the state from its role as the distributor of resource rent among the population. In recent years, everyone has realised that there are two insoluble problems in Russia: pensions; and the unfair distribution of profits from the sale of natural resources. So why not solve one problem with the help of the other? Why not send profits from energy sales (which, in any case, are fixed separately from the rest of the budget) to citizens’ individual savings accounts, that could be opened directly in the Treasury? The sum that’s needed to pay fair pensions is almost exactly the same as the amount that goes into the budget from the exploitation of resource rent. So locking them together is totally logical. In one fell swoop, the Russian people are able directly to control resource rent, while putting a stop to feeding a gigantic bureaucracy and the mafia that’s attached itself to it. This is something that both can and should be done immediately after the temporary government takes over. It would open up a channel of political possibilities while implementing simple changes. This is the most important thing; but there is something else as well.

Clearly, it will be impossible in practice to restore trust between the state and society in the near future, unless the consequences of the unfair privatisation of the 1990s are removed. It’s a trauma that set in with the birth of privatisation, and one which will prevent the introduction of any measures to improve the health of the economy. It means that there’s no trust in society, not only for the government, but for the very principle of private property. Yet private property lies at the heart of any constitutionally-governed state. Largely thanks to the experience of privatisation in the ’nineties, the majority of the population see private property in Russia as the result of an unfair distribution of state assets. What’s more, this is also partly reflected in today’s situation, since a significant portion of public wealth is controlled by a small criminal segment that has crushed the state.

There are two reasons why no progress can be made on the path to democratic reform unless this totally parasitic property is wiped out. Firstly, if this property remains in the hands of the collective beneficiaries of the Putin regime it will be used to block any constructive activity attempted by the temporary government. And secondly, unless this property is confiscated it will be impossible to earn society’s trust; society won’t support any government that leaves this money in the hands of these people.

Therefore, the second essential social measure of the temporary government must be the expropriation of this parasitic capital from the Putin clan. The assets that are seized from them must be passed to public investment funds under the control of parliament. The income from the activity of these funds should be directed towards additional funding for social projects. First and foremost this should be for education and health care. This can be placed in individual savings accounts that will be opened for every citizen. This could be considered as a compensatory measure, as it would go some way to righting the wrongs that were committed by the state under its privatisation programme. So it would be a step towards re-establishing socio-economic justice.

In effect, Russia today lives under a state of emergency. There exists a regime of political terror. Any practical resistance to the authorities is paralysed. However, experience shows that this cannot continue forever. Any closed system ultimately contains within itself the reason for its collapse. Putin’s regime will be no exception. And even if right now it’s difficult to influence the longevity of this regime, it’s entirely possible to affect the pace of the post-regime recovery. This will largely depend upon the speed of reaction by the elites as to what is happening; on how much preparation is done to rethink Russian history; on there being a clear and achievable goal from those seeking change; and, even more importantly, on there being a detailed road-map for change.

The normalisation process after the fall of the regime will be made much simpler and swifter if a provisional consensus can be reached by society on all these points. The lack of such a consensus and especially the lack of an actual plan around which consensus can be reached will have a seriously adverse effect on society’s chances of repairing itself. Indeed, it may even make this impossible. Circumstances may well dictate that for a period of time – and this could be long drawn-out – spiritual and intellectual opposition may prove to be virtually the only form of resistance possible for the majority of those citizens who are opposed to the regime. But “otherworldliness” and the fact that this appears to be something abstract doesn’t lessen its historic significance. On the contrary, this is exactly where the frontline of the battle for the future of Russia lies today. Every action begins with a word; and it’s vital that this word is the right one and that it hits the target.