Donaldson opened the meeting by saying that no one in the room was authorized to discuss any of the information that would be covered with anyone except those present. Then he introduced General Brad Nathans, deputy director of the NSC.
Crocker had never met Nathans but had heard a lot about him. He knew he was a former marine general who had served in the First Gulf War and the invasion of Iraq, and had subsequently lost his right arm in a terrorist bombing in Kuwait. Nathans was reputed to be a brilliant strategist, a military historian, and a tireless worker. More important, he was part of the president’s trusted inner circle.
Nathans cleared his throat and, speaking from notes, repeated what Sutter had told Crocker about the arrest of the Unit 5000 operatives in New Orleans and the seizure of weapons, sarin, and explosives. Then he went further, explaining that three more people had been arrested in the New Orleans area. Two had recently entered the country on student visas. The other was a U.S. citizen.
The man from FBI pointed out that the investigation was ongoing and more arrests were expected. “This was a complex and wide-ranging conspiracy,” he warned. “It could have been devastating. Thank God those men were stopped in El Paso, because they were primarily responsible for carrying out the attacks in New Orleans. The other people we’ve arrested, with the exception maybe of one of the students, were playing support roles-moving money, renting rooms and vehicles, storing supplies. We’re almost one hundred percent sure this operation was baked in Iran.”
An eerie hush filled the room. Even though all the people there were tough professionals, they seemed deeply affected by what they had just heard.
The general cleared his throat and deepened his voice. “Nothing I say from this point on can leave this room. Nothing. Understood?”
Everyone nodded.
“One of the individuals we’re holding has told us that the Quds Force, and Unit 5000 in particular, is planning more attacks against the U.S.”
Crocker knew that despite increased patrols and updated technology, the long borders the United States shares with Mexico and Canada were still relatively porous. The fact that an organization as devious and capable as the Quds Force had launched a program to infiltrate terrorists and bombers into the States scared him.
“When and where are these attacks likely to occur?” Sy Blanc asked.
“The man we’re holding claims he doesn’t know,” Donaldson answered. “But the president has decided to take the gloves off. He’s had enough.”
Crocker liked the tone of his remarks so far, but wondered where this was going.
Nathans said, “Some of you here have heard of Scimitar.”
Crocker looked at Sutter, sitting beside him, who shook his head. He didn’t know about it either.
“Scimitar,” Nathans explained, “is a top-secret group of anti-regime Iranian operatives that the CIA has organized, supplied, funded, and supported inside Iran. It’s Lou’s baby, so I’ll let him tell you about it.”
Donaldson sat up and adjusted his collar. Crocker didn’t like his arrogant manner but had to admit that he seemed to have grown bolder and less risk averse the higher he’d climbed the bureaucratic ladder.
Donaldson said, “What I can tell you about Scimitar is that it was authorized three years ago by presidential finding and approved by the congressional oversight committee. It consists of about a dozen highly trained individuals who live in and near Tehran. They have supplies, resources, and safe houses, and they’ve developed sources internally. So far we’ve only used them to collect intel.
“Because of the aggressive nature of what has just transpired, with the Iranians going so far as to infiltrate their operatives onto American territory to initiate an attack, the president has made the decision to activate them further,” Donaldson continued. “In other words, their role will soon expand from collecting intel to going operational. The problem is that they don’t have the expertise or combat capability to carry out the operation we have in mind.”
Now Crocker understood why he was present. The prospect of a direct attack on Iran excited him. He watched Donaldson turn his long, serious face to him, then heard him say, “That’s why we invited Chief Warrant Officer Crocker. All of you, I believe, are familiar with Black Cell.”
People turned to him and nodded. He saw the excitement in Leslie Walker’s warm brown eyes and felt proud.
The next morning Crocker, Sutter, Anders, Blanc, and Walker sat in Lou Donaldson’s office, drank coffee, chewed on bagels, and started to sketch out a plan. They began with the presumption that Crocker and his team would be dropped into Iran with gear and weapons. Members of Scimitar would meet them and provide logistical support. Black Cell would attack targets inside the country, then retreat to a remote location from which they could be extracted at night. The list of possible targets included nuclear sites, military bases, and the homes and offices of high-ranking Iranian officials. According to Donaldson, the president had made clear that any mission he authorized had to meet three criteria: One, it had to be targeted specifically to respond to the thwarted Unit 5000 strike on New Orleans. Two, it had to have a reasonable chance of success. And three, it had to have enough of an impact to discourage the Iranians from launching future terrorist attacks.
For the most part, Crocker stayed out of the discussion. But he did point out that criterion number one seemed to eliminate most of the CIA’s list of targets, namely the nuclear facilities and military bases.
“Not necessarily,” Donaldson said.
Sy Blanc: “I agree with Crocker. How does our hitting a military base in Iran qualify as a pointed response to Unit 5000’s recent activities and its plan to hit New Orleans? And how does it serve as a warning to Quds Force not to launch future attacks?”
Anders: “They’re two tentacles of the same rogue state.”
Walker: “That’s a stretch.”
Donaldson asked, “Then what do you propose we hit?”
Crocker spoke up. “Since we know that this was planned by the Quds Force, and specifically Farhed Alizadeh, it seems logical to target him. Correct?”
Blanc: “Yes, but-”
Donaldson cut him off. “Nice idea, Crocker. But I don’t think Alizadeh is a big enough target. Besides, I’m not sure we know where he is.”
Anders: “We don’t.”
“Why isn’t he big enough?” Blanc asked.
Anders: “First of all, no one’s ever heard of him. And second, is taking him out really worth risking Scimitar and the lives of your men?”
Everyone in the room with the exception of Crocker seemed to agree. He spoke up. “Let’s not forget what this guy has done-the hijacking of the nuclear material off the coast of Somalia, his operations in Libya and the attempt to steal WMDs, his drug smuggling operation out of Ciudad del Este, building a base in Venezuela, and this attempt on New Orleans. I say we take him out, then broadcast his crimes to the media.”
“And make him a martyred hero in Iran?” Donaldson asked. “I don’t think the president will appreciate that recommendation.”
Talk then shifted to assassinating a higher-profile official, including the minister of intelligence and security, Heidar Moslehi; the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the chief commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohammed Ali Jafari; and the commander of the Quds Force, Major General Qassem Suleimani.
Crocker’s mind started to wander. He imagined Alizadeh sitting somewhere, talking about how the United States was bloated and soft.
Anders argued that any U.S. attack on the president of Iran or the Supreme Leader would be seen as an act of war and would probably provoke a furious response from the world’s Shiite community. He didn’t think the president was willing to risk that.