THE END OF RUSSIA AND
WHAT IT MEANS FOR AMERICA
ILAN BERMAN
Copyright © 2013 by Ilan Berman
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who wishes to quote brief passages in connection with a review written for inclusion in a magazine, newspaper, website, or broadcast.
First ebook edition © 2013
eISBN 978-1-62157-177-3
The Library of Congress has catalogued the hardcover edition as follows:
Published in the United States by
Regnery Publishing, Inc.
One Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20001
www.Regnery.com
Manufactured in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Books are available in quantity for promotional or premium use. Write to Director of Special Sales, Regnery Publishing, Inc., One Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001, for information on discounts and terms, or call (202) 216-0600.
Distributed to the trade by
Perseus Distribution
250 West 57th Street
New York, NY 10107
In loving memory of Misha,
my own personal Solzhenitsyn
CONTENTS
FOREWORD
PREFACE: Russia’s Disorder Comes West
CHAPTER ONE: Misreading Russia
CHAPTER TWO: The New Sick Man of Europe
CHAPTER THREE: Muslim Russia Rising
CHAPTER FOUR: Russia’s Hidden War
CHAPTER FIVE: The Far East Flash Point
CHAPTER SIX: Putin’s Crumbling State
CHAPTER SEVEN: Misunderstanding the Muslim World
CHAPTER EIGHT: In Retreat in Asia
CHAPTER NINE: Rebuilding the Empire
CHAPTER TEN: Managing the End of Russia
NOTES
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
APPENDIX ONE
APPENDIX TWO
INDEX
Credit: Library of Congress
FOREWORD
Ilan Berman’s Implosion: The End of Russia and What It Means for Americais a very important addition to current efforts to think strategically about America and the world.
In the tradition of Herman Pirchner and the American Foreign Policy Council, it looks at Russia and not merely at its president, Vladimir Putin. The combination of his personality, the disciplined ruthlessness of his KGB background, and the temporary advantage of the energy resources in providing a windfall to the Russian state have enabled Putin to occupy a larger space in international relations than the strategic position of Russia would justify.
In many ways we are all still affected by the scale of the Soviet Empire, its toughness in playing the major role in defeating Nazi Germany despite enormous casualties, and its ability to mobilize 20 percent of the economy to build a military machine out of all proportion to its long term capacity (and, one could argue, ultimately bankrupting the country, as had been suggested would happen in 1950 in National Security Council Report 68).
Russia’s relative influence is also helped by its continued possession of one of the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals, its relatively modern arms industry, and the sheer geographic expanse of the country. When you look at a map, you instinctively assume a country that big has to count for something.
Finally, Russia still benefits from being one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. It inevitably, and at virtually no cost to Moscow, is at the center of the dialogue in international negotiations simply by the historic achievement of having been there at the creation, to borrow Dean Acheson’s term.
The question Ilan Berman puts on the table is whether Russia is a declining power more like the two weaker permanent members of the Security Council (France and Britain) than a true peer of the United States and China.
There are three great advantages to this incisive study.
First, Berman gets one thinking strategically. Not about this week’s posturing in Syria or next week’s press event of Putin posing shirtless next to a dead tiger, but rather thinking beyond Putin about the underlying strategic strengths and weaknesses of the current Russian system.
Second, Berman looks to the roots of any nation’s long-term power capabilities and examines demography and comparative development. Experts have been warning ever since the collapse of the Soviet Empire that Russia is in a deep demographic crisis. Berman walks the reader through the details, and they are very convincing. Alcoholism, abortion, suicide, and emigration are all combining to shrink the Russian ethnic population. At the same time, the Muslim population of Russia is growing. Muslim Russians don’t drink, don’t commit suicide, don’t have abortions, have many children, and have a much more optimistic view of the future than their ethnic Russian counterparts. As Berman notes, Putin’s successors are simply going to have fewer people with a much more difficult ethnic mix to deal with. Russia beyond Putin will inherently be a smaller player on the world stage because it will no longer have the population to be a major one.
This population imbalance will play itself out in two different directions. Internally, the tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim Russians will almost inevitably exacerbate as the energy and youth of the former crowds the aging, declining Russian Christian population. Berman’s recounting of the number of mosques being built in Russia today is in itself a convincing insight into the tensions of the future. Externally, the surging Chinese population will almost inevitably lead to massive Chinese involvement in Asiatic Russia where the Russian population is declining. (A side effect of the end of the Soviet totalitarian system is that a lot of people who were compelled to live in bleak, cold areas are now moving to warmer, more modern areas—and the people in those nicer areas are moving out of Russia to Europe and the United States).
Third, Berman’s last decade has been spent studying radical Islam and its terrorist component and he brings that expertise to bear on Russia’s internal problems. It isn’t just that there will be relatively more Muslims in Russia. The odds are very high that a larger and larger portion of the Muslim population will be attracted to and indoctrinated in a more extreme and more violent aspect of Islam. Because of his unique Russian–Middle Eastern dual specialties, Berman is able to bring together factors many analysts miss.
The primary Russian internal threat is from the radical wing of Sunni Islam. In effect, it is a variant on Wahhabism. This threat is exacerbated by the Russian alliance with the dictatorships in Iran and Syria. Both Russian allies are in the Shi’a camp at a time when the Shi’a-Sunni split may be more bitter and trending toward more violence than any period in recent history. In effect, the Russians may find themselves on the wrong side of an Islamic civil war and that may intensify the efforts outsiders put into radicalizing and militarizing Russia’s own domestic Muslim population.