But beginning in the mid-1990s, the removal of Kozyrev, and his replacement with hard-line Arabist Yevgeny Primakov, reestablished Russia’s imperial and anti-Western approach to the region. “The world is moving toward a multipolar system,” Primakov explained to Rossiyskaya Gazeta, a Russian government daily, shortly after his installation as foreign minister. “In these conditions we must pursue a diversified course oriented toward development of relations with everyone . . . [and] we should not align ourselves with any particular pole.” 6For their part, more than a few Middle Eastern countries—increasingly discontented with Western policy—turned to Russia as a political balancer and alternative to America and Europe in the region. Moscow thus reverted to (mostly) Soviet behavior.
Over the past decade and a half, Russia has progressively assumed the role of balancer and pro-Arab broker in the long-running peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This includes support for the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) participation in regional forums, including Arab League summits, 7as well as serving as a consistent backer of the PA’s bid for international recognition at the United Nations. 8Moscow has simultaneously pivoted toward support for the more radical elements of Palestinian politics, undermining Western diplomacy by unilaterally engaging with the Hamas movement. 9It has done so despite warnings by Russian experts that the Kremlin’s outreach to Palestinian radicals was at odds with its approach to the breakaway republic of Chechnya—and that this double standard could end up damaging Russia’s image in the eyes of moderate Muslims. 10
Russia also expanded its role as a key strategic partner and political enabler of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq—a relationship that continued until Saddam’s ouster by Coalition forces in 2003. At that time, oil and drilling contracts held by Russian companies were estimated to be worth nearly $44.1 billion. 11Over the course of Saddam Hussein’s regime, half of Iraq’s arms came from Russia. So did shipments of electronic jamming equipment, night vision goggles, and anti-tank weapons, provided in violation of UN sanctions. 12
In 2003, a cache of captured documents revealed that Moscow was even sharing intelligence with, and providing training for, Iraq’s intelligence operatives. 13With Saddam’s removal, however, Moscow found itself progressively shouldered out of political developments in the former Ba’athist state. Its massive economic stake in Iraq—developed during the decades of Saddam’s rule—was largely nationalized by Iraqis who saw Russia as a foe because of its backing of the ancien régime. It took the Kremlin years to reestablish a commercial foothold in the country.
And today, Russia’s standing in the Muslim world has been progressively undermined by its strategic ties to two countries.
EMBRACING IRAN
In Moscow’s Mideast policy, no country matters more than Iran. Over the past three decades, Moscow and Tehran have formed a major partnership—one that so far has endured both September 11 and the expanding global crisis over Iran’s nuclear program.
The contemporary Russo-Iranian entente can be traced back to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which unleashed a wave of ethnic and religious separatism in Russia’s turbulent “southern rim” of Central Asia and the Caucasus and raised the prospect of Iranian interference there—something Moscow was eager to mitigate. Russia saw practical reasons for the partnership. Its defense industry had not weathered the post-Soviet transition well, and Iran—then emerging from a ruinous eight-year war with neighboring Iraq—promised to be a significant source of income for the battered Russian armaments sector. (One leading expert would later admit that Russia “should be grateful to Iran for having provided tens of thousands of Russian companies with 70 percent of their work.”) 14The resulting arrangement between Moscow and Tehran during the 1990s included a pledge of Russian sales of conventional arms (and later the sharing of nuclear know-how) to Iran in exchange for a tacit understanding that Tehran would steer clear of meddling in Russia’s near abroad.
Under the stewardship of Vladimir Putin, this partnership has strengthened yet further. In November 2000, in a public show of support for the Iranian regime, Russia officially abrogated the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement, under which Moscow had agreed to curtail new nuclear-related exports to the Islamic Republic. The importance of Russia’s ties with the Islamic Republic also became a feature of the foreign policy blueprint issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry that same year. 15
Despite the events of September 11 and the ensuing War on Terror, ties between Moscow and Tehran remain strong. Over the past several years, fears of a long-term Coalition presence in Eurasia (fanned by U.S. and allied activity in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Central Asia) have led Moscow and Tehran to begin discussions of a common political and security agenda for the post-Soviet space. 16Nuclear cooperation likewise continues, with Russian officials supporting Iran’s atomic effort in the face of mounting international concerns.
Yet this does not mean that Russia trusts Iran. Many Russian experts believe that the Islamic Republic could someday soon pose a real threat to their country. Officials like Andrei Kokoshin, the influential chairman of the Russian State Duma’s Defense Committee (and a former Russian National Security Advisor), and Alexei Arbatov, leader of Russia’s liberal “Yabloko” political faction, have publicly questioned the prudence of their country’s partnership with the Islamic Republic. 17So has Yevgeny Velikhov, the secretary of Russia’s Civic Chamber and the country’s top nuclear scientist. 18Indeed, today, the view that Iran cannot be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons is increasingly common among officials in Moscow. 19
Yet cooperation with Iran’s ayatollahs continues to be seen as necessary, for both practical and strategic reasons. Officials in Moscow are wary of severing ties with an increasingly capable Islamic Republic, and emphasize the need to maintain good relations with neighboring states. 20Indeed, Iran’s ability to stir up trouble on Russia’s periphery, or within Russia’s own restive Muslim regions, remains a real concern for policymakers in Moscow. 21As a result, Moscow has sought to keep the Iranian regime pacified—and peaceful—through economic and diplomatic outreach.
Trade with Iran also remains a boon to Russian industry. In the years after September 11, Russia’s vast energy sector—and the high world price of oil—helped fuel the country’s revival. Since the onset of the global financial crisis in late 2008, however, Russia’s economic fortunes have faded. Paradoxically, Iran’s nuclear program has provided a bit of assistance in this regard. Since Iran’s nuclear program broke into the open, there has been an explosion of interest in the atom in the greater Middle East, with at least fourteen countries in the Middle East and North Africa openly beginning to pursue some level of nuclear capability. 22
Russia, the world’s leading exporter of nuclear technology, has capitalized on this trend, inking nuclear cooperation deals with a number of these nations, including Algeria and Jordan. 23Russia’s conventional arms trade has benefited, too. Growing international concerns over Iran’s nuclear program has led to an upsurge in investments in arms and defenses in the already volatile Middle East. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, arms sales to the region rose by nearly 40 percent between 2004 and 2008, with Iran’s neighbors among the most active clients. 24As a result, Russia’s arms industry is now in the midst of a major expansion in the Middle East. 25In other words, Iran’s nuclear program has turned out to be very good for Russian business.