Two years later, Russia’s Defence Ministry issued a new defense concept outlining a more aggressive posture toward Russia’s “near abroad.” That document, known colloquially as the “Ivanov Doctrine” for its principal architect, then Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, instituted major changes to Russian military structure and force posture in order to better “protect and further Russian interests” in its zone of strategic influence. 23It was a not-so-subtle signal that, after a period of retrenchment, Moscow’s territorial appetite had again been whetted.
In this effort, Belarus, Russia’s closest economic and geopolitical ally, has received the lion’s share of attention. The idea of a formal union has been a fixture in relations between the two countries since Alexander Lukashenko rose to power in Minsk in 1994 on a platform of neo-Soviet nostalgia. His appeal was understandable; Belarus’s ten million citizens are all Slavs, mostly Russian Orthodox in religious belief and generally oriented toward Moscow in their political outlook. This viewpoint was formally codified in a 1995 Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation, which emphasized the “common historical experience” of the two countries, as well as their joint desire for “deeper integration.” 24
The years since have seen more than a dozen bilateral agreements on everything from military cooperation to easing customs barriers and even a formal union declaration in the late 1990s. But a real unification of the Russian and Belarusian systems has not taken place due to various disagreements over trade and energy issues and because Lukashenko himself likely understands that such a step would make him dispensable. 25Nevertheless, relations between the two countries remain close, and pro-unification sentiments abound on both sides of the border. 26So does the idea that Belarus’s integration into the Russian Federation remains simply a matter of time, since, as the prominent political scientist Samuel Huntington once noted, the country is “part of Russia in all but name.” 27
Russia’s relations with the other main territory that it covets are considerably more acrimonious. Ukraine holds a prominent place in Russian policy because of its historic role as an ancient seat of Russian power (and, more recently, as a Soviet holding), and because it continues to serve as a key transit point for Russia’s energy exports to Europe. Although the common border between the two countries was settled in the late 1990s, many in Russia still cannot bear the idea of an independent Ukraine. 28
As a result, the Kremlin has systematically worked to subvert democratic institutions, cultivate compliant political candidates, and resurrect a pro-Moscow political order in Kiev. This has proved to be complicated, however, because Ukraine is a country divided: the country’s eastern provinces are dominated by a Russian Orthodox population sympathetic to Russia, while its Western oblasts overwhelmingly look to Europe and the United States. This divide played out in the 2004 “Orange Revolution,” which saw a democratic outpouring—supported and sustained in the country’s west—upset the traditional pro-Russian status quo in Kiev with the election of pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko to the country’s presidency. (Ukraine’s eastern oblasts, by contrast, protested against the move, even unsuccessfully floating the idea of becoming an autonomous region.) 29
The revolt was a concrete challenge to Moscow, which responded with a campaign to undermine the fledgling Yushchenko government. Within less than five years, Ukraine’s pro-Western consensus had collapsed, torn apart by competing domestic political factions. What followed was a political reversal that ended in the restoration of Ukraine’s pro-Moscow orientation. 30
So the situation remains. Kiev’s current government, headed by pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovych, has once again adopted a friendly line toward Moscow, extending Russia’s lease to the strategic naval base at Stevastopol and codifying a close energy association that posits Russia as the senior partner. And while a strong sense of nationalism continues to predominate throughout Ukraine, sympathetic attitudes toward the idea of reintegration are not absent; one-fifth of Ukrainians now favor the unification of their country and Russia into one state. 31
PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES
Elsewhere, Russia took a major step in this general direction when it invaded neighboring Georgia in August 2008. The weeklong conflict was precipitated by the Georgian government’s increasingly assertive policies toward two autonomous territories in the country’s north, the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In Soviet times, both had enjoyed the anonymous status within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. When Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, it took the two areas along with it despite strong pro-independence sentiments in both. A series of skirmishes followed, culminating in the creation of an uneasy status quo whereby both South Ossetia and Abkhazia maintained functional independence but de jurewere part of the larger Georgian state.
That balance held until Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” of November 2003, which ousted long-serving pro-Moscow strongman Eduard Shevardnadze in favor of opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili. In the years that followed, Saakashvili’s government tacked west, improving relations with the United States and Europe while simultaneously distancing itself from Moscow. 32Relations with Russia deteriorated precipitously, culminating in Moscow’s decision to use force to protect South Ossetia when the Saakashvili government attempted to take over the region during the summer of 2008. 33
From the start, the conflict had a strong territorial character. Prior to Russia’s invasion, more than half of South Ossetia’s population of seventy thousand had accepted Moscow’s offer of Russian citizenship. Thereafter, the Kremlin argued that it was acting to protect the rights of those citizens. 34It did so; over the course of five days, Russia launched a large-scale ground offensive against Georgia, decisively defeating the Georgian military in numerous battles in the breakaway region and thereafter occupying multiple cities in the former Soviet Republic. 35
Mediation by the European Union ended the conflict, but Russia’s shadow continues to loom over Georgia. Under a 2010 agreement grudgingly agreed to by Tbilisi, Moscow is permitted to maintain two thousand troops at a base in South Ossetia—making the region a de facto military protectorate of the Russian Federation. 36Russia likewise has laid plans to build a permanent naval base in Abkhazia for its Black Sea fleet, cementing its long-term strategic presence there as well. 37As of September 2012, a part of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet had been deployed to Ochamshire, Abkhazia as part of this effort. 38
For their part, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have firmly ensconced themselves in Moscow’s orbit. In the wake of the 2008 conflict, both regions declared their independence from Georgia—a declaration that Russia promptly recognized. 39(Most of the rest of the world, by contrast, has not; today, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are recognized by just six and five member states of the United Nations, respectively.) 40
The reverberations have been felt in Tbilisi. Although Saakashvili handily won reelection in 2008, his popularity plummeted thereafter, at least in part because Georgians grew increasingly weary—and wary—of their country’s deeply acrimonious relationship with Russia. This internal discontent culminated in the ouster of Saakashvili’s government by a pro-Kremlin bloc in late 2012—and real movement toward a strengthening of ties between Tbilisi and Moscow since. 41