However brief, the incident represents more than a mere territorial skirmish. It was the first time that Moscow has attempted to use force to reclaim former territories (albeit indirectly) since the end of the Soviet era. And the outcome of the conflict has served to reward Russia’s urge for territorial expansion—and whet its appetite for still more.
THE LOGIC OF “GREATER RUSSIA”
Moscow’s interest in its former holdings is animated by more than imperial nostalgia. The historic yearning for forfeited territory is also bolstered by concrete socioeconomic calculations. To wit, policymakers in Moscow recognize that the addition of Belarus’s ten million citizens to the Russian Federation would increase Russia’s overall population by some 7 percent. The addition of Ukraine would do even more; ethnic Russians make up nearly 20 percent of Ukraine’s forty-five-million-person population, and if even part of the country were to formally vote in favor of annexation, the number of Russian citizens would swell significantly. If additional territories that are currently coveted by Moscow—including parts of neighboring Georgia and Kazakhstan—were added, that number would be higher still, significantly bolstering the Russian Federation’s flagging demographics in the process.
Today, in light of the decline of Russia’s Slavic population and the rise of its Muslim minority, the reclamation of lost lands has evolved from an aspiration to something resembling a strategic imperative. A recent article in the influential Literaturnaya Gazetaexplained it this way: “Russia as a sovereign unitary state can exist only as long as the state-forming Russian people, which support the unity of Russia, maintain an absolute majority in the population. The fewer the number of Russians, the lower their share in the population, the greater the chances of Russia breaking up into petty ‘independent’ [states].” 42
In other words, if Russia hopes to survive, it will need to assume an increasingly aggressive posture toward its former holdings in the years ahead.
CHAPTER TEN
MANAGING THE END OF RUSSIA
In March 2009, when the Obama administration’s outreach to Russia was still in its infancy, America’s chief diplomat made a major gaffe. Meeting in Geneva with her Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented him with a symbolic red button, meant to signify the “reset” of bilateral relations then being advocated publicly by President Obama.
But the button was mislabeled. In a glaring error of translation, it was inscribed with the Russian word peregruzka, meaning “overload,” rather than the correct term, perezagruzka(signifying a “reloading” or “rebooting” of affairs). Both Clinton and Lavrov were quick to laugh off the incident, but a significant message had inadvertently been sent.
A FAILED RESET . . . AND AFTER
In the years since, the “reset” with Russia—which has emerged as a centerpiece of the Obama administration’s foreign policy agenda—has followed a predictable, if disheartening, trajectory. On a number of tactical fronts, Moscow and Washington have indeed drawn considerably closer. In terms of strategic priorities, however, the two countries remain worlds apart.
Most concretely, Russia has become a major player in Coalition efforts in Afghanistan, assuming a key role in the U.S.-led effort there. Today, an estimated 60 percent of U.S. supplies to troops in Afghanistan arrive by air, road, or rail via Russian territory. 1Indeed, it would be fair to say that Moscow has helped sustain the War on Terror’s first front, even as America’s deteriorating relationship with Pakistan has progressively closed off traditional supply routes. As of March 2013, in excess of 2,200 flights, carrying 379,000 military personnel and 45,000 cargo containers, are estimated to have transited Russian territory en route to the Coalition in Afghanistan. 2
Russian assistance on this front, moreover, is expanding. In June 2012, the Russian government came to terms with NATO on a supplemental transit route through the Volga region. 3The move is deeply symbolic, given that the area is home to some 40 percent of Russia’s Muslim population. It also reflects an abiding self-interest: Moscow’s assistance, scholars note, has been rendered not “because of its love for the West.” Rather, it is because Russian leaders are deeply concerned over Afghanistan’s continued role as an incubator of Islamic extremism—and cognizant of the fact that, left unaddressed, the threat could easily migrate to exacerbate ethnic and sectarian tensions within the Russian homeland as well. 4
The two countries likewise have managed to revive their bilateral arms control dialogue, which remained moribund during the later years of the George W. Bush administration. In late 2010, over the objections of many in the U.S. Congress, the Obama administration concluded a new arms control framework agreement with the Russian government. That treaty, colloquially known as New START, was a strategic victory for Moscow, enshrining new bilateral reductions of nuclear arms in a formula that deeply favored the Russian Federation. 5It also provided a concrete affirmation to Moscow elites that Russia still mattered to official Washington—a not-inconsequential thing for a country preoccupied with its own global status. New START looks to be just the beginning; since ratification of the agreement, the two countries intensified their discussions about additional strategic reductions. 6
In service of the “reset,” Washington has also rolled back its commitment to missile defenses in Europe. In September 2009, the Obama administration unveiled a new missile defense policy, dubbed the “phased adaptive approach,” in which it abandoned its predecessor’s commitment to deploy early warning radars and interceptors in Poland and the Czech Republic in favor of a more graduated, four-phase plan to protect American allies (and eventually the U.S. homeland) from ballistic missile attacks from rogue states. 7But even that plan increasingly has come into question. At a summit in Seoul, South Korea, in March 2012, President Obama was accidentally captured on a microphone telling outgoing Russian president Dmitry Medvedev that he would have “greater flexibility” to negotiate over the shape of American missile defenses following his reelection to the U.S. presidency, which took place in November 2012. 8A year later, incoming Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that budgetary constraints and a rethinking of strategic priorities in the White House had led to a scrapping of the European component of the phased adaptive approach, which would have helped NATO build a missile architecture for Europe. 9
Russia and the United States also collaborate on an array of science and technology issues. In the aftermath of the Obama administration’s 2011 decision to scrap NASA’s space shuttle program, Russia has emerged as America’s de facto gateway to manned space, providing U.S. astronauts with transportation to the International Space Station. 10For the time being, at least, Russia seems both ready and willing to play that role. In March 2013, the Russian government codified plans to collaborate with the United States on space research through the end of the decade. 11Other issues, from cyber-warfare to nuclear research, are likewise the subjects of quiet bilateral cooperation. 12
Strategically, however, the “reset” rests upon very flimsy foundations. This is because it is overwhelmingly an expression of American political desires writ large (and those of the Obama administration in particular), rather than a true, deep strategic and ideological reorientation by both countries. Indeed, Russian president Vladimir Putin has said as much. In December 2012, as part of a major press conference in Moscow, he told reporters that “reset” was an American term and objective, rather than a Russian one. “Reset is not our word,” Putin said, “We didn’t see the need in it at all.” 13