It was after all an open secret that the French and British received reports about Germany’s Armed Forces from the Dutch General Staff, through its Intelligence Service. They had a very good source. He was Hans Oster, a Prussian Officer and a very influential major, but in counter-intelligence. He continually delivered to the Dutch Military Attaché in Berlin all the newest secret military plans made by Germany. However, he was always mistrusted by both the Dutch government and their Military Directorate. They could not envisage a Prussian officer betraying his fatherland and sacrificing the security of his comrades, but they used him, with reservations. One commander-in-chief, General Winkelman described him as a ‘wretched traitor’.
The ‘good’ relationship between Holland and Germany, as neighbours, suddenly clouded over. The German Secret Service kidnapped two very active British intelligence agents who were working in Venlo. They were whisked over the Dutch border into Germany in November 1939. They spent the rest of the war in a German prison. Meanwhile, Holland’s neutrality had been horribly damaged.
Although Churchill, then Minister for the Navy, had done his best to encourage the neutral states of Europe and the USA against the ‘Third Reich’, many retained their good relationships with Germany. Sweden enjoyed very many good business contracts with Germany, much to Britain’s annoyance. Its iron-ore, for instance, was being continually transported by ship, to the south, using the Norwegian port of Narvik. After receiving no response to close their port to such transport, the British Navy mined the Norwegian territorial waters.
A very critical situation then developed in Hitler’s headquarters. On one side there were those against extending the war in the north, but on the other side they were very dependent on the ore from Sweden. Secondly, Allied military bases there had to be avoided, at all costs. It was a race against time. Hitler won. He took the initiative on 9 April 1940 with his Weserubung campaign using his Wehrmacht. This ‘one-off campaign was brilliant in precision and audacity, being complimented with support from both Navy and Air Force. On his ‘journey to the north’ he beat Churchill by just a couple of hours, and occupied Narvik. Norway resisted, manning the 28cm calibre guns positioned in coastal batteries. But those were quickly overcome and the most important harbour was then occupied.
In the next few days there was hard fighting with French and British troops who had landed, supported by exiled Polish troops and joined by Norwegian units. General Eduard Dietl, with a very mixed bag of paratroopers, mountain troops and sailors surviving their ships being destroyed, held his position for weeks, despite the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. It was not until the beginning of June therefore that the Allies withdrew their troops and Norway capitulated. Germany’s ‘spring to the north’ was successful by a hair’s breadth in preventing the Allies landing. Both sides violated Norway’s neutrality.
The battle ‘under the heavens of the North Pole’ had ended successfully for Hitler, the Weserubung enforcing the undefended occupation of Denmark. Its government saw the uselessness of resistance and submitted to the forced ‘protection’ of the Greater Germany.
While Belgium and Holland waited for an invasion from their easterly neighbours, Germany was worried much more about the ‘compliance’ of its western neighbours. They had allowed the Allies to march through their land to the Ruhr, rather than wait for an independent attack from them. Germany had to combat that at all costs. Both those countries made efforts to contact the secret services of the Allies. It was not only those efforts that strengthened the assumptions of the German leaders, but also the predominantly one-sided defence measures directed towards the east. At a later date, that assumption proved to be correct.
Street plans could already be found in the department of National Defence, as to which main roads had to be evacuated for the smooth passage of French/British troop movements. Not only that, French regiments had already received provisional operation orders, in April 1940, for their advance through Belgium and Holland. The ‘Siegfried Line’, that wall of protection against France, was not quite completed. It ended at the Belgian/Dutch borders. The open flank offered itself as the area of concentration for the Allied Armed Forces.
It was Duff Cooper, later Minister for Information in Churchill’s cabinet, who said, “We cannot afford to have any scruples. We must take any step necessary, and without consideration of the neutrality of the land”. At the same time, in the House of Commons, Chamberlain declared, “The campaign can take place anywhere else, as in the north, and with far more power and results. We British can distribute our attacks as and when we wish”. Hitler decided not to give his enemies the chance of any initiative.
Plan ‘Yellow’ was being planned, designed to destroy the Allied Armed Forces within Europe, the main emphasis of that planned offensive being the ‘seam’ between France and Belgium, where the Maginot Line ended. To prevent the sequential access of the British into Holland, as in the case of Denmark, it had to be occupied. The breaking of ‘Rights of Neutrality’ were not considered by Germany, in view of the far from neutral behaviour, not only of Belgium, but of Holland as well. For the last time, and more than once in the evening before the offensive, the German Major from the Resistance informed the Dutch Military Attaché in Berlin, who in turn informed his government, of the exact time of the attack.
The Hague gave the alarm and the Army put their last defence arrangements into action. They blew up their bridges, built road barriers with felled trees, closed their ports, and ordered their ships out to sea where they could hopefully avoid an attack. Along the coastline submarines waited in ambush.
For the whole Western offensive, the Wehrmacht consisted of 89 divisions, amongst which were 10 Panzer divisions, with another 45 divisions as reserves. The Allies had 144 divisions, supported by Belgium and Holland, although with their deficiency of front-line experience, one cannot say that they could contribute much, their worth having been over-estimated. Although the German High Command held Holland to be a secondary theatre of war, 160 modern bombers and 240 fighters were to be used, in addition to transport planes. The Dutch Air Force as already mentioned, had a total of 170 machines, the majority obsolete. Their ground forces did not possess one combat tank which they could use against the Germans, not one.
CHAPTER 6
The War in the West
Hitler started his ‘Plan Yellow’ campaign to the west, with the following speech to his troops. “The hour has come, for you, which will decide Germany’s fate. Do your duty! Go with the blessing of the German people”.
On Friday 10May 1940, this major offensive took its course from the North Sea to the southern border of Luxembourg. Weather conditions had caused postponements on more than one occasion. The 19th Army, with its 22 divisions, was under the command of General George Kïchler. He had support from General Albert Kesselring’s Luftflotte 2, who positioned himself as the northern flank of the attacking force to the west, through Belgium to France. With the first morning light, at 5.30 am, German ‘summer time’, and in an early morning mist, the first advance troops marched over the eastern border of Holland.