The coming year would be very different from anything that had gone before. Attacks would be bigger, more widespread, and they would be repeated again and again until the destruction was total. Over the next six months the Americans built up their air force from eighty or so operating planes to a force of well over three hundred, and accumulated vital combat experience over targets in northern Europe. The British, meanwhile, began a relentless offensive against the industrial cities of the Ruhr. In March they hit the Krupps armament factory in Essen, causing severe damage to buildings and machinery. In May they devastated Dortmund and Wuppertal in quick succession, especially the latter, where a miniature firestorm consumed most of the city centre. In June they attacked Düsseldorf, starting fires that raged over forty square kilometres – twenty military installations were hit, seventy-seven companies put out of business, and 140,000 people were made homeless.
Germans all over the country noticed the increasing intensity of the bombing, and gossip flew from one city to the next. Wild estimates of the death tolls circulated: in Dortmund, they said, fifteen thousand people had been killed (the figure was actually around six hundred), in Düsseldorf seventeen thousand (in reality it was twelve hundred) and in Wuppertal twenty-seven thousand (actually 3,400). 19Worse than the numbers being touted were rumours about how people had died. Tales were told of victims being turned into living torches by the phosphorus bombs, or becoming stuck in the melted asphalt of the roads. Such rumours certainly reached Hamburg, but few who lived there truly believed that the same fate lay in store for their city. When British reconnaissance planes dropped leaflets claiming that Hamburg would be next, no one heeded them: even those Germans who thought the Nazis were doomed believed that Hamburg would be left largely intact, because the British and Americans would need the town and its harbour later on. 20Besides, propaganda leaflets had been dropped throughout the war, and few people paid much attention to them.
But Hamburg would indeed be next. Even while Dortmund and Düsseldorf were still reeling from their attacks, Harris issued an operations order in which he stated his intention ‘to destroy Hamburg’: ‘The “Battle of Hamburg” cannot be won in a single night. It is estimated that at least 10,000 tons of bombs will have to be dropped to complete the process of elimination. To achieve the maximum effect of air bombardment this city should be subjected to sustained attack.’ Moreover, having learned that fire was the best weapon, Harris ordered that most of the bombers should carry ‘maximum economic incendiary loads’ to saturate the fire services of the city. 21
Harris expressed the hope that the Americans would join in with the bombing of Hamburg, but it was not up to him to make that decision. Until now the USAAF had never bombed a target that the British had bombed the previous night – it was deemed too dangerous – and ‘round-the-clock bombing’ had been merely a theory, not a reality. But the Americans also had their eye on Hamburg. The city contained many targets that they considered high priority, including aircraft-parts factories and submarine builders. US planes had tried to attack the city at the end of June, but had been forced back by heavy cloud. Now, weather permitting, they would be all too happy to join the RAF, and when General Eaker issued the order to attack the Blohm & Voss shipyards on the banks of the Elbe, Hamburg’s fate was sealed.
It must be said that not everyone on the Allied side was happy about this new target. Shortly before the attack took place Sir Henry Tizard, the brilliant academic who was responsible for creating the British radar network, wrote to the Prime Minister expressing his misgivings about the proposed series of raids. He was an outspoken critic of many aspects of British bombing policy, and doubted that the war could ever be won by bombing alone. He was particularly unhappy about the prospect of destroying Hamburg, a city that he believed was essential to keep intact so that it could be used to administer Germany after the invasion: ‘Hamburg is anti-Russian, anti-Prussian and anti-Nazi. It may well be soon, if not already, anti-war. Apart from submarine construction and shipping, generally it is not industrially important. It is a centre of commerce rather than of production. It is a very important port and might therefore be much more useful to us alive than dead.’ 22
Churchill did not agree, and neither did the Chief of Air Staff. In a strongly worded rebuttal, Sir Charles Portal pointed to the numerous industrial, chemical, transportation and engineering targets within the port. ‘It seems abundantly clear that Hamburg is much more than a dormant centre of peace-time commerce,’ he said, ‘and, if so, I certainly do not think we should refrain from bombing it.’ 23
Tizard’s suggestion was rejected: the bombing of Hamburg would go ahead as planned. The final piece of the jigsaw was a codename for the series of attacks, and the one they eventually settled upon was ‘Operation Gomorrah’. The symbolic implication of the title was clear: God’s power to rain down fire and destruction upon the earth now lay in man’s hands, and was being wielded in what the British establishment saw as just retribution for the damage that the Luftwaffe had caused during the Blitz.
8. The British Plan
Technology is making gestures precise and brutal, and with them men.
It expels from movements all hesitation, deliberation, civility.
Theodor W. Adorno 1
On the morning of 24 July 1943, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris arrived at Bomber Command Headquarters in High Wycombe at his usual time of 9.00 a.m. At the base of a large grassy mound, guarded by sentries, was a doorway that led to the enormous underground Operations Room. Harris made his way into the bunker, and took his seat at the desk in the midst of the room. Behind him a huge board listed the available crews and aeroplanes, squadron by squadron, while on either side were great wall maps of Europe and a target priority list of dozens of cities and objectives. Around the table stood a dozen or so others: Harris’s deputy commander-in-chief, Sir Robert Saundby; the meteorological officer, Magnus Spence; the senior air staff officer and his deputy; naval and army liaison officers; and various representatives of Intelligence and Operations. That day an American VIP was also present: Brigadier-General Fred Anderson, the commander of the USAAF’s bomber force in Britain.
The routine at Bomber Command HQ was well established. Normally there would be a brief report of the previous night’s operations, followed by a weather report from Spence. Apart from Harris, Spence was probably the most important man at the meeting, and his reports on the movements of various weather fronts across Europe were essential when it came to choosing the following night’s targets. Having listened to his summary, Harris would select two or three and, with a hasty shuffling of folders and photographs among his staff, the possibilities would be laid out on the table before him. There was rarely any discussion over what the target should be: Harris ran the meeting, and the decision was unequivocally his. After he had examined the folders, he would make a final decision, and the meeting would draw rapidly to a close. Harris would return to his office, and his subordinates would set about putting the operation in motion. 2
That morning, however, everyone knew what the target was likely to be – weather permitting. The attack on Hamburg had been scheduled for two days now, but had been cancelled twice because a bank of heavy cloud was moving south towards the city. Now, as Spence laid out the weather charts on the table and began to explain the conditions, it became evident that the weather was at last good enough to go ahead. Harris studied the charts, then gave the order to proceed as planned. Moments later he rose from the chair, leaving the other members of the team to telephone through his decision to the Pathfinder Force, the bomber groups, the army, the navy and Fighter Command. General Anderson would take the news back to the USAAF headquarters at Wycombe Abbey. Operation Gomorrah was on.