I received additional training in radar theory from the NCS and supplementary courses were taught by contractors and local universities such as George Washington University. This was coupled with training in the lab using data that was intercepted by various collection sites. The work came easily to me as I was able to use my maths skills in all aspects of radar signals analysis.
My job involved determining radar signal characteristics, reporting new signal parameters through ELINT technical reports (ELTs) and updating databases. Radars were often detected undergoing modification and performing calibration tests, and on rare occasions we observed and reported malfunctioning radars. These intercepts could provide information not normally observed and they sometimes led to a better understanding of the radar’s modes of operation.
New operating modes required reporting in order to update various databases such as the ELINT Parameter Limits (EPL) listing. A book of some thickness, this listing allowed collectors around the world to quickly and correctly identify a radar emission based on its signal parameters. The military needed the most current radar performance data to help counter and defeat various weapon systems by using electronic ‘jamming’ techniques—a field of electronic warfare known today as electronic attack. NSA is particularly interested in electronic countermeasure development against weapon systems that pose a threat to the US military, and their analysis results are used extensively by major Defense contractors within the ‘countermeasure’ development community. The Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming (EWIR) database contained radar information provided by NSA analysts, and this database required updating whenever weapon systems underwent modification or when new weapon systems appeared. Combat engineers used it to program the radar warning receivers (RWRs) of fighter aircraft, ground forces, and naval ships. RWRs are a key component in defence against the many lethal types of weapons available to America’s adversaries.
I enjoyed the learning and challenge provided by the type of work I was doing. Outside work, I was getting to know my colleagues on a different level by involving myself in various sports such as softball, volleyball and racquetball. After work, we often went to a local sports pub, Champions, to unwind with a well-deserved beer after spinning tapes and writing reports all day. I also regularly travelled to nearby Washington DC to visit the capital’s historic buildings. Maryland wasn’t a bad place to live when the weather was pleasant, and when I wasn’t generating reports the beaches provided a place to escape during the summer months.
Meanwhile, my career at the NSA was progressing and I was selected, along with six other colleagues, to take part in a one-week overseas conference in ████████████████, a country with a controversial history and which had become closely aligned with the United States. This was my first overseas trip for the agency and I was eager to gain the experience. We went there to brief our counterparts on our analysis findings of radars and weapon systems of interest that were deployed in a neighbouring country. They also briefed us on their analysis findings and collaborated on collection tasking for those weapon systems that were of high priority for the defence of our allies. We were also taken on a tour of a specially configured aircraft used for collecting ELINT during overflights of this area, learning how this aircraft was configured for this sensitive mission. Another highlight was visiting many of the historical tourist sites and sampling the great beers and food found in this region of Europe. The discussions were successful for both parties, but it was still a turbulent time in Europe as communism would soon begin to crumble and new democracies gain power. These fundamental changes were later reflected in where the agency focused its intelligence priorities. The world was rapidly changing and would quickly become very different to what it had been when I joined the NSA.
I received my first promotion to Grade 9 in 1987 and by then I was an experienced ELINT analyst, mentoring new arrivals into W22. I was also given the opportunity to learn how our counterparts in the Science & Technology centres used their skills to exploit captured or bought weapon systems through their involvement in specialised government research and development. I travelled to the National Air Intelligence Centre at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, for an orientation on foreign airborne radars. This type of hands-on training was invaluable as it showed us the hardware that generated the radar signals we routinely analysed in the lab. Handling the actual radar antenna used by certain aircraft helped fuel my passion for the world of ELINT and kept me motivated as I assessed the performance of various threat radar systems.
In addition to reporting newly discovered radar capabilities, I wanted to attend and present my analysis findings at the various ELINT technical conferences, and management encouraged me to take part in the yearly conferences on radar signals from naval, land-based, airborne, SAMs and unidentified sources. I had already taken the mandatory course on briefing skills and was confident in my ability to represent my office at these conferences. They also provided me with an opportunity to meet several contractors and government colleagues who briefed their analysis results of signals that I also analysed. This helped broaden my perspective of the intelligence community as I was introduced to representatives of other government intelligence agencies and some of the major signal analysis contractors such as Radian and Quest. These contractors and many others made a small fortune supporting the signals intelligence business.
In late 1988 I was offered and accepted a supervisor position in the Landbased Signals Panel, W223, managing the work of three analysts and being responsible for helping with their career development. My new role exposed me primarily to early warning and air traffic control radar signals. I enjoyed my new management responsibilities but I also retained my signal analysis duties, making me a ‘working supervisor’ with both management and technical aspects to my work. As a supervisor, I needed to comprehend a broader perspective of the agency and I was selected to go on a three-day orientation to an overseas intercept site. Each year, one or two analysts were selected to receive firsthand experience of how this particular site functioned. I looked forward to learning the finer details of signals collection from what my office regarded as the premier signals intercept facility in the world. The trip was rewarding as it greatly helped my understanding of the agency’s global capabilities and aided in my understanding of what we could include in our formal tasking requests to this site.
When I returned from overseas, I prepared for a trip to California along with a few other analysts. We were to attend a course on radar stealth technology by Northrop-Grumman, developer of the B-2 Stealth Bomber. Stealth technology had been making headlines after years of research, and the United States led the way with the B-2 and F-117 Stealth attack aircraft. These aircraft could theoretically penetrate Soviet airspace virtually undetected by existing Russian radars, and this threat led the Soviets to incorporate advanced radar signals and signal processing techniques into their early-warning radars, enhancing ███████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ that used older Moving Target Indicator (MTI) signal processing.
Moving Target Detector (MTD) signal processing was relatively new technology that significantly improved the ‘detectability’ of targets that have a low-radar cross-section—a target’s effective area that reflects the transmitted signal back to the radar. Since MTD technology was being incorporated into the Soviet Union’s early warning radars, my panel needed to know how effectively these improved radars performed against the United States’ stealth aircraft.