From this changed situation, Khrushchev drew certain conclusions. He said, “In these circumstances the Leninist precept certainly remains in force that, so long as imperialism exists, the economic basis giving rise to wars will continue to exist. That is why we must display the greatest vigilance. … But war is not fatalistically inevitable. Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war, and if they actually do try to start it, to deliver a smashing rebuff to the aggressors and frustrate their adventurist plans.”[12]
Another part of the speech that the Chinese leaders found disturbing was Khrushchev’s discussion of the “road to power.” The CPSU Secretary-General said that “the question arises whether it is possible to make the transition to Socialism by parliamentary means. No such course was open to the Russian Bolsheviks, who were the first to effect this transition. … Since then, however, the historical situation has undergone radical changes which make possible a new approach to the question. … The present situation offers the working class in a number of capitalistic and former colonial countries the conditions needed to secure fundamental social changes. In the countries where capitalism is still strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal, the reactionary forces will, of course, inevitably offer serious resistance. There the transition to Socialism will be attended by a sharp revolutionary struggle.”[13]
Khrushchev’s “secret speech” to the 20th CPSU Congress was dedicated to an extensive denunciation of Stalin, and the Chinese did not react strongly against “de-Stalinization,” at least in public. An editorial in People’s Daily conceded that Stalin had made many “errors,” but mainly near the end of his life. It said, “A series of victories and the eulogies which Stalin received in the latter part of his life turned his head. … He began to put blind faith in personal wisdom and authority. … As a result, some of the policies and measures he adopted were often at variance with objective reality. He often stubbornly persisted in carrying out these mistaken measures over long periods and he was unable to correct his mistakes in time.”[14] However, as the Chinese were to indicate on many occasions thereafter, they continued to consider themselves Stalinists.
Later in 1956, there was an upheaval in Poland, with the selection of a new Politburo headed by Wladislaw Gomulka, who had been purged at Stalin’s direction and had only recently been released from jail. Khrushchev headed a delegation that rushed to Warsaw, and Soviet troops stationed in Poland were ordered to prepare to march on Warsaw. However, after extended conversations with Gomulka, Khrushchev agreed not to interfere further, and ordered Soviet troops back to their bases.[15]
The Chinese party leaders played what was perhaps a decisive role in the Polish situation. About a month earlier, Edward Ochab, then Secretary-General of the Polish party, had been in Peking, where he had an extended conference on “the future of Poland” with Mao Tse-tung and Anastas Mikoyan, who, like Ochab, was a fraternal delegate to the 8th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. According to O. Edmund Clubb, “on that occasion Mao seemingly threw his support to Ochab against Mikoyan. The Polish delegation returned home with assurances of Chinese support in the event of conflict with the CPSU.”[16]
When the crisis came in Poland, the Chinese did become involved. “In later official statements the Chinese party revealed that it had intervened in this crisis, and had advised the Soviet leaders against using force, and also against calling an international Communist conference to condemn the Polish party.”[17] O. Edmund Clubb concluded, “It would appear probable that the Soviet leaders took judicious account of the Chinese support for Warsaw when they made their decision to stop short of using force to maintain in Poland the Stalinist pattern rejected for Soviet domestic affairs.”[18]
About the same time these events were transpiring in Poland, an even more serious crisis developed in Hungary. Imre Nagy, who had been head of the Hungarian party following Stalin’s death, and then had been removed, was returned to power.
Faced then with a massive uprising of the Hungarian people-who tore down Stalin’s statue and lynched secret police officers, among other things-Nagy did two things that the Soviet regime would not then permit any East European Communist regime to do. He ended the Communist Party’s monopoly of power by forming a coalition government with several hitherto illegal parties, and on October 31, he informed Anastas Mikoyan that Hungary was going to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.[19] The Soviet Army, which had previously withdrawn from Hungary, returned in force and overthrew the Nagy government, installing a new one headed by Janos Kadar.
The Chinese attitude on Hungary was in sharp contrast to its posture on Poland. It strongly urged Khrushchev to suppress the Hungarian uprising. According to Keesing’s Research Report, “Later Chinese statements revealed that this reversal of policy had been carried out on Chinese advice, and alleged that Mr. Khrushchev had adopted a vacillating attitude and had only with great difficulty been persuaded by the Chinese Government to ‘go to the defence of the Hungarian revolution.’”[20]
Mao Tse-tung at the Fortieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution
These disagreements between the Soviet and Chinese leaderships in 1956 were not revealed until several years later, when open conflict between the two parties broke out. Nor was a significant debate that took place in November 1957, on the occasion of the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, revealed at the time. Mao Tse-tung headed the Chinese delegation to Moscow on that occasion. After the ceremonies, there was a meeting of delegations of twelve Communist parties, including those of the USSR and China.
That meeting drew up a declaration that said: “The main content of our epoch is the transition from capitalism to socialism, which was begun by the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. … The question of war or peaceful coexistence is now the crucial question of world policy. … At the present time the forces of peace have grown to such an extent that there is a real possibility of averting wars. … The Communist and Workers’ Parties taking part in the meeting declare that the Leninist principle of peaceful co-existence of the two systems ‘socialist’ and ‘capitalist’… is the sound basis of the foreign policy of socialist countries and the dependable pillar of peace and friendship among the peoples.”[21]