Aidit explained the theoretical basis of the strategy and tactics of the PKI under his leadership. He said, “The CPI has advanced the theory that there are three forces existing in Indonesia, namely, the progressive force, the middle force, and the diehard force. … The Party’s line towards these three forces is to develop the progressive force, unite with the middle force and isolate the diehard force. While uniting with the middle force, the Party also conducts struggles against it. The Party unites with the middle force in order to oppose imperialism and feudalism. But the Party struggles against this middle force if it wants to weaken the independence of the Party and of the working people’s movement or if it wavers in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism.”[738]
In the early 1960s, according to Aidit, the Communists were agitating “for the formation of a Gotong Royong cabinet with NASAKOM as its fulcrum.” It was explained that Gotong Royong was “an expression signifying all forces working together in unity,” and that NASAKOM “expresses the unity between the three main political trends in Indonesian society: NAS, Nationalists; A, religious groups; KOM, Communists.”[739]
The PKI also endorsed the “five principles,” or Pantjasila, that President Sukarno had put forward soon after establishment of the Indonesian Republic. Aidit commented on this that “Another concept which also reflects national unity and NASAKOM unity is embodied in Pantjasila or the Five Principles. The five principles are: 1) Belief in One God; 2) Humanism or Internationalism; 3) Nationalism or Patriotism; 4) Democracy; and 5) Social Justice. The CPI supports and upholds Pantjasila in spite of the fact that one of the principles is ‘Belief in One God,’ because Pantjasila combines the various trends existing in society, rather than tries to replace the philosophy of those who support it. The Party, therefore, resolutely opposes the attempts of some people to make one of the Five Principles the chief one. Pantjasila must be accepted as a whole, and as a whole it is a means of unity. This point is frequently stressed by President Sukarno, the sponsor of Pantjasila.”[740]
In view of what happened about two years later, it is important to note what D. N. Aidit had to say about the Indonesian Army, when speaking before a meeting in Peking in September 1963. He said, “Today there are no enemy armed forces in Indonesia; there are only armed forces of the republic of Indonesia which were born shortly after World War II in the anti-fascist struggle and the national democratic revolution. In building these forces, the working class and the CPI played an important role. They are not reactionary armed forces. It can be seen from their inception that they have been anti-fascist, democratic and anti-imperialist in character. The duty of the CPI is, therefore, to closely unite the people and the armed forces, so that in any crisis the armed forces, or their greater part, will stand firmly on the side of the people and revolution.”[741]
The apparent closeness of the CPI to President Sukarno was indicated in a comment by Aidit in May 1965 at the celebration of the forty-fifth anniversary of the Communist Party of Indonesia. He said, “Among us… is Bung Karno, Brother Sukarno. The clear sky above is witness to it. Thousands of eyes see him. Millions of people are listening to him on the radio and watching on their TV screens. … Sukarno’s portrait hangs beside those of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.”[742]
The PCI and the Sino-Soviet Split
As the split between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties became more and more clear after 1959, the Communist Party of Indonesia sought desperately not to take sides. In March 1963, the CPI sent letters to both the Soviet and the Chinese parties that started, “Dear Comrades! The eyes and hearts of the proletariat, the laboring people and Progressives of all countries turn toward your two parties. They are full of hope and believe that your two parties will fulfill their hopes.”[743]
In 1963, D. N. Aidit told a group at the Party School of the Kwangtung Provincial Committee in Canton, China, “I am making this trip abroad at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Besides visiting the Soviet Union and China, I have visited Cuba and the German Democratic Republic.”[744]
Earlier in that month, Aidit had talked before the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. There he had made a strong plea for the unity of the International Communist Movement. He started this part of his discourse by saying, “If we talk about the international communist movement, it is for no other purpose than strengthening the unity of the movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.”[745]
Aidit commented, “It is quite natural that there are differences of opinion in the international communist movement which includes more than ninety Marxist-Leninist parties led by thousands of Central Committee members. This is particularly so since many comrades like to exaggerate the differences rather than give priority to the identity of views. They do not put principal questions first and cannot restrain themselves when another Communist Party holds different views on questions which are not basic, or on basic questions, but the settlement of which can be postponed. The imperialists and revisionists, of course, utilize this situation to aggravate these differences and for the time being they have succeeded in causing a rift in the international communist movement.”[746]
A bit later, when he attacked “revisionists,” he used only the Yugoslavs as an example. He concluded his discussion of “revisionism” by saying, “Therefore, as is stressed in the 1960 Statement, it remains our obligatory task resolutely to expose the modern revisionists, Yugoslavia.”[747]
Aidit stressed the “independent attitude” of the CPI in the face of the Sino-Soviet split. He said, “It is the policy of the CPI to put all the available material on the international communist movement within the reach of all, in order that they can use the approach of the CPI to the questions of the international Communist movement to study and discuss this material in a critical spirit.”[748]
The Indonesian Secretary-General appealed to the Chinese and Soviet parties to overcome their differences. He said, “You comrades are already quite familiar with the attitude of the CPI towards the current problem in the international communist movement. The CPI was one of the first Marxist-Leninist parties to propose that talks be held between the Soviet and Chinese parties. We are therefore glad that talks between the Soviet and Chinese Parties were held in July, and that they were not terminated but will be resumed in the future. Since we are aware of the seriousness of the questions at issue and their essence, we do not hope for more than this.”[749]
Splintering of the PKI after October 1965
After the virtual liquidation of the Indonesian Communist Party, what was left of it, largely in exile, split into rival factions, a pro-Soviet group based in Moscow and a pro-Chinese one operating in both Peking and Tirana, Albania. Within the country, an underground organization was apparently reestablished, aligned with the Chinese faction, but it was liquidated by government forces in 1968.
Jay B. Sorenson, writing in the Far Eastern Economic Review in June 1969, recounted what happened to the underground group. He said, “In the spring of 1967 it had become clear Peking was helping the remnants of the scattered and outlawed PKI to reorganize. Beginning in the spring of 1967 they began to regroup in Eastern Java and apparently were planning a Vietnamtype guerrilla war. Peking at the time gave constant encouragement with frequent radio and news broadcasts, and called for ‘revolutionary armed struggle’ in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Java. Mid-1968 attempts to fan uprisings in rural areas were hailed in Peking as ‘victorious’ application of Mao’s strategy of struggle in the countryside. Through the PKI campaign of insurgency, China delineated a policy toward the Suharto regime; unlike Moscow, Peking did so in disregard of caution and of any improved relations with Djakarta it might have sought as an Asian power.”
742
Quoted in “How Maoist Strategy Sabotaged Indonesian Revolution,”