Halsey ordered Spruance to detach Lexington and send it to Pago Pago immediately. Then he told Ziggy to head northwest towards Efate, just in case the enemy got any ideas about intervening there. He would take Taffy 11 northeast, hoping to further cover the Fijis, and that move would present Yamamoto with a most difficult decision.
When the Admiral got the news from Hara, he could read well enough between the lines. His old warhorse had been defeated. The list of damaged ships was piling up, and it seemed likely that one or two of those carriers, most likely Junyo and Gozo Kiryu, might sink. He was still a full day’s sailing from the chosen landing site at Vanua Levu, with Yamato cruising like a massive iron fortress, surrounded by all those troop ships. One of his transports, the Teisin Maru, was leaking oil and darkening the sea with a wide black stripe. That would lead any spying plane right to his ships. Reports were still showing enemy carriers between 400 and 500 miles to his southwest, and he realized now that he would have no carrier cover if he persisted.
This attack cannot proceed, he realized. I am carrying the entire 3rd Infantry Division, and it will be completely exposed. Even if I did manage to reach the landing site, it would be subject to attack by all the American land based planes, and then those carriers…. The only thing to do now is to turn speedily about, and hope to get north before those carriers can close the range. We have obviously taken a severe tactical defeat here, and now my next order converts that into a strategic loss as well. Yet there is nothing else to do. The invasion fleet must withdraw.
That order was given, and Yamamoto could now thank the weather gods that had so confounded his pilots that day. Hopefully, the thick clouds would cover his retreat. Admiral Nagumo was ordered to leave Gozo Kiryu with a small destroyer escort and take the remainder of his fleet directly to Truk. Hara and Yamaguchi would take their ships back to Rabaul.
Troops suddenly come in great abundance, thought Yamamoto, but this engagement has changed the entire strategic picture if I cannot get them into battle. Our offensive was completely blunted, a dented sword that had to be sheathed before it could even join with the enemy. 3rd Division will now sit on Rabaul, and quite frankly, I doubt that I can cover it for any further offensive operations in the foreseeable future. Operation Suriyoko was over.
The journey home simply got darker the next day, when Yamamoto was informed that the Americans had safely reinforced Efate with yet one more regiment of their Marines, and that Luganville had been struck by carrier planes, the airfield there severely damaged, and the air wing depleted. The brave stand of Vicksburg and Gettysburg had protected 8th Marines, when all of Yamamoto’s fleet could not protect 3rd Infantry and allow it to reach its landing beaches. It would come to be called the Battle off Yasawa, the long string of islands off the Fijis that marked the mid-point between the two opposing carrier forces, and it was a clear American victory.
There would be many lessons learned from that battle, on both sides. The Americans would realize that their new Essex Class carriers had finally achieved parity with the enemy, and now, with so many Japanese carriers reported hit, Nimitz and Halsey would begin to feel that the US Navy was top dog for the first time in the war. The performance of the new F6 Hellcats was deemed to be superb, and the US dive bomber squadrons received commendations for both bravery and newfound skill.
Strategically, Halsey now believed he could defend all the turf the Allies now held in the Pacific, and stop any further enemy offensives. In fact, because of Yasawa, New Zealand felt secure enough to again release its veteran 2nd Infantry Division for deployment to Persia, and that would make a big difference in that campaign. The US had control of southern New Caledonia, and with the delivery of 8th Marine Regiment, they would now outnumber the Japanese on Efate two to one, and with much better troops. Nimitz also still had the entire 1st USMC Division in the bank at Pago Pago, and was slowly mustering the transports to move them. The fact that he had this division in hand, with carriers that could defend its transit to a new objective, put the real fear into Yamamoto.
Yet compared to the catastrophe that was Midway in the old history, this battle was not such a severe blow to Japan. While many carriers were hit and damaged, almost all of them would make it safely to a friendly port, except Junyo and Gozo Kiryu, which both sunk on the 21st of March as they struggled homeward. Perhaps it was to bolster morale, but the Japanese circulated the rumor that the battle had been a draw, claiming they had sunk the Lexington, even though Halsey knew it was safe at Pago Pago, and needed only six days repairs to the hull.
The Japanese had plenty of work to do at pierside. Akagi would need 38 days repair, and some of her damage to the hull and engines was going to eventually require a trip home to Japan. Hiyo would need only 23 days work, as would Tosa when that ship reached Truk. So by the end of March, Halsey had all his carriers intact, save for Gettysburg, which would be laid up at Suva for some time. But the Japanese would be missing two carriers, particularly Junyo, and need to wait into mid to late April to get back Akagi and Tosa.
One lesson that both Hara and Nagumo could agree upon was that the toughness of ships like Taiho and the battle carrier Ryujin made a big difference. Both those two ships took bomb damage, but simply shrugged off the hits and kept operating. It put in their minds that the big fleet carriers they had relied on at the outset of the war were much too fragile, and that they would need to get more ships like Taiho if they were to win this war.
This changes everything, thought Yamamoto. The troops on Fiji are now withering on the vine, two of the best divisions in the Army, and I cannot reinforce there for at least a month, let alone land on Vanua Levu to continue to contest those islands. I will be lucky to cover supply runs to Fiji, Efate, and New Caledonia, and our position on Espiritu Santo at Luganville is now very precarious. The Army will now lord it over me, and berate the navy, saying that their gift of five divisions promised to the South Pacific region is sorely wasted. I suppose they will, at long last, have a point.
Morale will be very low when we return to Rabaul. I must do something to bolster the troops. Perhaps I should arrange a tour of all our bases in the Solomons, for they will most likely become the next front if we cannot hold out in the New Hebrides.
He did not know it, but that idea was a dark shadow that could threaten to end his life. He had died while conducting just such a tour, ambushed by American fighters on the 18th of April, 1943. If time and fate had their way, the Admiral had only three weeks left to live.
Then he received two cryptic messages, right in the midst of all this turmoil. One from Admiral Nagano, as he was surprised to learn that Captain Harada and Takami never arrived at Yokohama. Then, not two hours later, the special communications equipment given to him by Harada lit up aboard Yamato. It was the very man he needed to speak to, and he would receive some most unusual news….