The reasons for the failure of the rebellion remain to be examined. The rebel forces were doubtless far inferior to the Roman in military qualities, training and discipline. But their ability should not be underestimated: the evidence already summarized indicates that the Cyrenean insurgents probably underwent a period of physical and military training in the desert regions for a number of years, and the possibility should not be discounted that a number of Egyptian Jews received similar training. Nor should it be forgotten that no small part of the Jews of Egypt and Libya were cultivators whose forefathers had served for generations in the Ptolemaic armies and had earned their livelihood as military settlers under the same dynsties. The Libyan Jews’ march across the desert from Cyrenaica to Egypt itself testifies to physical endurance and organized morale. The route had been traversed in ancient times by the armies of Egypt (Apries) and Persia — twice in the reign of Arkesilaos II (see pp. 26-7), — also by the forces of Magas and Euergetes II. In that period the coastal plain was better settled than it is today; the winter rain collects in rock-basins, and ancient cisterns are to be found in considerable numbers along the coastal belt.[1812] The season would also have facilitated the march, for Lucuas’ men moved on Egypt in the rainy season of the early months of 116. In 1805 an American force 600 strong under the command of Captain William Eaton made the march from Alexandria to Bomba in eastern Cyrenaica, albeit with much privation, in thirty days.[1813] The overthrowing of the inner columns of the Temple of Zeus and of the outer peristasis of the Temple of Apollo in the Sanctuary of Cyrene, required technical skill,[1814] and implies a degree of organized effort exerted on a considerable scale. The general impression is, indeed, that the Jews of Libya acted as the spearhead of the entire movement. Unlike them or the Jews of the Egyptian countryside, on the other hand, the Jews of Alexandria lacked a military tradition and probably had received no moral preparation for the struggle; they were the attacked, not the attackers, and their combat methods were probably those of men experienced in rioting and street-fighting.
In the light of the events we have portrayed, therefore, we may conclude that it was the Jews of Cyrene and the Egyptian countryside who acted in a coordinated fashion according to a prepared plan; the same is perhaps to be assumed with regard to the Jews of Cyprus, but we know nothing of their military conditions. It is still more difficult to determine whether some sort of coordination developed between the Jews of Cyrene and Egypt on the one hand, and those of Cyprus on the other.[1815]
If we endeavour to formulate the strategic object of the Jews of Cyrene and Egypt, then, it was directed to achieving two aims: first, the liquidation of lesser resistance at the enemy’s weakest point, Cyrene, and the establishment of contact with the strongest Jewish centre outside Judaea, that is, Egypt, which was also a vital crossroads and the base of Rome’s corn supply. The aim of the second stage was to annihilate with united forces the Roman garrison of Egypt, which had been weakened in 115-116 by the despatch of a detachment of the III legion Cyrenaica to Mesopotamia and Judaea.[1816]
The second stage of the Jewish plan was the most crucial, as on its success depended the insurgents’ ability to capture Alexandria and to seize control of the sea, in order to pass on swiftly to Eretz Yisrael. The Jewish victory in Cyrenaica may have given the Jews control of the adjacent sea, if Apollonia was taken, while, as we have noted, the revolt perhaps affected Jaffa, and Jews seem to have crossed from Cyprus to Syria and Judaea. But such control of the sea would have been far from complete, as witness the fact that most of the insurgents reached Egypt from Cyrenaica by land across the desert.
It may be supposed that the inhibiting factor was the Roman fleet — the classis Alexandrina, stationed at Alexandria.[1817] The capture of the city would have enabled the Jews to close the seaways and cut off the corn supply, so starving the capital of the Empire. The fighting may indeed have affected this supply adversely for a period, since an inscription[1818] commemorates T. Flavius Macer, curator frumenti comparandi urbis factus a divi Traiano Augusto, which may reflect a corn shortage in Egypt known to have existed in 99, but might equally have been the result of measures taken due to the war situation between the years 115-118. But the Jewish plan to capture the city of Alexandria, if it existed, was frustrated, and this was the vital failure of the rising.
The Jews of Alexandria did not seize the initiative when the moment was ripe, perhaps due to the opposition of their comfortable classes; doubtless they were also influenced by the proximity of the Roman garrison and by memory of past failures.
The failure in Alexandria produced two grave consequences: the Jewish advance upon Judaea was stopped, and the Roman forces in Syria were able to mount a counter-attack by sea at a time chosen by themselves. The rebels’ plan required the swift liquidation of the imperial forces in Egypt — in order to concentrate as large as possible a force in Eretz Yisrael for the decisive struggle with the principal Roman armies. This aim explains the consistent Jewish policy of annihilation carried out towards the Greeks and Romans equally, and the method of “scorched earth” followed in Cyrenaica and Egypt, the object of which was to leave no effective opposition in the rear. A sea-crossing would have ensured the success of this operation, but Alexandria remained untaken and the battle for the Delta crossroads near Memphis ended with defeat. Further, the resistance in the remaining districts of Egypt exceeded what was anticipated. Fighting continued along the entire Nile valley in the form of local engagements, and it would seem that the insurgents failed, due to the great distances over which the struggle was waged, to concentrate enough force at one point to bring the contest to a decision before the legions advanced to join the battle. Characteristic of this situation was the far-flung fighting between the two remote poles of Memphis and the Thebais, — if the latter theatre may be regarded as the outcome of an attack by activists who had crossed from Cyrenaica by the oases of the western desert. This division and dispersion of the rebel forces must be counted among the factors of the Jewish failure.
1813
Bates,
1814
The columns of the peristasis of the Temple of Zeus at Cyrene are now known to have been overthrown in the Christian period (see p. 352), but the inner columns of the naos suffered in 115-117. For the Temple of Apollo, whose outer columns were overthrown in 115-117, See p. 275.
1815
The question arises whether the naval monument in the agora of Cyrene which takes the form of a warship’s prow surmounted by a female figure, commonly thought to be Nike, has any connection with the Jewish revolt. The monument was found in 1929, but its base was located only during the excavations conducted after the Second World War (Stucchi,
1816
See A. Kasher,