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The earliest item Berlin included in Four Essays on Liberty - 'Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century' (1950) - examined the origins of Communism, Fascism and Marxism, and dwelt on the belief that human life tended in 'one and only one direction'/ on the general prevalence of instrumentality and on 'the artificial stilling of doubts'/ the last by treating people as properly subjects of science; to these it preferred 'more room' to differ,4 and suggested very briefly that human goals were really various, and 'at times incompatible'.5 It attracted little published notice beyond an unsigned leading article by E. H. Carr.6 This implied that Berlin's attitude was nostalgic rather than practical; but Berlin's piece also occasioned a notable exchange of letters between George Kennan and Berlin, which identified a need for development and the role of 'the Kantian morality' within it.7 Berlin's letter is published for the first time in the present volume.

By reprinting 'Political Ideas', Berlin placed it as a preface to two of his more substantial lectures, 'Historical Inevitability' (i 9 54) and 'Two Concepts of Liberty' (1958).

Berlin needed at least to make space for free choice if he was to give conceptual strength to his preferences. 'Historical Inevitabili­ty' accordingly was more philosophical than historical in method, and devoted itself to this task, albeit negatively. It connected determinism with the view that 'the world has a direction and is governed by laws',1 that these laws could be known, and provided grounds for understanding humanity (and not just nature) specifi­cally in terms of groups rather than individuals; that this view undermined individual responsibility; that determinism would require radical changes in 'our moral and psychological categor­ies';2 and that moral judgement remained possible. The lecture, which was printed as a short book by Oxford University Press/ stimulated much comment, including high praise from Pieter Geyl in Debates with Historians/ and less high praise from E. H. Carr in What is History? Popper's The Poverty of Historicism6 is in some respects comparable with 'Historical Inevitability'. Philosophical commentators included J. A. Passmore in 'History, the Individual, and Inevitability'/ Ernest Nagel in 'Determinism in History';8 Amartya Sen in 'Determinism and Historical Predictions';9 and Morton White in Foundations of Historical Knowledge.10 The piece also stimulated a most perceptive brief treatment of Berlin by D. M. Mackinnon in A Study in Ethical Theory}1

Christopher Dawson, reviewing 'Historical Inevitability', remarked that Berlin's 'thesis is a simple one that will enlist the sympathy of all good citizens', and added that 'he attacks the enemies of freedom . . . with such indiscriminate enthusiasm, that . . .he has made a clean sweep of science and metaphysics and theology, and stands alone on the stricken field' .12 Berlin did indeed need to make at least two further steps towards being constructive.

One was to insist upon negative freedom as a complement to a capacity for free choice, the other to explain that neither metaphy­sics nor, in particular, value, properly understood, admitted the viewpoint Berlin rejected. His classic statement of these claims was his inaugural lecture at Oxford as Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory, 'Two Concepts of Liberty'. 'Two Concepts'

' 114. 2 123. 3 London, 1954-

• Gri:iningen/The Hague, 1955: Wolters/Nijhoff; London, 1955: Batsford.

5 London/New York, 1961: Macmillan/St Martin's Press.

' London, 1957: Routledge; Boston, 1957: Beacon Press.

Philosophical Review 68 (1959), 93-102.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (1959-60), 291-317, at 311-6; compare his The Structure of Science (London, 1961: Routledge; New York, 1961: Harcourt, Brace and World), 599-605.

' Enquiry (Delhi) 2 (1959), 99-115, at 113-14

New York, 1965: Harper and Row, 265 ff.

London, 1957: A. and C. Black; New York, 1962: Collier, 207-17.

" Harvard Law Journal 70 (1957), 584-8, at 585.

indicated that though the concepts of negative and positive free­dom were 'at no great logical distance'1 from each other, yet over time they had been developed in very inconsistent ways. Berlin gave an account of the distortion of the positive concept from its original form of collective control over external nature to group control over, and modification of, the individual; he connected it with the metaphysical view that society and nature alike disclose a harmonious order, discoverable by reason, towards which political authority might direct people; and he concluded the lecture by suggesting quite briefly a contrary view, 'that not all good things are compatible, still less all the ideals of mankind'/ that choice amongst them was necessary and therefore so was the freedom to exercise choice that the provision of negative freedom would facilitate.

'Two Concepts' excited much comment in the years immedi­ately succeeding publication, including an unsigned review by Richard Wollheim, at once friendly and critical,3 and a eulogy by Noel Annan.4 There was a variety of further responses. These included Marshall Cohen, 'Berlin and the Liberal Tradition',5 which found 'Two Concepts' 'fundamentally obscure',6 and criticised especially its reading of positive liberty; David Spitz, 'The Nature and Limits of Freedom'/ which suggested that Berlin's 'central thesis'8 had been argued by Dorothy Fosdick's What is Liberty?? and A. S. Kaufman, 'Professor Berlin on "Negative Freedom"',10 which found confusion.

Fuller commentary began with Alan Ryan, 'Freedom'/1 which discussed both Berlin and his critics. It was carried forward by L. J. Macfarlane, 'On Two Concepts of Liberty',12 which remains the most penetrating general discussion of Berlin's treatment of liberty.

'178. 2213.

'A Hundred Years After', Times Literary Supplement, 20 February 1959, 89-90.

'Misconceptions of Freedom', Listener, 19 February 1959, 323-4.

Philosophical Quarterly io (i960), 216-27.

'217.

7 Dissent 8 No i (Winter 1961), 78-85, at 79-82.

' 79.