Liberty: Incorporating "Four Essays on Liberty"

'2 Oxford, 1984: Blackwell; New York, 1984: New York University Press.

u Oxford, 1967: Oxford University Press.

'4 In Murray Forsyth and Maurice Keens-Soper (eds.), The Political Classics: Green to Dworkin (Oxford, 1996: Oxford University Press), 121-42.

freedom has been put to use in various ways. See, for example, Sandra Farganis, 'Liberty: Two Perspectives on the Women's Movement';¹ Partha Dasgupta, An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution? Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law? and Robert Grant, 'Morality, Social Policy and Berlin's Two Concepts'.⁴

The brief account of conflicts of value at the end of 'Two Concepts' applied to politics a staple of moral philosophy that Oxford had made its own, being one of the few points on which Ross and Ayer could converge.⁵ It was also welcome to those who distinguished the right and the good in political philosophy, and John Rawls has endorsed Berlin's theses about it as much as those about negative and positive freedom.6 Further treatments of value pluralism include Thomas Nagel, 'The Fragmentation of Value', in his Mortal Questions? Bernard Williams, 'Conflicts of Value';⁸ Charles Taylor, 'The Diversity of Goods'/ Michael Walzer, Spheres ofJustice?⁰ Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom;^u Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values?² and Steven Lukes, Moral Conflict and Politics.™ A useful anthology of essays on this topic is

Ethics 88 (1977-8), 67-73² Oxford and New York, 1993: Clarendon Press, chapter 2, section 5.

3 Cambridge, Mass, 1996: Harvard University Press; Oxford, 1996: Oxford University Press, 214-17.

' In Arien Mack (ed.), Liberty and Pluralism [Social Research 66 No 4 (1999)],

¹²¹7^-44⁵ See, amongst earlier examples, James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty Equality, Fraternity (1873, 1874), ed. Stuart D. Warner (Indianapolis, 1993: Liberty Press), 93 ff., 118, 169, 172, 174, 180, 206, 225, etc., and Franz Brentano, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong (1889), ed. Oskar Kraus and Roderick M. Chisholm, trans. Roderick M. Chisholm and Elizabeth H. Schneewind (London, 1969: Routledge; New York, 1969: Humanities Press), para. 3 2.

' See most recently his Political Liberalism (New York, 1993: Columbia University Press), 57, 197, i98n, 299n, 303n, 332, and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass., 2001: Harvard University Press), 177 note 61.

Cambridge and New York, 1979: Cambridge University Press.

In The Idea of Freedom, 221-32, and in his Moral Luck (Cambridge and New York, 1981: Cambridge University Press).

' In Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge and New York, 1982: Cambridge University Press), and in his Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, 23^47.

¹⁰ New York, 1983: Basic Books; Oxford, 1983: Martin Robertson.

Oxford and New York, 1986: Clarendon Press.

'2 Oxford and New York, 1990: Clarendon Press.

и Oxford, 1991: Clarendon Press, esp. part 1.

Christopher W. Gowans (ed.), Moral Dilemmas} This view and its congeners, of course, attract criticism from utilitarians, as for example James Griffin, Well-Being} The whole topic is treated in Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason¹ which is dedicated to Berlin's memory, and is discussed with special reference to him by Dworkin, Williams, Nagel and Taylor in part 2 of The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin.* Broader philosophical considerations of Berlinian themes include Bernard Williams's 'Introduction' to Berlin's Concepts and Categories,^ъ and Richard Wollheim, 'The Idea of a Common Human Nature'/

Value pluralism, not least because of Berlin's account of it, has given birth to a number of recent debates. Roger Hausheer, 'Berlin and the Emergence of Liberal Pluralism'⁷ was one of the earliest treatments. The implications of Berlin's views are examined search- ingly by Eric Mack in 'Isaiah Berlin and the Quest for Liberal Pluralism',⁸ and in 'The Limits of Diversity: The New Counter- Enlightenment and Isaiah Berlin's Liberal Pluralism'.' George Crowder questioned the relationship between 'Pluralism and Lib- eralism',1⁰ which attracted a response from Berlin and Bernard Williams, 'Pluralism and Liberalism: A Reply', ¹¹ with further remarks from Crowder.^u For a significantly revised view from Crowder see, for example, his Liberalism and Value Pluralism}¹

The attempt to disconnect liberalism and pluralism owes much to the vigorous midwifery of John Gray. In his Isaiah Berlin¹* he produced a fully rounded view, hinted at previously in his 'On

' New York, 1987: Oxford University Press.

Oxford and New York, 1986: Clarendon Press, chapter 5.

Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1997: Harvard University Press.

' See p. 3 55 above, note 1.

5 London, 1978: Hogarth Press; New York, 1979: Viking, xi-xviii.

• In Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration, 67-79.

7 In Pierre Manent and others, European Liberty (The Hague, 1983: Nijhoff), 49-81.

^s Public Affairs Quarterly 7 No 3 (1993), 115-30.

' In Howard Dickman (ed.), The Imperiled Academy (New Brunswick, 1993: Transaction Books), 97-126.

Polittcal Studies 42 (1994), 293-3^.

ibid., 306--9.

ibid. 44 (1996), 649-p.

" London and New York, 2002: Continuum.

14 London, 1995: HarperCollins; Princeton, 1996: Princeton University Press.

Negative and Positive Liberty⁴ and again in 'Berlin's Agonistic Liberalism'.² He has taken his views further in 'Where Pluralists and Liberals Part Company',³ and in Two Faces of Liberalism* Gray's interpretation of Berlin has been reviewed by Michael Walzer, 'Are There Limits to Liberalism?'/ and examined closely by Hans Blokland, 'Berlin on Pluralism and Liberalism: A Defence'.⁶ It provided a cue for further accounts of the matter by Amy Gutmann, 'Liberty and Pluralism in Pursuit of the Non- Ideal'/ and by Jonathan Riley, 'Crooked Timber and Liberal Culture'.8