Was there anything else he needed to pack?
He turned on the monitor wall and found a BBC documentary – unlike the bulk of the population, he was able to receive most foreign channels without any difficulty, legal or illegal – and went in search of a box to sit on. At first he could hardly work out what was going on, then the subject started to interest him. Exactly right. Pleasantly far away from everything he had had to deal with over the past few days.
‘A year ago today,’ the commentator was saying, ‘a dramatic worsening in Chinese–American relations preoccupied the plenary meeting of the United Nations, one that would become known as:’
The Moon Crisis
Jericho fetched a beer from the fridge and sat cross-legged on the box. The documentary was about the ghost of the previous summer, but began two years earlier, in 2022, a few weeks after the American base on the North Pole of the Moon went into operation. Back then the USA had started quarrying the noble-gas isotope helium-3 in the Mare Imbrium, setting in motion a development that had hitherto occupied the minds only of economic romantics and authors of science-fiction novels. Without a doubt, the Moon had a special part to play in the opening-up of the solar system: as a springboard for Mars, as a place of research, as a telescopic eye reaching the edges of the universe. From a purely economic point of view, compared with Mars Luna was a cheap date. You needed less fuel to get there, you got there quickly and came back quickly too. Philosophers justified moon travel with references to the spiritual sustenance of the enterprise, hoping for proofs or counter-proofs of God’s existence and, quite generally, an insight into the status of Homo sapiens, as if it took a stone ball 360,000 kilometres away to do it.
Having said this, the distant view of Man’s shared, fragile home did seem to encourage the formation of peaceful states of mind. The only questionable aspect was the satellite’s economic productivity. There was no gold up there, no diamond mines, no oil. But even if there had been, the cost would have made commercial exploitation absurd. ‘We may discover resources on the Moon or Mars that will boggle the imagination, that will test our limits to dream,’ George W. Bush had announced in 2004, wearing the face of a founding father, and it had sounded exciting, naïve and adventurous, but then who took Bush seriously? At the time America had been bogged down in wars, and had been about to ruin its economy and its international standing. Hardly anything could have seemed more inappropriate than the idea of the reawakening of a new Eldorado, and besides, NASA had no money.
And yet—
Startled by the announcement by the US that they planned to send astronauts to the Moon again by 2020, the whole world had suddenly been galvanised into frantic activity. Whatever there was to be fetched back from the Moon, the field wasn’t to be left open for America again, particularly since this time it seemed to have less to do with the symbolism of flags and footprints than with a tangible policy of economic supremacy. The European Space Agency offered technological support. Germany’s DLR fell in love with the idea of having its own moon base. France’s ESA carthorse EADS preferred a French solution. China hinted that in a few decades moon-mining would be crucially important to the national economy, explicitly the mining of helium-3. Roskosmos was also flirting with this quarrying idea, and so were the Russian companies Energia Rocket and Space Corporation, which had announced the construction of a moon base by 2015, whereupon India had immediately sent a probe with the beautiful name of Chandrayaan-1 into the polar orbit of the satellite to see how exploitable it was. Given the clear undertone of the Bush doctrine of going it alone, representatives of Russian and Chinese space travel authorities met for discussions about joint ventures, Japan’s JAXA entered the game: everyone was in a terrific hurry to court La Luna and make sure they got hold of some of her legendary treasures, as if it were enough simply to go there, dig the stuff up and scatter it over the home territory. Each prognosis outdid the last in terms of boldness until Julian Orley set out his clear conditions.
The richest man in the world had become involved with the Americans.
The result was, to put it mildly, radical. No sooner had international competition for extraterrestrial raw materials begun than it had fizzled out again, as the victor was, thanks to Orley’s decision, quite clear: a decision made less for reasons of sympathy than because the notoriously cash-strapped NASA turned out to have more money and a better infrastructure than all the other space-travelling nations put together. Apart from China, perhaps. There, during the nineties, ambitions to soar to cosmic greatness had become apparent, admittedly with a modest self-evaluation and an overall budget that came to a tenth of the USA’s, but which were driven by patriotism and claims to world-power status. Then, after one Zheng Pang-Wang had begun financing Chinese space travel in 2014, their budgets and aspirations had become almost equal; there was just a lack of know-how – a shortcoming that Beijing thought it would be able to make up.
Zheng, high priest of a globally active technology company whose greatest ambition lay in putting China on the Moon even before the USA, and making the exploitation of helium-3 a possibility, was often described in the media as the Orley of the East. In fact, like the Englishman he had not only immense wealth but also an army of high-class builders and scientists at his disposal. The Zheng Group went to work feverishly on the realisation of a space elevator, probably in the knowledge that Orley was doing the same thing. But while Orley attained his goal, Zheng didn’t solve the problem. Instead, the group managed to build a fusion reactor, but again they fell behind because Orley’s model worked more safely and efficiently. China’s ruling Communist Party grew nervous. Zheng was urged finally to demonstrate some success, if necessary by making long-nose an offer he couldn’t refuse, so old Zheng went for dinner with Orley and told him that Beijing wanted to cooperate in the near future.
Orley said Beijing could kiss his butt. But would Zheng share another bottle of that wonderful Tignanello with him?
Why not share everything? asked Zheng.
Like what?
Well, money, a lot of money. Power, respect and influence.
He had money of his own.
Yes, but China was hungry and extremely highly motivated, far more than slack, overweight America, which was still reeling from the financial crisis of 2009, so that there was something doddery about everything it did. If you asked an American about the future, in seventy per cent of cases he would see something profoundly terrifying about it, while in China everyone faced the coming day with a cheerful heart.
That was all well and good, said Orley, but shouldn’t they move on to an Ornellaia?
It was pointless, and certainly all mining plans with traditional rocket technology were economically unproductive, and condemned to throw Chinese space travel into the red. But with the defiance of a foot-stamping child, the Party decided to do just that, trusting in the hope that Zheng and the great minds of the Chinese National Space Administration would soon be back in the running. And because America had shown no scruples about letting its mining machines loose on the very part of the Moon where, according to the general geological view, there was a higher-than-average deposit of helium-3, a border area of the Mare Imbrium, the components for a mobile Chinese base and solar furnaces on caterpillar tracks were transported to that very spot, right next to their unloved competitor, and the Chinese began their own mining operation on 2 March 2023. America acted first amazed, then delighted. China was cordially welcomed to the Moon, there was talk of a global legacy and an international community, and no one worried about the newcomer’s touching efforts to squeeze its pathetic portion of helium-3 out of moon dust.