Despite the undisputed success of BX6847, US State Department officials were extremely wary of endorsing a second mission over North Korea after the Pueblo incident. The diplomatic scars left by the 1960 U-2/Powers shoot-down were still sensitive eight years later. It wasn’t until Brig Gen Paul Baclais (Director of the OSA) had briefed Secretary of State Dean Rusk on the specific mission objectives and assured him that the aircraft would only be in North Korean airspace for seven minutes (two passes or “photo lines”) that the State Department gave its blessing and the three-hour 39-minute sortie, designated BX6853, was flown in Article 127 by Frank Murray on February 19, 1968. Equipped with the same sensors as the previous incursion, 88 percent of the programed targets were cloud-free; however, this proved not to be the case where USS Pueblo was concerned, and she remained hidden from 127’s prying Type I camera.
On May 6, 1968, Jack Layton launched Article 127 on sortie BX6858 and headed out on Oxcart’s third mission to North Korea. Unknown to him at the time, his mission proved to be the final operational flight of the entire A-12 program. The reconnaissance “take” was disappointing in comparison to the two earlier missions as 50 percent of the programed targets suffered degradation due to cloud and haze. Then on the high-speed flight back to Kadena AB, “milky white fingers” began slowly clawing their way across the front of the left windshield panel. Having already experienced this “white-out” phenomenon to a lesser degree during a stateside training sortie, Jack was aware of the problem, which was caused by frictional heating on the windshield to the point that the glue between glass laminations became viscous and turned completely opaque. Proceeding on instruments all the way to landing, Jack completed a successful ground-directed radar approach for a safe recovery back at Kadena AB after three hours and 30 minutes in the air.
Although the procurement of such intelligence information was not of direct benefit to Lt Cdr Bucher and his crew, who were beaten and not released by their North Korean captors until nearly a year had passed, such a “hot-spot, quick-look” capability was considered an early and important achievement of the Oxcart program, clearly demonstrating the validity of manned reconnaissance vehicles and their ability to respond with minimal lead times to international incidents of political and military importance. At the same time, the Pueblo incident signaled the end of the Navy’s seaborne foray into the world of SIGINT trawling, the two remaining AGERs being scrapped soon after USS Pueblo’s seizure.
Oxcart closedown
It seems almost unbelievable that during the very month Oxcart was finally declared operational (November 1965), and before the program had the opportunity of fully vindicating itself, moves were already afoot to close it down. The Bureau of the Budget (BoB) questioned the necessity and cost of funding both the covert CIA Oxcart A-12 program and the “overt” USAF Senior Crown SR-71 program. Its author proposed several less costly alternatives, recommending that the A-12s be phased out by September 1966 and that all further procurement of SR-71s should stop. Copies of the memorandum were circulated within limited circles of the Defense Department and the CIA, together with the suggestion that they explore the alternatives set out in the paper. Since the SR-71 was not scheduled to become operational until September 1966, the Secretary of Defense quite rightly declined to accept the proposal. In July 1966, BoB officials proposed that a tri-agency study group be set up to again establish ways of reducing costs of the two programs. After the study was completed, a meeting was convened on December 12, 1966, and a vote was taken during which three out of the four votes cast were in favor of terminating the Oxcart fleet in January 1968 (assuming an operational readiness date of September 1967 for the SR-71) and assigning all missions to the SR-71 fleet.
The BoB’s memorandum was transmitted to President Johnson on December 16 despite protestations from the DCI, Richard Helms, who was the sole dissenting voice in the vote. Twelve days later Johnson accepted the BoB’s recommendations and directed that the Oxcart program be terminated by January 1, 1968. However, as the Vietnam War escalated and the results of Black Shield’s outstanding work became apparent to a privileged few, the wisdom of the earlier phase-out decision was called into question. As a result, the rundown lagged and the issue was again addressed. On November 3, 1967, the two competing aircraft types and their respective reconnaissance-gathering sensors were pitted against one another in a stateside fly-off codenamed Nice Girl. The outcome was deemed inconclusive, although the resolution of the A-12’s Type I camera was better than the optics of the SR-71. However, SR-71 had the ability to gather simultaneous, synoptic coverage of a target area that not only included PHOTINT and SIGINT, but more importantly, RADINT, via its nose-mounted, ground-mapping radar antenna. Despite continued objections raised by Helms, the original decision to terminate Oxcart was reaffirmed on May 16, 1968 by the Secretary of Defense — a decision further endorsed five days later by President Johnson.
Project officials decided that June 8, 1968 would be the earliest date to begin the redeployment from Kadena AB back to the United States. During the intervening period, sorties would be restricted to those essential for maintaining flight safety and pilot proficiency. Meanwhile, those aircraft back at Area 51 were to be flown to Lockheed’s facility at Palmdale in California and placed in storage by June 7. Back at Kadena, preparations were being made for Oxcart ferry flights back to the United States. Mission sensors were downloaded, low-time/high-performance engines were replaced with less highly-tuned units, and Functional Check Flights (FCFs) were flown to confirm each aircraft’s readiness for the trans-Pacific ferry flights.
