Like almost half of the Marine Corps, during the fall and winter of 1990 and early 1991, the junior Krulak, now himself a general, found himself in the sands of Saudi Arabia. Though trained as an infantry Marine, he wound up in a different position — serving as a logistician. As commander of the 2nd Force Service Support Group [FSSG], it was his job to keep over ninety thousand Marines involved in Desert Shield and Desert Storm supplied and fed.
Tom Clancy: Tell us about your work in Southwest Asia during Desert Shield and Desert Storm as head of the 2nd FSSG.
General Krulak: Initially MARCENT [Marine Component, United States Central Command] was going to rotate forces into the theater. But that idea was vetoed. Instead of replacing the existing in-theater forces, we reinforced them to about twice their original strength. So the 2nd Marine Division, the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, and my combat support organization fell in on top of the 1st MEF [composed of the West Coast-based 1st Marine Division, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, and 1st FSSG]. From the two combat service support units [1st and 2nd FSSG], we formed a direct support command that supported the Marine warfighters up front and a general support command to run the ports and bring the supplies into the theater. Then-Brigadier General Jim Brabham commanded the general support unit, and I commanded the direct support unit, which was the 2nd FSSG. My mission was to provide support for two full Marine Divisions, a heavily reinforced Marine Aircraft Wing [West Coast-based 3rd MAW, augmented by the East Coast-based 2nd MAW], the Army's "Tiger" Brigade [from the 2nd Armored Division], and my own 2nd FSSG troops.
After the war, I became MARCENT Forward and commanded the forward-deployed CENTCOM Marine forces responsible for the reconstitution of the Maritime Prepositioning Ships. This was a daunting task that required retrieving equipment spread over one hundred miles across the desert, transporting that equipment to the port of A1 Jubail in Saudi Arabia, then back-loading the equipment on the ships.
Tom Clancy: Since you've been an infantry officer for much of your career, could you tell us your thoughts about the effects of logistics on the success of the war?
General Krulak: My impression is that the success of the Marines in Southwest Asia will go down in history as a victory based on logistics. That's a tough thing to say for a career infantryman. From the very first days of Desert Shield, this was an operation heavily dependent on logistics. Just five days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the five-ship, Maritime Prepositioning Squadron [MPSRON] 2 was ordered to Saudi Arabia. The following day, three ships of MPSRON 3 were ordered to the region. From receipt of the mission on August 7th until the final off-load on September 7th, the MPSRONs provided supplies and equipment to support over 53,000 Marines and sailors for thirty days. Not only did this effort completely validate the requirement for MPS, it formed the foundation of the tremendous logistic effort to follow.
Regarding the ground war itself, you hear and read a lot about the minefield breaching and "left hook" in the war, as well you should; but to get the Marines prepared to make that assault was a logistical nightmare. The only reason that the logistic part of the war has not gotten its due is that the ground portion was so successful. The difficulty inherent in supporting and sustaining that large a force was tremendous; but it was never really an issue, because the war went so fast. The follow-on support requirements just went away. Had it lasted, it would have been something else. The lessons learned are many and varied. It took about two thousand short tons a day to keep MARCENT in ammunition alone during the ground war. To me the Gulf War proved the accuracy of the maxim "Amateurs study tactics, and professionals study logistics." This is one of the great things about the MAGTF. It has its own tactical and logistical capability. You get everything with one call. Whether you order up a full MEF [a Marine Division/Aircraft Wing/FSSG], or an MEU [SOC], these units have their own logistics base that does not absorb itself as it conducts operations. They carry what they need with them, so that field operations can be sustained for a period of time [usually fifteen to thirty days] without the need for immediate resupply or reinforcement. That's the "expeditionary" part of the Marine Corps today. We have the offshore resources on the amphibious and MPS ships to sustain forces on the land without anyone's permission to base forces ashore.
Following the war and his own homecoming, Brigadier General Krulak began a task as painful as it was important, the drawdown and restructuring of the Marine Corps in the post-Cold War world. Under the so-called Base Force concept, all of the military services were to be downsized, with excess and redundant units and capabilities eliminated. General Krulak's job was to design and supervise this effort for the Marine Corps, without actually destroying it, or its vital capabilities.
Tom Clancy: You came out of Desert Storm, and then what happened?
General Krulak: When General Mundy assumed duty as the 30th Commandant, he assigned me as the head of the Personnel Management Division at Headquarters in Washington. I no sooner took over when he held an off-site meeting with all of his three-stars [Lieutenant Generals]. Out of that meeting came the decision to put together the Force Structure Planning Group [FSPG] to actually develop the plan to take the Corps down to the mandated [Base Force] level of 159,000 personnel. Essentially, we were tasked to take our existing Corps and build a new Corps. So the study group spent the next year working that issue and then, under the direction of General Mundy and with his personal involvement, selling our plan to Congress and the rest of the military services. The key was that, as the FSPG looked at the National Military Strategy and the Marine Corps' role, we determined that we could not meet the needs of this nation at 159,000. Our work showed that the number we actually needed was 177,000, of which we got to keep 174,000 active-duty Marines — a number that was validated by the Department of Defense Bottom-Up Review.
I was then promoted to lieutenant general in October of '92 and went to Quantico to command the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. During my two years there, we as a Corps were formalizing and institutionalizing the combat development process, which was the brainchild of General Gray. From there, I moved back to Hawaii and took over my father's last command, Marine Forces Pacific.
Following in his father's footsteps and commanding the Marine Forces of the Pacific was an honor for Chuck Krulak. But more was to come for the young three-star, as we will soon hear.
Tom Clancy: When you learned that you were being considered for the post of 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, what went through you mind?
General Krulak: My very first thought was, "Am I up to the job?" I questioned whether I was the right man for the job because there were such great people in the running. General Mundy and Secretary [of the Navy] Dalton interviewed every three- and four-star general in the Marine Corps and all were qualified to lead the Corps. We have great generals, and Secretary Dalton made certain that everyone got his day in court. His personal efforts during this process are unmatched in the history of the Navy Secretaries. My second thought was about my wife Zandi, and the pressures that would fall on her. My third thought was that I had a great job as Commander, Marine Forces Pacific, and whatever happened I was going to continue to be challenged.
Tom Clancy: During this time, was there any thought on your part about how close your own father came to being appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps?