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The ruling circles were highly concerned that the heads of collateral branches of the dynasty, Vasilii III's brothers Prince Iurii Ivanovich of Dmitrov and Prince Andrei Ivanovich of Staritsa, would claim power during Ivan's minority. In December 1533, Prince Iurii was taken into custody, where he died three years later.[60] Between 1534 and 1536 Elena Glinskaia also exerted pressure on Prince Andrei Ivanovich by imposing new terms to define their mutual relationship.[61] These conditions reflected profound changes in the relations between the grand-princely family and the collateral line of the dynasty Unlike previous agreements between members of the dynasty, the grand princess did not recognise traditional responsibilities such as respecting Andrei as a close relative and guaranteeing his land possessions. Elena also forbade Andrei to receive grand-princely servitors, though previous agreements allowed servi­tors to choose masters at their will.

The new terms thus facilitated a redistribution ofpower within the dynasty in favour of the ruling family. It is very likely that it was precisely this dictated agreement that made Andrei rise in rebellion against Elena Glinskaia in 1537.[62]Despite having military forces at his disposal, Andrei eventually preferred to negotiate with the Moscow authorities rather than to fight. Elena Glinskaia used this situation to her own advantage by inviting Andrei to the capital and imprisoning him, his wife Efrosin'ia and his son Vladimir. Andrei died in custody in December I537, but the members of his family would remain a source of concern for Ivan IV for decades to come.

Elena's death at the age of around thirty on 3 April I538 gave rise to much speculation about her poisoning. The archaeologist T. D. Panova, who carried out an autopsy ofthe remains of members ofthe dynasty buried in the Kremlin, also believes that many of them, including Elena, were poisoned.[63] Panova's conclusion is based on the findings of large amounts of arsenic and mercury in the bodies. However, we know very little about the background chemistry of Muscovites in regard to their nutrition, medicines and cosmetics. This is why relative estimations seem to be more revealing than absolute ones. The content of such a typical poisonous substance as arsenic in Elena's remains was substantially lower than in those who were definitely poisoned (the Staritsa family, see below). On the whole, accusations of poisoning were typical of political struggle in the sixteenth century and are hardly trustworthy.[64]

As long as Elena Glinskaia was alive, the ruling line of the dynasty had enough political power to impose its will on those whom it considered dan­gerous pretenders to the throne. Her death was followed by the so-called 'boyar rule' (1537-47). Despite the minority ofthe ruler, the administration and courts continued to function in the realm. At the same time, the 'boyar rule' saw an escalation of conflict between court groupings headed by the princely clans of the Shuiskiis, Bel'skiis, Kubenskiis and Glinskiis, and the boyar Vorontsov clan. The reason for the political crisis was the absence of capable leadership in the ruling family and the political ineffectiveness of the Church hierarchs who could not mediate between the conflicting parties at court.[65]

There were, however, certain cultural mechanisms which would secure the position of an under-age monarch in Muscovy. The ruling circles propagated an image of Ivan as a capable monarch and a brave warrior. The practice dated back to Vasilii III, who saw Ivan not only as a child, but also as a rep­resentative of the dynasty, even though of small physical proportions. Vasilii ordered a helmet for the under-age Ivan, to symbolise the concept of the infant eventually becoming a mighty sovereign. The helmet, which reproduced the design of adult ones in miniature, featured inscriptions propagating the auto­cratic power of Vasilii III and glorifying Ivan as his successor (see Plate 12a).[66]The same cultural model of the authority of the crown assuming a life apart from the human form of the ruler was employed in the official chronicles and government documents. According to these sources, the orphaned under-age monarch was responsible for all governmental decisions in the late 1530s and 1540s. Nancy Shields Kollmann thinks that the discrepancy between the image of the ruler in the official propaganda and the powerlessness of the child Ivan reflects the weak position of every monarch, whatever his or her age, in Mus­covite politics.[67] However, the official documents did acknowledge the fact that the grand prince was still a defenceless minor, who could not take part in military actions and needed the guidance of adults.[68] Part of dynastic policy, such calculated propaganda contributed to the succession of power within the ruling family.

The first signs of political stabilisation became visible in the early 1540s. In 1540-1, Efrosin'ia and Vladimir of Staritsa were released from captivity and Vladimir was restored to his father's landed possessions. The dynasty finally received an effective protector in 1542, when Makarii became the new metropolitan.[69] The generally accepted view is that Makarii was a client of the Shuiskii princes, who belonged to the Suzdal' line of the dynasty and had matrimonial ties with the ruling family.16 At the same time, Makarii had already accumulated substantial political and moral weight prior to his enthrone­ment when he was archbishop of Novgorod, the second-ranking figure in the Church hierarchy. Makarii's tenure in Novgorod (1526-42) coincided with A. M. Shuiskii's vicegerency in Pskov (1539/40-winter 1540/1). In Pskov, A. M. Shuiskii was very hostile to the locals and caused many Pskovian abbots to flee to Novgorod.17 He planned to give Makarii a solemn reception in Pskov, but the Pskovian chronicles do not mention such a visit by the hierarch.18 Makarii apparently cancelled his trip to Pskov because of the misdeeds of the vicegerent. Makarii, who demonstrated a keen interest in Church affairs in Pskov, would hardly have accepted such harsh treatment of the local clergy.19 This is why it is unlikely that the Shuiskiis promoted Makarii. When he became metropolitan, Makarii resolutely interfered in court feuds acting against the Shuiskiis.20 In 1543, A. M. Shuiskii was thrown to the court kennelmen. Various sources attribute the order to kill Shuiskii to the grand prince or unnamed boyars. Whoever was behind this cruel murder, Makarii did not use his consid­erable moral power to stop the humiliating death of Shuiskii. The metropolitan apparently had no interest in saving the life of the boyar.

According to the official chronicle, after the murder of Shuiskii, 'the boyars began to fear the sovereign'.21 It seems that the sphere of Ivan's ritual and social activities did indeed become wider then. Beginning in 1543, the chamber for official receptions in the Kremlin was referred to in the official sources as stolovaia, which alluded to the throne (stol) or, more widely, to the hereditary power of the grand prince.22 The new appellation implies that Ivan began on a regular basis to utilise these premises, which were specially designated for the ritual activities of the ruler. In 1543 the ruling circles also began propa­gating abroad the idea that Ivan was ready for marriage. The Kremlin sent requests for a bride to several foreign royal houses and waited for responses.23

16 See e.g. A. A. Zimin, Reformy Ivana Groznogo (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no- ekonomicheskoi literatury, i960), p. 264. Krom notes that the Shuiskiis did not enjoy a monopoly on power in 1542-3: see his 'Politicheskii krizis', 14.

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60

On variousinterpretations ofPrince Iurii Vasil'evich's position towards the grand-princely family in the tendentious official chronicles, see PSRL, vol. xiii, pp. 77-8, 90. On Iurii, see also M. M. Krom, 'Sud'ba regentskogo soveta pri maloletnem Ivane IV Novye dannye o vnutripoliticheskoi bor'be kontsa 1533-1534 goda', Otechestvennaia istoriia, 1996, no. 5: 40-2.

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61

SGGD, vol. i (Moscow: Tipografiia N. S. Vsevolozhskogo, 1813), pp. 451-2.

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62

On Andrei's rebellion, see 1.1. Smirnov, OcherkipoliticheskoiistoriiRusskogogosudarstva 30- jokhgodovXVIveka (Moscow and Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1958), pp. 56-74; A. L. Iurganov, 'Staritskii miatezh', VI, 1985, no. 2: 100-10.

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63

There is no scholarly publication of the results of the autopsy to date. The main results of the autopsy can be found in a popular article: Denis Babichenko, 'Kremlevskie tainy: 33-i element', Itogi, no. 37 (327), 17 September 2002: 36-9.

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64

See Andrei Pavlov and Maureen Perrie, Ivan the Terrible (Harlow: Longman, 2003), p. 29.

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65

M. M. Krom believes that the main reason for the crisis was the minority ofthe ruler. See his 'Politicheskii krizis 30-40kh godov XVI veka. Postanovka problemy', Otechestvennaia istoriia.,1998, no. 5: 13,15.

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66

See N. S. Vladimirskaia (ed.), Orel i lev. Rossiia i Shvetsiia v XVII veke. Katalog vystavki. Gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii muzei, 4.04-1.07.2001 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi istorich- eskii muzei, 2001), pp. 56-7, no. 3.

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67

See Nancy Shields Kollmann, 'The Grand Prince in Muscovite Politics: The Problem of Genre in Sources on Ivan's Minority', RH 14 (1987): 293-313.

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68

PSRL, vol. viii (St Petersburg: Tipografiia Eduarda Pratsa, 1859; reprinted Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul'tury, 2001), pp. 297-301; Pskovskieletopisi, ed. A. N. Nasonov, vol. i (Moscow and Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1941; reprintedDiisseldorfand The Hague: Briicken-VerlagGMBH, Europe Printing, 1967), p. 110; Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, vol. Lix (St Petersburg: Tipografiia F. Eleonskogo i K., 1887), pp. 33, 34, 37, 43-4, 66-7, 95. I am grateful to Charles J. Halperin for these references.

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69

On Makarii, see Arkhimandrit Makarii (Veretennikov), Zhizn'i trudy sviatiteliaMakariia, mitropolita Moskovskogo i vseia Rusi (Moscow: Izdatel'skii sovet Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi, 2002).