Выбрать главу

It is hard to determine who personally was responsible for the reforms. Historians sometimes call the ruling circles of the 1550s 'the chosen council', but this vague term is apparently irrelevant to governmental institutions.[102]B. N. Floria has suggested that the reforms were the results of a collective effort by the ruling elite, whose members were finally united after the long period of conflict during the boyar rule.[103] It is true that Ivan granted top court ranks to a wide circle of elite servitors, which especially benefited the tsarina's relatives, the Zakhar'in-Iur'evs. At the same time, there was no complete harmony among the elite. Their matrimonial ties with the ruler did not save the Zakhar'ins from falling out of favour after the 1553 dynastic crisis. The wide admission to the upper strata of the court apparently facilitated a certain social mobility at court. This situation was favourable for such functionaries as the courtier Aleksei Fedorovich Adashev and the secretary Ivan Mikhailovich Viskovatyi. They did not belong to the highest strata of the elite, but actively contributed to the running of the polity. Adashev had enough authority to revise the official genealogical records in favour of his clan. He was also involved in writing the official chronicle. Though his role in the 1550s government may be exaggerated in later sources, it is obvious that Adashev was a very important figure of the day.[104]

Limited and inconsistent as they were, the reforms allowed Ivan to reach a certain degree of consolidation of his realm and to pursue an aggressive policy towards his neighbours. With the taking of the Tatar states of Kazan' (1552) and Astrakhan' (1556), Ivan acquired vast territories populated with a multi-ethnic, predominantly Muslim population with distinctive cultural and economic traditions. The conquest was thus a major step in turning Ivan's realm into a multi-ethnic empire. By annexing the khanates, the tsar estab­lished control ofthe Volga waterway and gained access to the Caspian Sea and the markets of Iran. The official propaganda presented the conquest of the Tatar states as a triumph of militant Orthodoxy over the infidels. Conquering the Kazan' and Astrakhan' khanates, which the Muscovite political tradition saw as tsardoms, also contributed to the legitimisation of Ivan's assumption of the title of tsar. The ruling circles used a variety of methods of integration in the annexed territories, including the use of violence against the rebellious, Chris- tianisation, which, however, was not very deep or systematic, incorporation of the loyal local elite into the tsar's court and giving the annexed territories special status in the administrative system.[105]

The victory over Kazan' triggered the expansion of Muscovy into Siberia. After the taking of Kazan', the Siberian khan acknowledged the suzerainty of Ivan IV and became his tributary. The ruling circles employed the entrepreneurial merchant family of Stroganovs for the colonisation of Siberia. The annexation of Astrakhan' enabled Muscovy to increase its presence in the North Caucasus. Ivan's marriage to Mariia Kuchenei of Kabarda, mentioned above, was part of this policy.[106]

The conquering of the lands of Kazan' and Astrakhan' escalated the tension between Muscovy and the powerful Muslim states of Crimea and Turkey. The Crimean khan saw Kazan' as a hereditary possession of his dynasty. The Turkish sultan, in his turn, was particularly concerned about Muscovy's penetration of the North Caucasus. Despite somewhat different political perspectives, these powerful states concluded a union against Muscovy and jointly attacked Astrakhan' in 1569. Thanks to the protective measures of the Russian side, its diplomatic manoeuvring and the logistical miscalculations of the Turkish commanders, the campaign failed.[107] Despite the failure, the Crimean khan continued his aggressive policy towards Muscovy. He devastated Moscow in 1571, but Ivan's commanders inflicted a defeat on him at the Battle of Molodi in 1572. This victory halted the revanchist plans of the Crimean khan.

Ivan IV failed to avoid simultaneous involvement in military conflicts on several fronts. Without settling the conflict in the south, he launched a war against his western neighbour, Livonia, in 1558. Historians traditionally inter­pret the Livonian war (1558-83) in geopolitical terms, asserting that Ivan was looking for a passage to the Baltic Sea to expand overseas trade. Revisionists explain the war's origins in terms of Ivan's short-term interest in getting trib­ute to replenish his treasury. They note that the geopolitical interpretations of the Livonian war are somewhat anachronistic and marked by economic determinism. The widely accepted view that the tsar began the war to gain access to the Baltic Sea derives from the Livonian and Polish sources. At the same time, there are no Muscovite sources corroborating the idea that the Muscovite authorities aspired to develop their own commercial and transport infrastructure in the Baltic region.[108]

The Muscovite ruling circles showed no intention of escalating the military operation in Livonia after a series of victories in the late 1550s. The situation, however, dramatically changed in the early 1560s when the Polish-Lithuanian state, Sweden and Denmark partitioned Livonia and became directly involved in the ongoing struggle. The main opponents of Muscovy, Poland and Lithua­nia, considerably strengthened their political and military resources when they united into a single monarchy by concluding the Union of Lublin in 1569. From 1579, Stefan Batory of Poland and Lithuania, an energetic politician and gifted commander, repulsed Muscovite forces and invaded the Novgorod and Pskov regions. In the last stage of the war, the Swedes captured a number of Muscovite strongholds along the coast of the Gulf of Finland. The Livonian war only resulted in human and material losses for Muscovy.

In his deliberate search for allies, Ivan actively supported commercial rela­tions between Muscovy and England by granting generous privileges to English merchants. The English were interested in furs and a number of Muscovite commodities required for shipbuilding (timber, rope fibres, tallow, tar). Muscovites, in turn, benefited from English supplies ofarmaments, non- precious metals, clothes and luxury items. The tsar's attempts to conclude a political union with Elizabeth I of England were, however, in vain.

вернуться

102

A. N. Grobovsky, The 'Chosen Council' of Ivan IV. A Reinterpretation (New York: Gaus, 1969); A. I. Filiushkin, Istoriia odnoi mistifikatsii. Ivan Groznyi i'IzbrannaiaRada' (Moscow: Voronezhskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1998).

вернуться

103

Boris Floria, Ivan Groznyi, 2nd edn (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2002), p. 50.

вернуться

104

On A. F. Adashev, see D. M. Bulanin, 'Adashev Aleksei Fedorovich', in Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnostiDrevneiRusi,vyp. 2: VtoraiapolovinaXIV-XVIv. (Leningrad: Nauka, Leningrad- skoe otdelenie, 1988), pt. 1, pp. 8-10; Filiushkin, Istoriia. On I. M. Viskovatyi, see Gralia, Ivan.

вернуться

105

AndreasKappeler, TheRussianEmpire:AMultiethnicHistory(Harlow: Longman, 2001), pp. 24-32; M. B. Pliukhanova, Siuzhety i simvolyMoskovskogo tsarstva (St Petersburg: Akropol', 1995), pp. 177-90,199-202.

вернуться

106

See Janet Martin, Medieval Russia, 980-1584 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, :995), pp. 354-5; Kappeler, The Russian Empire, pp. 33-6.

вернуться

107

See Martin, Medieval Russia, pp. 355-7; Khoroshkevich, Rossiia, pp. 508-14.

вернуться

108

See Maureen Perrie, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin's Russia (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 89-92; Aleksandr Filiushkin, 'Diskursy Livonskoi voiny', Ab Imperio 4 (2001):

43-80.