38
There is no question that the deliberation councils handle some very important matters; the problems relate to the selection, procedures, and degree of independence from the bureaucracy of the councils.
And on those questions there is considerable debate. Do the councils actually provide civilian input to the bureaucracy's decisions, or are they merely covers for bureaucratic power, intended to provide the public with a façade of consultation and consensus? Former MITI Vice-Minister Sahashi said in an interview that as far as he was concerned deliberation councils were important primarily as a device to silence in advance any criticism of the bureaucracy.
39
Kawanaka Niko* believes that deliberation councils are actually important weapons of the bureaucracy in the struggles that occur within and among ministries to promote particular policies: the important names that appear as members of a council are not so much intended to impress the public as they are to influence and warn off rival bureaucrats, one ministry's clients serving to counterbalance those of another ministry.
40
Some Japanese journalists are even harsher. A group of
Mainichi
economic specialists calls the deliberation councils ''gimmicks," noting that the councils do not have independent staffs and that all proposals submitted to them have been approved in advance by the sponsoring ministry. On the other hand, they believe that the most important councils in the economic spherethe Economic Council (Keizai Shingikai) attached to the Economic Planning Agency, the Industrial Structure Council (Sangyo* Kozo* Shingikai) attached to MITI, and the Foreign Capital Council (Gaishi Shingikai) attached to the Ministry of Financeare not mere "ornaments."
41
Concerning one of these, the Foreign Capital Council, the MITI Journalists' Club disagrees, suggesting that at least before capital liberalization it was a
kakuremino
a magic fairy cape thrown over something (in this case MITI's influence over all foreign capital ventures in Japan) in the hope of making it invisible.
42
If these criticisms are at all valid, we may ask why the Diet itself does not perform the vital tasks of writing and deliberating laws. The answer is that the Japanese Diet is not a "working parliament" in Weber's sense, "one which supervises the administration by continuously sharing in its work."
43
The most important work of the government is done elsewhere and is only ratified in the Diet. As we have already stressed, the Diet's dependent relationship with the bureau-
Page 49
cracy originated in the prewar structure. It persisted and was reinforced because of the harsh period of postwar reconstruction. During the late 1940's and early 1950's the bureaucracy fought for its policies, and against interference by the none-too-competent political parties of the time, by invoking the old idea that the bureaucracy speaks for the national interest and the political parties only for local, particular, or selfish interests. General wisdom was said to reside in the state and only particular wisdom in the society, a political philosophy that was not at all alien to Japan, in contrast to some of the democratic institutions founded by SCAP Kojima Akira traces this ideology to the state's monopoly in the Meiji era of the power to establish the "orthodoxy of the public interest," everything not so designated being, by definition, part of the private interest and therefore subordinate.
44
Interest groups exist in Japan in great numbers, but there is no theory of pluralism that legitimates their political activities. The parties developed what strength they had before the war by representing private interests to the government, and this heritage too was passed on to their postwar successors. One of the reasons that there are so few private members' bills passed is that virtually all of them are based on appeals from constituents or are intended to serve some special interest. Many party politicians themselves accept the orthodoxy of a vertical relationship between the state's activities and their own activities. "They tend," writes Campbell, "to perceive voters as animated almost solely by particularistic, pork-barrel desires rather than by concern over issues of broad social policy."
45
Although Japan's fused relationship between the executive and legislative branches may be disappointing to liberals, from the point of view of the developmental state it has some hidden advantages. In the postwar world the Diet has replaced the Imperial institution in the role of what Titus has called "the supreme ratifier," the agency that legitimates decisions taken elsewhere.
46
Like the emperor under the Meiji Constitution, the Diet is the public locus of sovereignty, but the same discrepancy that existed earlier between authority and power is still maintained, and for at least some of the same reasons. There is, however, one major difference: the Diet performs these vital functions much more safely, effectively, and democratically than the Imperial institution ever did. For the bureaucracy to have mobilized resources and committed them to a heavy industrial structure as it did in postwar Japan, the claims of interest groups and individual citizens had to be held in check. Although the high-growth policies of the bureaucracy ultimately raised the economic level of all citizens and may thereby have served their diverse interests, the citizens themselves
Page 50
were not consulted. The funds, legislation, and institutions the bureaucracy needed for its programs were enacted by what Wildes has called the "puppet Diet."
47
This "puppet Diet," working through its LDP majority, has nevertheless served as a mediator between the state and society, forcing the state to accommodate those interests that could not be ignoredagriculture and medium and smaller enterprises, for exampleand, on occasion, requiring the state to change course in response to serious problems such as pollution. At the same time, it has held off or forced compromises from those groups whose claims might interfere with the development program. By and large, it has done so equitably, maintaining a comparatively level pattern of income distribution and of hardships.
48
The Diet's unproclaimed mediating role has been the subject of much scrutiny and analysis in Japan. Although there are many different formulations, most of them end up dividing Japanese society into two sets of social groups and institutions, those that are central and those that are peripheral (or privileged and ordinary, first class and second class), with the central groups operating the developmental state for the sake of the society as a whole and not just for their own particular interests. The central institutionsthat is, the bureaucracy, the LDP, and the larger Japanese business concernsin turn maintain a kind of skewed triangular relationship with each other. The LDP's role is to legitimate the work of the bureaucracy while also making sure that the bureaucracy's policies do not stray too far from what the public will tolerate. Some of this serves its own interests, as well; the LDP always insures that the Diet and the bureaucracy are responsive to the farmers' demands because it depends significantly on the overrepresented rural vote. The bureaucracy, meanwhile, staffs the LDP with its own cadres to insure that the party does what the bureaucracy thinks is good for the country as a whole, and guides the business community toward developmental goals. The business community, in turn, supplies massive amounts of funds to keep the LDP in office, although it does not thereby achieve control of the party, which is normally oriented upward, toward the bureaucracy, rather than downward, toward its main patrons.