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This preference for congressmen rather than bureaucrats in the United States merely reflects the market rationality of the American system as contrasted with Japan's plan rationality.
Preferential access to the government for the strategic industries in Japan is not an unintended consequence of the developmental state; it is in fact an objective of the developmental state. This is the true significance of amakudari. A cost of the system is occasional misuse of access to gain some private advantage. Nonetheless, from the Japanese point of view, the advantages of amakudari for smooth policy formulation and execution outweigh this cost. The Japanese refer to consultations between ex-bureaucrat seniors and their incumbent
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juniors as "digging around the roots" (
nemawashi
), that is, preparing the groundwork for a government-business decision. To outsiders it often looks like "consensus."
The most senior amakudari positionsfor example, the postretirement landing spots of MITI's vice-ministers (see Table 6)are bases from which to coordinate the strategic sectors. At this level the Western distinction between public and private loses its meaning. As Eleanor Hadley remarks about the prewar zaibatsu, "The combines' strength was regarded as national strength but their profits were seen as private property."
88
In the postwar world this relationship persists, except that the weight of the government is much stronger. Sato* Kiichiro*, former president of the Mitsui Bank, observes that "during and after the war, . . . Japan's economy was controlled until it has become second nature with us to uphold a planned, controlled economy."
89
At the level of the supreme leadership of the business community, the primary concern is that the relationship between government and business be managed effectively for the good of all. Amakudari is significant here only in that it contributes to a common orientationas does education at Todai*, golf club memberships (MITI's Amaya acknowledges that "they do other things than play golf at golf courses"), and the common experience of the war and its aftermath.
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Of the five postwar presidents of Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations)Ishikawa Ichiro* (18851970), Ishizaka Taizo* (18861975), Uemura Kogoro* (18941978), Doko* Toshio (b. 1896), and Inayama Yoshihiro (b. 1904)three are former bureaucrats (one at Communications, two at Commerce and Industry) and four are graduates of Todai (one in engineering, one in economics, and two in law). It would be difficult, however, to correlate their backgrounds with their policies, except to say that all five worked closely with the government. Ishikawa (a nonbureaucrat engineer), Uemura (an exbureaucrat), and Inayama (an ex-bureaucrat) were most cooperative; Doko (a nonTodai engineer) was less so; and Ishizaka (a Todai law exbureaucrat), perhaps surprisingly, was the least cooperative.
Amakudari provides one more channel of communication for the government, the business community, and the political world. Nakamura Takafusa believes it is the main channel of liaison between the business world and the bureaucratic world.
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Nonetheless, its influence is tempered by the similar but also cross-cutting influences of school ties, marital alliances, clan networks, deliberation councils, senior-junior relations, and the ministerial clubs of all retired bureaucrats (for example, MITI's Kayo-kai*, or Tuesday Club, had some 588 members in 1963).
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The human element also enters. Some bureau-
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TABLE
6
MITI Vice-Ministers and Their Amakudari Positions (as of 1978)
(Parentheses under names indicate years of active service in MITI)
Name
Vice-minister dates
Amakudari position(s)
1. Yamamoto Takayuki (19291952)
5/493/52
Vice-president, Fuji Iron and Steel; died May 17, 1961.
2. Tamaki Keizo * (19301953)
3/5211/53
President, then chairman, Toshiba* Electric Co.
3. Hirai Tomisaburo* (19311955)
11/5311/55
President, then adviser, New Japan Steel Corp.
4. Ishihara Takeo (19321957)
11/556/57
Vice-president, then auditor, Tokyo Electric Power Co.
5. Ueno Koshichi* (19321960)
6/575/60
Vice-president, then adviser, Kansai Electric Power Co.; president, Kansai Oil Co.
6. Tokunaga Hisatsugu (19331961)
5/607/61
Vice-president, New Japan Steel Corp.; then president, Japan Petroleum Development Corp.
7. Matsuo Kinzo* (19341963)
7/617/63
Chairman, Nippon Kokan* Steel Co.
8. Imai Zen'ei (19371964)
7/6310/64
President, Japan Petrochemical Corp.
9. Sahashi Shigeru (19371966)
10/644/66
Sahashi Economic Research Institute; chairman, Japan Leisure Development Center.
10. Yamamoto Shigenobu (19391968)
4/665/68
Executive director, Toyota Motor Co.
11. Kumagai Yoshifumi (19401969)
5/6811/69
President, Sumitomo Metals Corp.
12. Ojimi* Yoshihisa (Spring 19411971)
11/696/71
President, Arabian Oil Co.
13. Morozumi Yoshihiko (Autumn 19411973)
6/717/73
President, Electric Power Development Company.
14. Yamashita Eimei (19431974)
7/7311/74
Managing director, Mitsui Trading Co.; president, Iran Chemical Development Co.
15. Komatsu Yugoro* (19441976)
11/747/76
Director, Kobe Steel Corp.
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crats simply do not like amakudari because they feel that it is beneath them as officials to become involved in business for profit or because they do not want to come back to their old ministry to lobby their younger colleagues. Iwatake Teruhiko, for example, joined Kobe Steel after retirement from MITI, but he did not approve of amakudari. When a Ministry of Finance official, Inoue Yoshimi, beat him out as president of Kobe Steel, he was offered the presidency of a satellite company, but he resigned instead and became a lecturer in literature at Todai *, something he had wanted to do for many years.