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According to the final air operations database later compiled by Hq USAFE, 421 fixed targets in 11 categories were attacked over the 78-day course of Allied Force, of which 35 percent were believed to have been destroyed, with another 10 percent sustaining no damage and the remainder suffering varying degrees of damage from light to severe. The largest single fixed-target category entailed ground-force facilities (106 targets), followed by command and control facilities (88 targets) and lines of communication, mostly bridges (68 targets). Other target categories included POL-related facilities (30 targets), industry (17 targets), airfields (8 targets), border posts (18 targets), and electrical power facilities (19 targets). In addition, 7 so-called counterregime targets were assessed as having sustained overall light damage. Finally, 60 targets were associated with Serb air defenses in two categories (radars and launch equipment), out of which two of three SA-2s, 11 of 16 SA-3s, and 3 of 25 STRAIGHT FLUSH radars associated with the SA-6 were assessed as having been destroyed.[122]

Figure 3.4—USAF Sortie Breakdown by Aircraft Type

As for the 28,018 munitions (excluding TLAMs) that were expended altogether, a full one-third were general-purpose Mk 82 unguided bombs dropped by B-52s and B-1s during the war’s final two weeks. Figure 3.5 presents the trend of U.S. and allied munitions expenditure over the 78-day course of Allied Force. Figure 3.6 shows the number of precision weapons and nonprecision weapons delivered daily over the same period. Of that number, the United States delivered 83 percent, or all but 4,703 (see Figure 3.7).

In a telling reflection of the sparse intelligence available on the location of enemy SAMs and of NATO’s determination to avoid losing even a single aircrew member, some 35 percent of the overall effort (including both direct attack and mission support) was directed against enemy air defenses. Thanks in part to the weight of that effort, only two allied aircraft were downed and not a single friendly fatality was incurred, save for two AH-64 pilots who were killed in a training accident in Albania (see Chapter Five for more on these incidents). Even at that, however, enemy SAMs were effectively suppressed but not often destroyed.

Figure 3.5—U.S. and Allied Ground-Attack Munitions Expended (excluding TLAM)
Figure 3.6—U.S. and Allied Munitions Expenditures by Type
Figure 3.7—Total Numbers of Munitions Expended

Chapter Four

WHY MILOSEVIC GAVE UP WHEN HE DID

As might have been predicted, disagreements arose after the cease-fire went into effect over which of the air war’s target priorities (fielded forces or infrastructure assets) was more crucial to producing the outcome. Contention also arose over the more basic question of the extent to which the air effort as a whole had been the cause of Milosevic’s capitulation. On the one hand, there was the view of those air power proponents who were wont to conclude up front that “for the first time in history, the application of air power alone forced the wholesale withdrawal of a military force from a disputed piece of real estate.”[1] On the other hand, there was the more skeptical view offered by the commander of the international peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, British Army Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson, who suggested that “the event of June 3 [when the Russians backed the West’s position and urged Milosevic to surrender] was the single event that appeared to me to have the greatest significance in ending the war.” Asked about the effects of the air attacks, Jackson, an avowed critic of air power, replied tartly: “I wasn’t responsible for the air campaign; you’re asking the wrong person.”[2]

We may never know for sure what mix of pressures and inducements ultimately led Milosevic to admit defeat, at least until key Serb archival materials become available or those closest to Milosevic during the air war become disposed to offer first-hand testimony. Asked by a reporter why Milosevic folded if the bombing had not defeated him militarily, Clark, who knew the Serb dictator well from previous negotiating encounters, replied: “You’ll have to ask Milosevic, and he’ll never tell you.”[3] Yet why Milosevic gave in and why he did so when he did are by far the most important questions about the air war experience, since the answers, insofar as they are knowable, will help to lay bare the coercive dynamic that ultimately swung the outcome of Allied Force. It need hardly be said that such insight can be of tremendous value in informing any strategy ultimately chosen by the United States and its allies for future interventions of that sort. Accordingly, it behooves analysts to make every effort to delve further into this innermost mystery of the air war, since even approximate answers, if buttressed by valid evidence, are almost certain to be more useful to senior policymakers than most “lessons” of a more technical nature regarding how specific systems worked and how various procedural aspects of the operation could have been handled better, important as the latter questions are.

In the search to understand what ultimately occasioned NATO’s success, one can, of course, insist that air power alone was the cause of Milosevic’s capitulation in the tautological sense that Allied Force was an air-only operation and that in its absence, there would have been no reason to believe that he would have acceded to NATO’s demands.[4] Yet as crucial as the 78-day bombing effort was in bringing Milosevic to heel, there is ample reason to be wary of any intimation that NATO’s use of air power produced that ending without any significant contribution by other factors. On the contrary, numerous considerations in addition to the direct effects of the bombing in all likelihood interacted to produce the Serb dictator’s eventual decision to cave in. As Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon have remarked, in a balanced reflection on this point, “air power might best be thought of as the force driving Milosevic into a deadend corner and threatening to crush him against the far wall. But had NATO not remained unified, Russia not joined hands with NATO in the diplomatic endgame, and the alliance not begun to develop a credible threat of a ground invasion, Milosevic might have found doors through which to escape from the corridor despite the aerial punishment.”[5]

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122

“AWOS Fact Sheet,” Hq USAFE/SA, December 17, 1999. See also William M. Arkin, “Top Air Force Leaders to Get Briefed on Serbia Air War Report,” Defense Daily, June 13, 2000, p. 1. As attested by cockpit display videotapes released to the press throughout the air war, allied air attacks succeeded in taking out quite a few more SA-6 launchers than those accounted for here. However, since the STRAIGHT FLUSH radar formed the core of an SA-6 battery, the battery was considered operational until the STRAIGHT FLUSH was destroyed. Comments on an earlier draft by Hq USAFE/IN, May 18, 2001.

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1

John A. Tirpak, “Lessons Learned and Re-Learned,” Air Force Magazine, August 1999, p. 23.

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2

Andrew Gilligan, “Russia, Not Bombs, Brought End to War in Kosovo, Says Jackson,” London Sunday Telegraph, August 1, 1999. To his credit, Jackson did later testify to the Commons Defense Committee of Britain’s parliament that “the effect of the strategic bombing, I suspect, was much weightier than the damage being done to the [Serb] army in Kosovo.” “General Admits NATO Exaggerated Bombing Success,” London Times, May 11, 2000.

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3

Michael Ignatieff, “The Virtual Commander: How NATO Invented a New Kind of War,” The New Yorker, August 2, 1999, p. 31.

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4

See, for example, Rebecca Grant, “Air Power Made It Work,” Air Force Magazine, November 1999, pp. 30–37.

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5

Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 2000, p. 184.