33 Ibid., p. 11.
34 Ibid., p. 12.
35 This refers to the use of ‘the orthodox and the unorthodox’ methods of employing troops, as discussed in Chapter 3.
36 Ibid., p. 16.
37 Ibid., pp. 19, 24.
38 Ibid., p. 24.
39 Ibid., p. 25.
40 Ibid., pp. 27–8.
41 Ibid., p. 28.
42 Ibid., p. 31.
43 Ibid., pp. 30–1.
44 Ibid., pp. 33–4 for the following section.
45 Ibid., p. 31. Here he obviously followed the contentious views of Liddell Hart, Lawrence and Fuller. As Azar Gat makes clear, Liddell Hart too made the mistake of missing the points that (1) the allied forces learned during the protracted wars against Napoleon and (2) that the blatant aggression led to their adoption of several tactical and stragical methods of Napoleon, including mass mobilization. So Napoleon’s failure cannot be attributed to his tactical concepts. See Azar Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War, Fuller, Liddell Hart, and other Modernists, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, p. 165.
46 Ibid., p. 40.
47 Ibid., p. 41. Clausewitz actually mentions several other centers of gravity as well. It can be an alliance, a capital, a political leader, and other ‘focal’ points of power. See for a detailed recent corrective Antulio Echevarria II, Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine-Again, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.
48 Ibid., p. 42.
49 Ibid., pp. 44–5.
50 Ibid., p. 46.
51 Ibid., p. 48.
52 Ibid., p. 49.
53 Ibid. Like Fuller in The Conduct of War, after this slide Boyd makes a brief excursion to Marxist revolutionary thought, noticing, however, that at this point in his presentation it is not clear how revolutionary strategy and guerrilla tactics fit in his argument, and he tells his audience that this will become evident after his discussion of World War I.
54 Ibid., p. 55.
55 As Azar Gat has recently convincingly argued, and as Michael Howard did before him, there certainly were genuine efforts to counter the increased lethality of the battlefield. See Azar Gat, The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, in particular Chapter 3, and Michael Howard, ‘The Influence of Clausewitz’, in Karl von Clausewitz, On War, (transl.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. For the German efforts in this vein, and a similar corrective message, see Antulio J. Echevarria II, After Clausewitz, German Military Thinkers Before the Great War, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000.
56 Ibid., p. 57.
57 Ibid., p. 59.
58 Ibid., p. 60.
59 Ibid., p. 62.
60 Ibid., p. 63.
61 Ibid., p. 62.
62 Ibid., p. 65.
63 Ibid., p. 64.
64 Interestingly, in selecting these concepts Boyd ignored developments some consider also of prime importance such as the development of (strategic) air power theory (with well known names such as Guilio Douhet and Billy Mitchell) or the introduction of carriers which transformed the face of sea power.
65 Ibid., p. 66.
66 Ibid., pp. 67–8.
67 Ibid., p. 69.
68 Ibid., p. 70.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., p. 71.
71 Ibid., p. 72.
72 Ibid. Note the use of the term ‘organism’.
73 Ibid., p. 74.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., p. 76.
76 Ibid., p. 78.
77 Ibid. Note how Boyd quietly moves to a higher level of abstraction when he asserts that the Schwerpunkt helps in establishing an advantage in adaptability.
78 Ibid., p. 79.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., p. 86.
81 Ibid., p. 87.
82 Ibid.
83 See p. 89.
84 Ibid., p. 88.
85 Ibid., p. 90.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., p. 91.
88 Ibid., p. 93.
89 Ibid., p. 94.
90 Ibid., p. 95.
91 Ibid., p. 96.
92 Ibid., p. 98.
93 Ibid., p. 101.
94 Ibid., p. 99.
95 Ibid., pp. 104–6.
96 Ibid., p. 105.
97 Ibid., pp. 107–8.
98 Ibid., p. 111.
99 Ibid., p. 113.
100 Ibid., p. 112. Notice the specific Cold War and post-Vietnam era elements.
101 Ibid., p. 114.
102 Ibid., p. 115.
103 Ibid., p. 117.
104 Ibid., p. 119.
105 Ibid., p. 120.
106 Ibid., p. 121.
107 Ibid., p. 124.
108 Ibid., p. 125.
109 Ibid., p. 128.
110 Ibid., p. 128.
111 Ibid., p. 129.
112 Ibid., p. 130.
113 Ibid., p. 131.
114 Ibid., p. 132.
115 Ibid., p. 133.
116 Ibid., p. 134.
117 Ibid., pp. 135–6.
118 Ibid., p. 137.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid., pp. 138–9.
121 Ibid., p. 140.
122 Ibid., p. 141.
123 Ibid., p. 142.
124 Ibid., p. 143.
125 Ibid., p. 148.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., p. 149.
128 Ibid., p. 150.
129 Ibid., p. 151. This strongly suggests there is more than only ‘OODA looping faster’ than the opponent.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid., p. 152.
132 Ibid., pp. 152–3.
133 Ibid., p. 156.
134 Ibid., p. 174.
135 Ibid., p. 175.
136 Ibid., p. 176.
137 Ibid., p. 177.
138 Ibid., p. 178.
139 Ibid., p. 184.
6 Exploration and refinement
1 Various sources have already been mentioned in footnotes in the previous chapter. Here it is worthwhile to note the following works that appear in Boyd’s bibliography: David Downing, The Devil’s Virtuosos: German Generals at War 1940–1945 (1977); T.N. Dupuy, The Military Life of Genghis, Khan of Khans (1969) and A Genius for War (1977); J.F.C. Fuller, Grant ands Lee, (1932); Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage, Crisis in Command (1978); Richard Gabriel and Reuven Gal, ‘The IDF Officer: Linchpin in Unit Cohesion’, Army (January 1984); John Gardner, Morale (1978); Simon Goodenough and Len Deighton, Tactical Genius in Battle (1979); Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (1952); Richard Humble, Hitler’s Generals (1974); Albert Kesselring, Manual for Command and Combat Employment of Smaller Units (1952); Harold Lamb, Genghis Khan (1927); Kenneth Macksey, Guderian, Creator of the Blitzkrieg (1976); S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (1947); Erwin Rommel, Infantry Attacks (1937); Charles Whiting, Patton (1970); and importantly, Martin van Creveld, Command in War (1982). Boyd’s C2 concept is one among many but he does not dwell on alternatives. See for a discussion of six different command arrangements for instance Chapter 6 of David Alberts and Richard E. Heyes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations, Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, CCRP publications, 1995.
2 ‘Organic design for Command and Control’, p. 2.
3 Ibid. It is not difficult to see the influence of The Tacit Dimension in this.
4 Ibid., p. 3.
5 Ibid., p. 4.
6 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
7 Ibid., p. 8.
8 Ibid., p. 9.
9 Ibid., p. 10.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 11.
12 Ibid., p. 15.
13 Ibid., p. 16.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 17.
16 Ibid., p. 18.
17 Ibid., p. 19.
18 Ibid., p. 20.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 21.
21 Ibid., p. 22.
22 Ibid., p. 23.
23 Ibid., p. 24.
24 Ibid., p. 25.
25 Ibid., p. 26.
26 Ibid., p. 28.
27 Ibid., p. 30.
28 Ibid., p. 29.
29 Ibid., p. 31.
30 Ibid., p. 32.
31 Ibid., p. 35.
32 Ibid., p. 34.
33 Ibid., p. 37. The definitions of command and control are here contrasted deliberately against those of understanding, monitoring, appreciation and leadership. Boyd actually listed them together in one sequence.