There are, of course, many possible distinctions that could be made about a particular step in a strategy as you analyze it in finer detail, such as color, location, pitch, clarity, etc., each of which may be useful at some time to achieve a specific outcome. As you choose the level of detail at which you will classify the representations in the strategy you are extracting, you'll want to opt for the description which is most elegant — that is, the one which employs the fewest distinctions but is still able to secure the outcome for which it was designed.
We have found the two distinctions presented so far to be the most essential for any adequate description of an experience. At times it may be important to add other modifiers into your notational description of a strategy, indicating which steps are involved in testing and operations, and checking the content experience being run through the strategy. We did this when we were identifying the difference between the constructed visual image (Vic) and the remembered visual image (Vir) in describing the test that took place in the visual spelling strategy. Memory (recall) and construction (imagination and fantasy) are formal distinctions that can be made for the internally generated experience in any of the representational systems, and seem to be a result of the functional differences ascribed to the two cerebral hemispheres in human beings.
Much research in recent years has been done on the functional differences in the neurological processing between the dominant hemisphere (the left cerebral hemisphere in most right–handed people) and the non–dominant hemisphere (the right cerebral hemisphere in right–handed people). The dominant hemisphere, it is claimed, tends to carry out linear, sequential, cause–effect type processing and, as a result, is responsible for the manipulation and construction of our internally generated experience. The non–dominant hemisphere, it is claimed, tends to carry out the more presentational, spatial, integrative, gestalten types of processing, and is thus responsible for much of the reaccessing and recalling of past sensory representations.[17]
Because of "handedness" (the fact that we tend to use one side of our body more than the other for many tasks), the dominant hemisphere will in many cases have a higher signal level than the activity taking place concurrently in the non–dominant hemisphere. As a result people are often more conscious of the activity taking place in their dominant hemisphere and less aware of non–dominant functions. We have found that making the distinction between dominant and non–dominant hemisphere functions (specifically those involving consciousness, memory and construction) is sometimes important for our work, particularly that involving altered states of consciousness (this is presented in detail in Patterns I & II). We will therefore often include some of these distinctions in our notation for strategies.
We have already used the "r" (remembered) and "c" (constructed) notation for these distinctions in this book. Using the "r" and "c" as a subscript to Vi, Ai, Ki or Oi, is redundant in the sense that we know that if someone is constructing or remembering an image they will be necessarily employing an internal orientation for that representational system. To make our notation more elegant, then, when it is necessary to indicate a remembered versus a constructed distinction, we will notate the "c" or "r" as a superscript in place of the "i". A constructed sound then will be noted as Ac; a remembered feeling will be noted as Kr ; and so forth.
Another distinction related to hemispheric functioning that we consider useful is the difference between digital (verbal) representations in the auditory representational system, and those involving tonal and tempo (non–verbal) qualities. Our language (auditory, digital) representations tend to be primarily organized by neurological systems localized in our dominant hemisphere (the left hemisphere for right–handed people). Although remembered verbal experiences, such as tapeloops and cliches, become incorporated by the non–dominant hemisphere, this .hemisphere seems to be somewhat specialized for organizing the tonal, melodic and rhythmic portions of our auditory experience. The information carried by each of these different processes will often have a very different functional significance. The digital portions of our communications belong to a class of experience that we refer to as "secondary experience." Secondary experience is composed of the representations that we use to code our primary experience — secondary experience (such as words and symbols) are only meaningful in terms of the primary sensory representations that they anchor for us. This is why we will often show the digital[18] component of an experience to be outside of the 4–tuple:
Here we have distinguished between the tonal and digital portion of our auditory representational system by subscripting with a "d" for digital or verbal, and a "t" for tonal and tempo qualities. (See Patterns II pp. 17–19 for a more explicit discussion of this distinction).
We have also indicated in this diagram the remembered and constructed distinctions as being possible subcategories of the internally generated experience.
Another possible distinction you may wish to make is that between the tactile (somatosensory) and visceral (emotional and proprioceptive) portions of kinesthetic experience.[19] Sometimes emotional or visceral representations will have a different functional significance for the behavioral task than those which involve purely external tactile sensations (pain, pressure and temperature). In general, however, we choose, for notational purposes, to class visceral sensations as kinesthetic internal experience (in the same category as remembered and constructed kinesthetic sensations).
As we said before, choose to make the distinctions you determine to be necessary to achieve the outcome you are working towards. It is sometimes important to break down the auditory digital aspects of someone's strategy into the corresponding meta–model category. For instance, we have observed that in many people the appearance of modal operators of necessity (words like "should," "must," "have to," "is necessary," "need to," etc.) in the verbal portions of their motivation or decision strategies often trigger the kinesthetic sensations of anxiety or stress. If they change these words to modal operators of possibility (words like "can," "is possible," "will," etc.) they are still able to achieve the outcome of the strategy but experience much less stress and discomfort.
You can also feel free to customize your notational system to fit your own needs, and to include distinctions that you think are important for the strategies that you find yourself working with. The distinctions we have offered here simply constitute what we believe to be the most minimal and elegant set of distinctions with which to analyze and notate strategy steps.[20]
3.23 Unpacking Strategies Through Accessing Cues.
We have previously mentioned that the verbal portion of our communication constitutes only one aspect of the entire process of communication. In fact, in our way of thinking, it often constitutes the least important part of the communication. A tremendous amount of information is communicated through the nonverbal (tonal, gestural and tactile) aspect of our communication, that typically takes place beneath the conscious awareness of most . people. Further, most people are unconscious of the vast majority of representations that pass through their neurological systems as they cycle through their strategies. It is very difficult for many people to tune into their actual sensory experience, or to communicate it verbally.
17
It should be pointed out that hemispheric brain research to date has not incorporated the representational system model presented in this book. We suspect that many of the attributes ascribed to the different hemispheres may also be attributed to representational systems. Many of the conclusions of this research should be re–evaluated from the perspective of the NLP model.
18
Digital representations may occur in any of the three major representational systems. The written symbols you are reading now are examples of visual digital (Vd) representations. Braille constitutes kinesthetic digital (Kd ) representations.
19
Many of the visceral, emotional and proprioceptive body sensations are mediated primarily by lower and evolutionary older brain structures like the lymbic system, and have no projection to the cerebral cortex.
20
We can show the distinctions we have presented as a set of hierarchic tree structures, beginning at the top with the most basic classifications:
