Such examples could easily be multiplied, and they all share a common pattern: phenomena which at one point in history were considered a nuisance, an obstacle or even a danger have been studied and understood sufficiently to allow us to utilize them in ways that benefit us. We have expanded or changed our models to transform problematic phenomena thought to be outside our control into valuable contributions to human well–being, within our control. Each of the examples in the previous paragraph, taken in its historical context, involved the shift of a portion of our experience from the class of environmental variables into the class of decision variables by reframing or restructuring the way a problematic phenomenon fit into our models. It is the continuation of this process, the shifting of environmental variables into decision variables by sorting and punctuating the way the variables fit into context, that is the goal of neurolinguistic programming. In our modern technologically oriented culture we have developed a large number of machines and devices which we use in our everyday activities. Nearly without exception these machines embody one or more of the forces of gravity, electricity or magnetism as an integral part of their functioning. Yet an adequate theory of these primary forces remains an elusive goal for the scientist. Fortunately effective models which secure the outcomes for which they are designed do not require complete and satisfactory theories. The reader will search in vain for any theory of human perception, communication and experience within these covers. Our goals here are much more modest — a model of a portion of these complex human activities which works.
Throughout the development of western scientific models there has been a major limitation imposed on the possible outcomes of human behavior, a limitation buried deeply in the empirical heart of scientific methodology itself. If we imagine ourselves stepping into the scientist's shoes, slipping into a crisp white lab coat and looking through the scientist's eyes, we may picture a universe of phenomena neatly interconnected by formulas, laws, theories and hypotheses — all "out there," either already discovered and explained or waiting to be discovered and explained. What's missing? To find out we remove the lab coat, step out of the scientist's shoes, take three steps back and look again. The scientist is missing. The model–maker, observer, measurer, mathematician, inventor of laws, theories and hypotheses — gone. According to its own empirical constraint, the syntax of science simultaneously defines an external model of "reality" and banishes the scientist from that model. By definition, the locus of behavioral control is "out there" in the model, not in us.
This pattern is particularly evident in the model of modern medicine. This model postulates that internal disorders such as tumors, infections, diseases and other pathological conditions inside the individual are caused primarily by environmental variables (such as germs, viruses, smog, heat, cold, ultraviolet light, etc.) and necessarily require external remedial treatment to restore the human body to health. Rather than utilize ways in which the biologicial system could be altered, regulated or adapted by the individual himself to change the pathological condition. Simplified, the remedial treatments of choice reduce to adding or subtracting something from the biological system — i.e., chemotherapy, radiation therapy, surgery or some combination of these. In this model even behavioral disorders such as schizophrenia are thought to originate from causes outside the behavior of the individual and to require external remedial treatment.
On the other hand, phenomena like the placebo effect, statistically important in all clinical drug research, are generally ignored because they can't be adequately explained in the context of the current medical model. When a patient responds to a placebo, a "fake" pill or injection of chemically inactive ingredients, by recovering from an ailment, he or she is considered an oddity who has been fooled by the fake medicine. Such cases are generally filed and forgotten, rather than being taken seriously as pointing in the direction of an alternative model of medicine. If the behavior of those who respond well to placebos can be modeled, their strategies for self–healing might be taught to others, an option for recovery that wouldn't require the ingestion of chemically active drugs with their typically undesirable side–effects. In the current medical model, the patient places the locus of behavioral control in the physician; the physician places it in the model. The placebo effect suggests that "getting sick" and "getting well" are, in fact, behaviors and, further, that the locus of behavioral control is in the individual — that sickness can be a decision variable for the individual.
This pattern of placing behavioral control outside ourselves has undoubtedly evolved from the fact that scientists have always looked outside themselves for variables and for sources of instrumental control that more easily lend themselves to measurement and reproducible results. The original model of behavioral science, like that of modern medicine, adopted the pattern of locating behavioral control outside the individual. Because the internal sensory–motor processes of the organism aren't measurable by the instruments available to the behavioral scientist, they are not considered to be part of the domain of the model.
1.5 Extending the Modern Scientific Model
As we pointed out earlier in this chapter, neurolinguistic programming constitutes the next natural extension in the evolutionary development of cultural models. By understanding that human beings do not operate directly on the world they are experiencing but through sensory transforms of that world, we also understand that "truth" is a metaphor rather than a yardstick calibrated to some absolute standard of external reality. Cultural models, including that of science, do not express "truth," but prescribe domains of experience within which behavior is organized into certain patterns. To the extent that the structural elements, syntax and limits of each model are arbitrarily selected and defined, we might suggest that models, in general, are metaphors for the convenient assumption that experience and reality are the same. Similarly, NLP is not the "truth" either, but another metaphor — a user oriented metaphor designed to generate behavioral options quickly and effectively.
NLP extends the limits of the modern scientific model by placing the locus of behavioral control in the individual. Einstein's relativity theory indicates that time, mass and spatial dimensions change relative to the observer's frame of reference at speeds approaching the speed of light. Although Einstein's theory represents an extension of the limits of preceding scientific models by its inclusion of the observer's perspective, behavioral control in his theory is a function of the relation between the velocity of the system and that of the speed of light, both of which are assumed to be external to the observer. NLP takes one further step and proposes to examine the correlations between what we experience as the external environment and our internal representations of that experience. To accomplish this, NLP draws from many recent advances in the neurosciences, psychophysiology, linguistics, cybernetics, communication theory and the information sciences.
To understand how our neurological processes are related to behavioral models, it is useful to represent mathematical equations from the scientific model as metaphors for those processes. Each mathematical equation defines a pattern in which a sequence of operations performed on specific variables results in a given outcome. For example, Newton's equation F = ma defines force as a function of (and equivalent to) the product of mass and acceleration. Each appropriate set of numerical values plugged into m and a, when multiplied together, expresses a specific outcome — force. The form of the equation remains the same, no matter what quantitative values are substituted for m and a, just as the form of a neurological pattern or sequence of operations remains the same, no matter what content is processed through it. It isn't important whether F = ma describes a real physical law; what's important about this formula is its demonstration of the human capacity to develop neural patterns that allow us to organize our representations of physical phenomena to obtain desired outcomes. Just as we have invented complex neural patterns that allow us to tie our shoelaces, play golf or read a book, we can develop neural patterns that fulfill other objectives.