“But what about communications with the Eastern Med?” said Alexander. “Our difficulties in Syria were largely due to the fact that it took so long to get reinforcements to us round the Cape and through Suez. Shouldn’t we open the Med—east to west—and eliminate that condition?”
“In due course,” said Tovey. “That would be done, but under conditions far more favorable to us once we have Sardinia. I speak now from a purely naval standpoint. If I’m asked to cover an invasion against either Sardinia or Sicily, I find the former to be a much easier task. I can operate in the Central Med, just as Lord Nelson did to keep the French Fleet bottled up at Toulon. There I would be beyond enemy air power, but if I must cover landings on Sicily, my fleet must come within range of enemy fields on both Sicily and Sardinia, particularly to cover landings in the southeast of the island, and this is one reason why I advocate taking Sardinia first, and making it our own unsinkable aircraft carrier.”
“Wouldn’t this invite the same response from Admiral Raeder?”
“Yes, but I would be facing him directly, and not looking over my shoulder if I have to transit the Sicilian Narrows to cover the Husky landing plan.”
Marshall spoke up now, for he had considered this and opted for Sicily. “To my thinking, we can cover Sicily better with our air force. It’s only 150 miles from Bizerte to Marsala or Trapani, and a little less from Tunis. The problem is the plan. We can’t invade Sicily without having to reduce Malta first. It’s only this insistence that we land south of Catania, on the southeast tip of the island, that makes Malta an imperative pre-requisite. Once we’re ashore at Trapani, we move to take Palermo, and then along the northern coast to Messina, which will force the enemy to abandon their positions in southeast Sicily, or be completely cut off.”
“Sound thinking,” said Tovey. “Yet I might also add that Cagliari on Sardinia is only 140 miles from Bizerte. The real question in all of this is what we expect to achieve by targeting either island? If we take Sicily, then where do we go?”
“Right into the toe and foot of Italy,” said Montgomery. “We’ve already planned four such operations, under the code names Buttress, Goblet, Musket and Slapstick. If taking Sicily alone doesn’t knock Italy out of the war, then that should do the trick.”
“Alright, let’s assume that knocking Italy out is a good objective,” said Marshall, “but that doesn’t mean the place will suddenly be neutral. The Germans will occupy the whole peninsula, and have every reason to do so. They’ll save the 20 million tons of coal they now ship Italy annually, and then they would seize all the Italian rail stock, along with their Navy. Beyond that, they’ll retain all the naval and air bases, maintaining a threatening presence in the Central Med, which will force us to go in there after them if we want them out. Can you imagine trying to fight your way up that peninsula? The terrain is tailor made for the defense, and you’d be at it a year or longer. Let’s not forget that our real effort against the Germans must come across the English Channel, and as soon as possible. Every resource, every ship, every division we commit to operations against Italy, is one less we have to use for the main event—France.”
“If I may,” said Tovey. “This is where the occupation of Sardinia gets interesting again. It’s nearly 200 miles by air from Palermo to Naples, and to Rome, that distance increases to just over 260 miles. However, from airfields around La Maddalena, Rome is only 170 miles or so.”
“My thoughts exactly,” said Patton. “If you want me to land on Sicily, I’ll do it, and I’ll take Palermo and Messina as well. But General Marshall has a point about fighting our way up that peninsula. That’s no place for a swashbuckling old cavalry officer like me. We’ll be bogged down there for months, if not a year. Yet if we do take Sardinia, we outflank anything they have in Southern Italy, and we can make an easy jump to the beaches north of Rome. You want to knock Mussolini out of the war fast? That’s the way to do it, right in the kneecap; not by tickling his foot.”
“There is some merit to that,” said Eisenhower. “If we do land in the south, and get stuck, then we’ll have to plan a subsequent invasion to unhinge that defense. Striking north of Rome would probably force any German presence in the south to retreat north, and fast. We could then occupy all of southern Italy to get useful ports and airfields without having to fight for it, and both Sicily and Malta wither on the vine and die like rotten fruit.”
“What about the German garrison there, and dare I say, the Italian troops as well?”
“I would think the Germans would see the writing on the wall and try to evacuate Sicily once we landed in Sardinia. As for the Italians, they would likely stay put, but if we force Italy to the negotiating table, and get an armistice, we won’t have to fight them.”
Marshall thought about that, and then nodded his head, as if coming to some inner decision. Montgomery had devised a terribly complex operation. He wanted to clear Pantelleria in a week’s time, then invade Malta by sea, which would take another two to three weeks. Then he had insisted, somewhat conceitedly, that the landing on Sicily would be under his command, and take place on the southeast end of the island. Patton’s troops were to land on his left, essentially covering his flank as he pushed north for Messina, or moving to clear western Sicily after the enemy retreated. After that he wanted to invade the toe and heel of Italy and start the long push north.
“General Brooke?” he asked.
“Well, I was going to say we go bald-headed for Sicily. It would probably be the stronger blow, but considering Sardinia, it would at least afford us a base to bomb all of Italy and southern Europe, and it would likely be easier to undertake. However, it doesn’t open the Med, and it might not force Italy to the negotiating table. In my mind, we must continue serious planning there in any case, for if the Sicily plan is deemed impractical, we need an alternative operation this year. Brimstone seems to be the only other ticket we have.”
Chapter 8
“It might be easier to hit Sardinia and then go right to Rome,” said Marshall, “but would the Germans conclude we intend to bypass Sicily? What if they don’t, and then hold their troops in the south.”
“Then they’d be in for a rude awakening when we go for Rome,” said Eisenhower. “It’s clear that we can cut them off by hitting Central Italy after we take Sardinia. But we won’t get there any time soon if we have to fight our way up through Sicily and all of the south.”
That was going to be a real grind, thought Marshall, and it was not likely that that Monty would get far before he was stopped in that rugged terrain. It had taken him many months to push from Algiers to Bone! That meant the Allies would probably have to plan subsequent invasions, all aimed at flanking the German defensive lines across Italy. It would tie up shipping, landing craft, supplies, and divisions in the Med for months, and set back planning for Roundup, the main landing in France. God only knows how long it will take before Montgomery finally gets to Rome.