“Doesn’t this yield the initiative to the enemy?” said Hitler immediately.
“Temporarily,” said Manstein, “for we would again be employing the concept of elastic defense. The Russians wanted Kharkov, and they may try for it again, though I am now inclined to think they want to reach and cross the Middle Donets as their primary objective this summer. Good for them I say! In fact, I would fold back our lines if they attack with their strongest shock groups, and invite them to cross the river again, and fall right into the same trap that we used to defeat them a few weeks ago.”
“Fold back our lines? I do not like the sound of that at all,” said Hitler. “General Heinrici was all too fond of folding back his lines, and he is no longer in command of his old army.”
“Heinrici’s front on the Oskol River was not essential,” said Zeitzler, feeling he should at least defend the man. “We needed to hold the Upper Donets, and that we did.”
“Except the region north of Chuguyev. The enemy still has his foot in the door there,” said Hitler, “and he should be pushed back over the river with all speed. As for the line between the Donets and Oskol at Kupyansk, that front is now protecting very valuable terrain. The Donets must not be crossed again in the south. It is the last major barrier between the enemy and the coal mines of the Donets Basin, which also screen Rostov, the gateway to our Army Group in the Caucasus.”
“All the more reason why 57th Panzer Korps must remain there. It cannot return to the Caucasus, nor can it be made available to go to the west after this unfortunate business in Tunisia.”
“But we must find new forces somewhere,” said Hitler. “Turkey is watching these developments closely, and we cannot permit anything to threaten our position there. You may continue to advocate these risky maneuvers, General Manstein, folding back your lines in the face of an enemy attack, but in my mind, terrain yielded to the enemy is not always recovered easily, as we have seen. We may have stopped the enemy Spring offensive, but we are not on the eastern Psel any longer, are we? We are not on the northern Oskol River either. Sergei Kirov has already spoiled breakfast. Don’t go thinking I will now want to give him my lunch! I want no more talk of folding back the lines, or inviting the enemy to take anything from us he does not pay for. For this reason, I reject the notion that we should wait for him to strike us first. This conference is to decide our own offensive operations, not to contemplate defense, elastic or otherwise.”
Zeitzler and Manstein had both spoken before the meeting, and this was what they expected to hear from Hitler. They had decided that it would be fruitless to engage in a two-day struggle with the Führer over this issue, and so the conference then moved quickly to offensive options, with all eyes on the map.
“Very well,” said Zeitzler. “Then we must now decide whether Untergang should be launched against Leningrad, and if so, when that would be most prudent. General Manstein?”
“It is clear that we cannot conduct that offensive while also contemplating offensives here in the south. If Untergang is launched, that is where Steiner must go, which means we will be forced to the strategic defensive in the Kharkov Donets sector. The enemy is clearly planning his defense against any thrust towards Leningrad, and yet look at all the forces he has brought to the Donets!”
“You believe they will renew their offensive here?” Zeitzler asked the question, though he already knew the answer.
“Of course they will, which is why I proposed an elastic defense to stop them as we did in April. If Untergang is launched in May, do not think the enemy will sit quietly on our porch here while we drive on Leningrad. He will attack, and with everything he has along the Donets—aiming to seize all that valuable territory that you are keen to protect, my Führer. Our other option is to instead pre-empt his offensive here with an attack of our own, and see that to a successful conclusion, with the aim of destroying the enemy’s power to conduct further offensives here before we launch Untergang.”
“I agree with that proposal,” said Model. “Mine is a defensive army, but I would rather see us after the enemy than sit waiting for him to come for us again. What are the prospects for our own offensive?”
“Three options have been identified,” said Zeitzler. “The first is Operation Habicht (Hawk). It will involve an attack across the Donets north of their 3rd Shock Group bridgehead, concurrent with an attack from the vicinity of Kupyansk—a pincer operation against the large group of mobile formations that remain between the Donets and Oskol Rivers. The second option is to widen those pincers by staging the attack from a point east of the Oskol River in the south, and at Belgorod in the north. This would attempt to pocket all the enemy forces along the upper Donets as well as those on the river gap sector, a much more enterprising offensive now coded Operation Panther. Opinions?”
“The second is too ambitious,” said Model immediately. “Where would those pincers meet?”
“One would drive on Valuki from the south, the other on Stary Oskol in the north.”
“Those objectives are far apart, and so both pincers will also be widely spaced. This will become nothing more than two unsupported attacks. I vote no on such a plan, and rather prefer the tighter attack that Operation Habicht proposes.”
“I think I must agree,” said Manstein. “For Panther we would have to reinforce both 48th and 57th Panzer Korps to make them strong enough for the job, and the most likely means of doing so would be to split Steiner’s Korps in two. I would prefer to keep his forces united as one mailed fist. Furthermore, the terrain east of Belgorod does not favor an attack to the east as in the Panther Operation. We would have to cross a series of rivers, and push through heavily wooded ground. For Habicht, all we have to do is force the crossing at Volchansk, then drive that pincer southeast along the main road and rail. The southern pincer can drive past Kupyansk, and then swing to the northwest. They should meet about here…” He fingered the map, “At Verliki Burluk.”
“That does not gain us much ground,” said Hitler. “Operation Panther gives me all the terrain back that we lost in April.”
“Only if it succeeds,” said Manstein, “and I have my doubts about that, as does General Model. Our objective with Habicht is not to gain terrain, but to destroy the three enemy shock groups we pocket—five or six armies. If we do that, the terrain will come to us as a bonus, and we will have destroyed their offensive potential against Army Group South for the foreseeable future. Then Untergang may proceed in the Summer, perhaps as early as June.”
“Is there another option?” Hitler was still not satisfied.
“Kursk,” said Zeitzler. “Operation Zitadelle. We could strike from the Bryansk-Orel sector on one side, and from the vicinity of Belgorod, only this time that group drives north and west, with the objective being the capture of Kursk and defeat of all the enemy forces within that bulge. General Kluge? You command Army Group Center. What is your opinion?”
“What will I use to attack from the north? I have already sent 42 Korps and 48th Panzer Korps to the Kharkov sector. The only way to get any offensive steam would be if I received fresh panzer divisions, unless you plan on returning Knobelsdorff to my command.”
“The plan calls for 48th Panzerkorps to remain in the south.”