Chapter 18
News coming to Manstein’s Headquarters was consistently bad. In the North, the enemy had already broken through west of Tomarovka, and powerful new forces were smashing their way through that second line of defense that the two remaining divisions of Salmuth’s Korps had thrown up. They had arrived just in time to be hit by the steam rolling offensive, a thankless fate. The men were weary from the long 70-kilometer march, and few battalions had time to get set up or prepare any kind of defensive positions. The enemy tanks were a new model that none of the Germans had seen before, and they watched their 50mm AT gun rounds bounce off that armor on the Kirov tanks.
Manstein drafted the orders that he knew he had to deliver, in spite of what Hitler would think. To Korps Raus holding the upper Donets and Belgorod, he signaled. “Your Korps is to withdraw from Belgorod immediately on the road through Mikoyanovka, and positions on the upper Donets are to be relinquished in good order as this movement proceeds.”
To Dostler’s 42nd Korps and Salmuth’s 10th: “You are to fall back in a fighting defensive withdrawal, while continuing to maintain as cohesive a front as possible between the Vorskla River and the Donets. Every effort should be made to maintain contact with Korps Raus on your right. In this movement, Tomarovka is to be deemed non-essential.”
To Knobelsdorff at his headquarters in Borisovka he signaled: “Your divisions are to render screening and defensive support to the infantry wherever possible, but it will be essential that 6th Panzer be extricated from the line as soon as possible.”
To General Walther Modeclass="underline" “Given the enemy breakthrough west of Belgorod, it is necessary to readjust your lines so as to maintain contact with our forces on your right. In doing so, Sumy is to be screened and held, but positions on the Psel should be considered disposable at your own discretion. It is imperative that you maintain the integrity of your army in the field, and use every opportunity to frustrate and wear down enemy offensive thrusts in your sector.”
Manstein hoped that note would be interpreted correctly, for Model was a very astute officer, and knew exactly what he needed to do in a situation like this. At the same time, Manstein had also passed the buck on that order, leaving the final decision up to Model as to whether he would withdraw.
In the south, Manstein had told Hollidt to pull his Korps back to the Donets and seek better defensive ground in the woodland fringing the winding river. 17th Panzer was already holding near the river and screening Balakleya. Reports came that the Russians had again seized Andreyevka, and forced their way over the river to create a small bridgehead. Whether they had any strength behind it was not known.
The only bright spot was the steady advance of the Wiking Division, which had leapt from the trains and deployed enough strength forward to quickly clear out Novaya Vodolaga. They continued northeast another eight kilometers before the sun came up on the 1st day of June, eventually meeting the 186th Tank Brigade and engaging it in that grey hour.
That morning, Manstein would cover all these exceptional orders, each one given without consultation with OKW or Hitler, with a long letter to Zeitzler:
“I have, this hour, ordered numerous adjustment to the front now being held by Army Group South in the interest of rebuilding a cohesive defense aimed at halting the current enemy counteroffensive. These orders entail the movement of certain formations, so as to maintain the army’s integrity as a fighting force in the field, and prevent any encirclement of our forces that would become a grave weakening of our general situation and overall strength.
If my intentions as Commander are frustrated by countervailing orders from OKW, or higher authority, I shall have no choice but to assume the Führer has not the necessary confidence in this Headquarters. While no commander in the field should ever be considered infallible, I must point out that this Army Group has carried out each and every assignment given to it with exemplary vigor, and when faced with difficult situations at the end of last year, and against the enemy’s previous attempt to seize Kharkov, we were able to master the situation. The orders I have issued are herewith attached, and are deemed by this Headquarters as essential prerequisites to ensure the defense of Kharkov, and prepare an appropriately timed counterattack.
If the Führer thinks he can find any Army Group Commander or headquarters staff with better nerves than we had in the past six months, with more initiative than we have showed, or with the ability to foresee the inevitable more clearly than we have done, I am fully prepared to hand over to them. As long as I remain at this post, however, I must have the chance to use my own head.”
It was a stunning and bold communication, covering the withdrawals he had ordered, and basically telling both OKW and Hitler to stay out of his affairs, or find someone else to command Army Group South. He thinly veiled his intention to tender his resignation if his present conduct of the battle was interfered with.[2]
When Zeitzler read the letter, his eyes fixed on one salient comment: “…so as to maintain the army’s integrity as a fighting force in the field.” That spoke volumes, the sum of all fears now arising in the minds of the Generals at OKW. The enemy had been able to seize the initiative on the field, and hold it, for the first time in the war. German offensives were now counteroffensives, all aimed at restoring a deteriorating position, and they seldom ended with any full recovery of territory that had been lost to the enemy. Soviet armies appeared on the front at the most inopportune time, and there seemed to be no end to them. All this was also creating a rising level of tension at OKW, for with every backward step the Army took, Hitler would become more and more irrational, more unstable, more demanding, and given to fits of anger and frustration.
As a hedge against Hitler, Manstein would have his staff update OKW on new division positions only after his orders were carried out and the units reported they were on their new assigned frontage. He knew that Hitler found any retreat inimical, unwilling to believe that the German Army could be forced off ground it was determined to hold. The long years of triumph had convinced him that the Wehrmacht was invincible, and he would then blame the loss of ground on the incompetence or weak nerves of his Generals. For him, iron will was the only solution to adversity.
The entire issue of the “adjustments” that Manstein had ordered would, however, be quickly eclipsed by new developments. The Soviets had opened yet another attack, this time aimed at Paulus and his 6th Army in the Don basin. 44th, 28th, 51st, and 2nd Guards Armies smashed through the remnants of Polsten’s 69th Korps, flanking Seydlitz-Kurzbach and compelling him to withdraw towards the Donets. This was Manstein’s greatest fear, a move that now threatened to cut off the entire position in the Caucasus. The rest of 6th Army was strung out to the east, and in danger of being cut off.
It was almost inevitable that there would be repercussions from the bold moves Manstein ordered near Kharkov, but when this news reached OKW, he was not surprised when Hitler announced that he would again fly to the scene for a direct conference, undoubtedly to prevent any further unilateral actions by Manstein. The General, and his Chief of Staff Hans Speidel, steeled themselves for the storm.
2
The letter presented in this narrative was very much in accord with one that Manstein had written in the real history, recounted in his own record of these events in the volume “Lost Victories,” page 453, quoted here in part, with adaptations to account for the alternate history being presented in this volume.