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“I am gratified to hear that,” said Manstein. “Yet realize that all I have done, in every situation, was for the preservation of the Army I command. 4th Army would be dead now if I had not acted earlier. 5th Panzerarmee is already dead, and now 6th Army is dying. Let me save it. May I order Paulus to move as I have requested?”

“You may do so, as long as you hold the line of the lower Donets, and Rostov as well. I will get you the troops you need, and then I expect you to use them. Push the enemy back, General Manstein. It is not enough to simply stop them. You must push them back—crush them, and show them the futility of these offensives. Then we can return to plans for our own summer offensive in earnest. It was abundantly clear that Zitadelle was hastily mounted, premature, and ill-conceived.”

“I argued against it,” said Manstein. “It had no hope of succeeding without a strong pincer on the northern segment.

“Indeed,” said Hitler. “That is now quite apparent, and I will also admit to you that had we heeded your advice and dealt with this concentration of enemy forces in the south first, then we might not be having this discussion here today. So now we correct that situation. I want you to use this opportunity to destroy these armies reaching for Kharkov. I have restored Steiner’s Korps to full power. Use it!”

Chapter 20

One other thing was ‘abundantly clear’ to Manstein after this exchange. In spite of every effort to clarify the situation the Army now faced, Hitler did not grasp what he had tried to convey. There he was talking of the enemy offensives as if they were mere spoiling attacks, a nuisance that interfered with his plans for further summer offensives that had not even been discussed. It was one thing to make such grandiose and sweeping statements, but quite another to see them carried through on the field of battle.

A feeling of quiet despair settled on the Field Marshal, for he knew that he would soon be placed in situations that would force him to make very difficult choices and decisions. He might have to choose between saving the army, the real army in the field, or preserving Hitler’s fanciful notion of that army by loyally acceding to his commands. Would it take a disaster greater than the loss of 5th Panzer Army to shake some sense into the Führer?

For his part, Hitler had been unwilling to take Manstein’s head, and he had pardoned his transgressions with an uncharacteristic willingness to compromise. This was born of the fact that he had come to many of the same conclusions concerning his foray into Syria and Iraq. It had seemed such a clear and vital plan at the outset, and the stunning success of Guderian’s Operation Phoenix was thrilling. Yet for what? The reality was that all the economic objectives were fruitless. Only the Maykop operation had delivered anything that could be used. In that, the Führer knew in his bones that his Field Marshal was correct.

Something in him took solace in the suggestion that the fields at Groznyy and Baba Gurgur be completely destroyed. He gave the order to Guderian to do that in his theater, and then to transfer both 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions to the general reserve on the Ostfront. He would also pull 2nd and 16th Panzers out of Syria, and begin to move Kubler’s Mountain troops to Italy. Plan Orient, rising from its ashes as Operation Phoenix, would now come to an end, for even Hitler could also perceive the growing threat in the east, and the grave danger the revitalized Soviet Army now represented.

That was where the war would be won or lost, and the Führer knew it as a man knows impending death when it stalks him. Yes, now he would war on death itself.

In spite of this awareness growing in the darkness of his mind, there was still a certain sloth in the way he would give consideration to requests made by his Generals. He remained stingy with his permission to make withdrawals, and while he made many promises, procrastination would become his weakness now. Hitler would consider all that Manstein had told him, but he would take his time.

In the short run, he would take one infantry division from Armeegruppe Center, the 7th, and allow Manstein to transfer two divisions from Hansen’s Army in the Caucasus, the 24th and 68th, which were formed into 44th Korps under General Maximilian de Angelis. That would still leave seven Line Infantry, four Light Infantry and two Security Divisions in the Caucasus, along with the 18th Panzer Division. While Hitler would give orders to shift all Oil Brigades to Maykop and the pipeline project effort to Tuapse, he did not yet order the destruction of the Groznyy fields, nor any withdrawal to consolidate the front closer to Maykop.

Volkov had to be left to stew for a while longer. Hitler wanted him to think that the cessation of operations there was merely a pause while the Army dealt with the Soviets. As for Operation Untergang, it was only mentioned in passing during the conference. Hitler continued to tie up much needed troops there, as the Russians stolidly dug in to await any attack that might come their way. The Führer continued to believe that Zitadelle was simply a cake that had been pulled out of the oven too soon, and inwardly blamed Manstein for cancelling it without his permission, though he never voiced that to the Field Marshal directly.

As for Manstein himself, Hitler began to feel that he was as much of a problem for him as an asset. The Field Marshal had just enough capital in the bank to preserve his post and allow his decisions to stand, but the Führer was quietly eying General Model as a possible replacement, again something he kept to himself. He would wait and see what developed around Kharkov. Perhaps the old miracle worker would prevail yet again.

And perhaps not…. There was a good deal that men like Mikhail Katukov, Vasily Kuznetsov, Rokossovsky, Vatutin, Konev and others would have to say about the matter, for words and promises do not stop the cold steel of enemy tanks, and procrastination in the face of a determined enemy was never wise.

* * *

The telephone rang at Manstein’s headquarters in Kharkov, and Speidel answered. It was General Model, and he had some very welcome news.

“The Führer has approved a transfer of two divisions to your sector,” he began. “So I have ordered General Siebert to take his 5th Korps to a position forward of Akythrya. If nothing else, you can know that you will have something in reserve.”

“That is very good news,” said Speidel. “Please tell me these are not hand me downs.”

“The Corps is composed of the 102nd and 294th. Both saw action last month, but they have been rested.”

“Any new infantry matters a great deal,” said Speidel. “The units on the front are wearing very thin, at least at the point of the enemy attack. I will see that the Field Marshal is informed immediately. His conference with the Führer has ended.”

“I hope it went well,” said Model. “Kluge tells me that there may be more coming from 9th Army. Whatever was discussed, it seems to have broken the logjam where Hitler’s use of reserve divisions is concerned. These were all troops he had insisted we hold for an offensive aimed at Orel. Needless to say, that is not in the works.”

“What is coming from 9th Army?”

“One division, the 82nd, and another Kampfgruppe. I’m afraid that may be all we can send. Tell Manstein that I have redeployed my right wing as he requested. If necessary, I can pivot that front towards Akythrya. That has to be where they are headed now. They want to envelop Kharkov.”

“Things are difficult,” said Speidel. “They are on the outskirts of the city as we speak. Every time I look at the map, all I can see is one massive pocket forming. If that northern pincer gets out of control, and moves due south, we could be in the stew. Hitler will see these division transfers as blood money, and he will not want us to withdraw.”