The enemy garrison was not strong. Even the Luftwaffe had been withdrawing most of its key air assets to Sicily, leaving long range recon, and a few fighter squadrons on the island. Two battalions of the San Marco Marines held the place, with a battalion of the Folgore Parachute Brigade, and the Italians had more planes there than the Germans, until the Allies began visiting the fields with daily fighter sweeps. The RAF was working hard to neutralize that outpost as a viable air base for the Axis, and then hammering key installations on Sicily daily as well, particularly the fields near Gerbini, Lentini, Palermo and Sigonella near Catania.
These attacks would also further the notion that Sicily was to be the next target of the Allies war effort, and as German troops began to make a steady withdrawal from first Iran, and then Syria, Churchill heaved a sigh of great relief. He had sweat blood to build a defense in both theaters, and now all that effort left a pool of seasoned divisions in the Middle East, forces that he could put to many uses in his mind.
The Prime Minister was still looking for some consideration of an attack into Greece and the Balkans, and he was also actively trying to reopen diplomatic channels with Turkey. In spite of that, Marshall, and the American Joint Chiefs, could see no reason why any concerted effort should be made there, and considered it a waste of both time and resources. They continued to press for an invasion of northern France in 1943, though Marshall conceded that removing Italy from the Enemy camp and restoring control of the entire Mediterranean Sea to the Allies was desirable, but he wanted action soon, and waiting another month to clear both Pantelleria and Malta before attacking Sicily would push that start date into July or even August.
Sardinia was not considered as great a strategic prize as Sicily, or an invasion of Southern Italy itself. In fact, Churchill once remarked that the former would be a “glorious campaign” and the latter a mere convenience.” Yet Sardinia could be invaded for half the cost in men and material, and once occupied, it presented the Allies with a good base to support an immediate attack on Rome. He did not see that coming from the Husky Operation for many long months. In this he was quite correct, for in the real history, Sicily was not cleared until mid-August, the landing at Salerno was staged on September 9, Naples entered on October 1, the Anzio landings staged January 22 of 1944, and Rome was not entered until June of that year. That was a long year from June of 1943 to June of 1944 before Rome was in hand, and Marshall believed the road through Sardinia would get there much sooner.
And so it was decided—Operation Brimstone would be the next Allied Offensive in the Med. While Husky was a major operation planning to lift eight divisions to Sicily, the attack on Sardinia would require only half that force. The actual draft plan, as developed by the Allies in the real history, (but not implemented) is presented here (in part) just as it was written.
I) OBJECTIVE:
To seize and hold SARDINIA.
a. To conduct an air offensive from NORTH AFRICA in order to reduce Sardinian fixed defenses and air bases, to neutralize air forces in ITALY and CORSICA, and to interdict movement of reinforcements and supplies by air and sea from ITALY proper to SARDINIA. Simultaneously to conduct intensive submarine operations against sea routes between SARDINIA and ITALY.
b. To gain beachheads on the west and southwest coasts of the Island, under limited fighter protection from escort carriers and at extreme range – from bases in NORTH AFRICA. Simultaneously to carry out diversionary landings with commando troops on other coastal points, and parachute attacks on airfields and vital communications inland.
c. To capture landing fields in the ORISTANO-VILLACIDRO-IGLESIAS area, and to establish shore based support aviation thereon.
d. To advance overland to capture CAGLIARI and the sur-rounding airdromes, and to land follow-up forces at the port of CAGLIARI.
e. To secure CAGLIARI from a counterattack from the northeast by an advance to the line TORTOLI-LACDNI-ORISTANO.
f. To reduce the remainder of the Island in the following order:
Advance to the line OROSEI-NUORO-MACOMER-BOSA MARINA. Occupy the PORTO TORRES, SASSARI, ALGHERI area, then complete occupation of the MADDALENA-TERRANOVA area.
g. To consolidate the Island against counterattack by sea or air.
h. To occupy CORSICA, or to neutralize the offensive capability of CORSICA by air and sea action, and commando raids.
II) MAJOR FORCES REQUIRED.
a. Ground:
4 Infantry Divisions
2 Armored Combat Teams
2 Parachute Regiments.
b. Air:
7 Fighter Groups
6 Bomb Groups.
c. Navaclass="underline"
3 BB, 3 CV, 6 ACV, 10 CA & CL 44 DD
15 ss
4. Availability.
All forces and shipping required should be available in the area.
d. Probable AXIS strength to be encountered.
The last intelligence estimate (May 3, 1943) of forces (all Italian) in SARDINIA was:
Two Infantry Divisions (Each of two Inf. Regts. and one Blackshirt Legion), Two Coastal Divisions, One Separate Infantry Battalion, One Sardinian Cav. Regiment, Twelve Bns. Fascist Militia, including three tank bns., Three Bersaglieri (cyclist) Bns.;
Fixed defenses include coast defense and antiaircraft artillery at all main ports.
NOTE: If the garrison of SARDINIA is appreciably reinforced, the above estimates of the forces required must be increased. If one German division were added to the present Sardinian garrison, it is estimated that two additional divisions would be required in the assaulting force.
Monty took the stage again for an encore, but this time the map behind him was not Sicily, but Sardinia. Now the final plan for Brimstone had been devised, and he was briefing Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, Anderson, Alexander and the Air Marshals. His Husky plan had been cancelled, and so to ease the sting, he was given final say on the dispositions for the Brimstone plan.
“Being half as big as the Husky Operation,” he began, “Brimstone can be mounted twice as fast. So instead of waiting for Malta and going for Sicily in late July or early August, we can now move in June. Ports supporting the invasion are Tunis, Bizerte, Bone, Algiers, Palma in the Baleric Islands, and Barcelona. Those last two cannot provide air cover, but the big new Allied airfield on Menorca is closer, only 230 miles from west coast of Sardinia. To put that in perspective, Cagliari on Sardinia is only 140 miles from bases near Bizerte, and that is closer than any point on Sicily from those same fields.”
“Our Spitfires have the range for that,” said Tedder, “and the American P-38’s and Mustangs can handle it quite easily.”
“Indeed,” said Montgomery. “It won’t be quite as good as using Malta to cover the landing sites I selected for Sicily. They were only 80 miles from that island, but as you say, our aircraft are quite capable, and we’ll also have close support from the carriers. And by the by, the operations against Pantelleria and Malta will still proceed, as they will be good cover to convince the Germans Sicily is our next target. As a secondary benefit, they’ll aid the eventual effort to clear the passage through the Sicilian Narrows for east-west shipping traffic. We’ll also open the door in the event we need to land on Sicily as originally planned.”