The Germans knew that the only chance for an evacuation of Sardinia would have to be by night. Daylight moves would be exposed to the withering power of the Allied air forces. To facilitate the operation, the Luftwaffe promised to use any night fighters they could scrape up, and deploy them to cover the Bonifacio Strait.
It was a well-run operation, with the artillery and vehicles withdrawing to Palau and then taking the ferry to La Maddalena Island, where a host of Siebels waited to move them to Corsica. The infantry departed directly from Porto Cruzitta, St. Teresa, Palau, and a full regiment of Student’s troops withdrew to the port at Olbia and left on small boats and ferries from there. Troops of Allen’s 1st Infantry and elements of TF Abrams pushed up the road to Olbia, but they were too late to stop the first evacuation. Their arrival would force the remainder of 15th Infantry to fall back on La Maddalena, and the smaller ports farther north.
Skillful at mounting delaying rearguards, the Germans were able to conduct an orderly withdrawal, though by day, the Allied fighters hounded and strafed any boat or ferries they found, sinking five Siebels.
So by day the Germans would move overland to the ferry and port sites, and by night they would cross the Straits. They would save 90% of their forces, which Kesselring considered a great success. Though he had hoped to delay the fall of Sardinia much longer, most major combat was over three weeks after the initial landings. The Allies would be another week rounding up and disarming any remaining Italians, and the whole operation was considered complete by July 15. Then the movement of supplies and material into Cagliari, Oristano and any other suitable landing site continued.
The buildup for the next jump, be it to Sicily, Corsica, or the Italian mainland, was soon underway, and the debate over which operation to choose was the next item on Eisenhower’s agenda. Corsica was deemed valuable to the Allies because it could provide bomber bases, and extend air cover into the Northern Med, and also become a base permitting further operations against Southern France or Northern Italy. But Eisenhower was told it was not essential if the next objective was Rome. He was briefed by Tedder and the Air Force commanders to determine the value of Corsica to the enemy.
“There are only a few decent air fields useful to the Luftwaffe,” he explained. “These are at Bonifacio and Porto Veccio in the south, Ajaccio on the west coast, and Calvi and Bastia in the north. We estimate that they could base and support no more than 450 aircraft there, and that even if they did so, our own forces could control and neutralize a force on that scale. In effect, we believe that we can hold the airspace over Sardinia secure.”
“Even up north?” asked Ike.
“Yes sir, even as far north as La Maddalena.”
“And yet,” said Montgomery, “the planners have indicated that any assault on Corsica should be made as soon after the fall of Sardinia as possible. Otherwise the Germans could strongly reinforce there. We were to use the same forces and shipping we have in hand now to do the job, and bring in the Free French Division as a point of honor.”
“Yes,” said Eisenhower, “but the plan also reads—and I quote: ‘This operation should be initiated only if it becomes evident that Corsica is to be appreciably reinforced, and only if at that time full use of Sardinia as an air base is deemed essential, or if future amphibious Operations against Southern France are contemplated.’ If we’re only going to Italy, then we can do so without Corsica. All we really need now is to develop port capacity on Sardinia, and Cagliari is our best bet.”
Montgomery spoke next. “We can use that for at least one assault division to embark, and the others assigned can sail directly from Tunis and Bizerte, sail due north, and rendezvous off Cagliari. We should be able to float three divisions for the first wave of any assault we plan, and protect them. The only question now is the target. My people are already working up a briefing on beach conditions near Rome. I’m told we have prospects south of the city, near Anzio, and that there are also good beaches north between Fiumincino and Civitavecchia. That last city can also offer us a small port to lift supply in after we take it.”
“We have a good deal to do beyond that,” said Eisenhower. “First, we need to set the primary objectives, both operationally and on the strategic level. Then we need to assess risks, and allocate resources needed to minimize them.”
“Rome is the obvious objective,” said Montgomery.
“Yes, but we don’t know whether the Germans will fight to hold the south as yet. The next few weeks should be very telling on that score.”
“If I may,” said Patton. “Rome is a great political objective, no argument there. Old King Alaric knew the value of the place when he first marched the Visigoth Army to sack Rome in the year 410. That aside, we could march in there on D+1 but still couldn’t claim any legitimate victory in Italy.”
“It would very likely topple the Italian Fascist Regime,” said Brooke. “Our Mister Churchill is quite convinced of the value of that. He wants us to hurl a wildcat ashore. And stir things up over there.”
“As he should,” said Patton. “Now, I’m just a crazy old horse cavalryman, but my view is that the Fascists are finished in Italy as things stand. They’ll collapse within weeks.”
“Possibly,” said Brooke. “But Italy could still choose to fight on under a new government. Taking Rome would be decisive.”
“But it wouldn’t mean we’ve defeated the German Army in Italy,” said Patton. “You can bet Hitler will be planning to seize the reins over there, no matter what the Italians do. Hell, he’s already moving divisions out of the Middle East and into Italy at this moment. Rome is one thing, very symbolic, but to win this, we’ve got to close with the enemy and take him by the throat. We’ve got to beat the German Army.”
“It we go for Rome,” said Montgomery, “then they’ll have to come north to stop us. From there we could cut off anything they choose to leave in the south. They would either have to evacuate or surrender.”
“Look,” said Patton. “We let them pull two goddamn divisions off Sardinia. Anything they evacuate from Southern Italy and Sicily is just another division we’ll have to fight somewhere else.”
“A fair point,” said Montgomery, “which is why we’re going to be looking at several other possible operations in the south. Some of these are already being sketched out. Operations Buttress and Goblet would be landings in Calabria on the toe of Italy, to cut off any Axis garrison on Sicily. They can live off the land there, but we can make sure they’ll never receive military supplies again with such a landing. Then we have Musket and Slapstick, both aimed at Taranto. If they do try to evacuate, they’ll do so through that port, and the major aerodrome of Foggia in that region. Considering Naples, we have Gangway, Mustang and Barracuda, all looking to make a direct assault there.”
“That port would be useful for our purposes,” said Eisenhower, “but the Germans could certainly not use Naples to evacuate a single platoon, particularly if we hit them on the kneecap at Rome. Napoleon said it best: Italy, like a boot, should be entered from the top. Marshall and the joint Chiefs went along with Brimstone, but as for all these other operations into Southern Italy, none of that has been agreed to. Draw up the plans, but realize that they will be subject to U.S. approval and cooperation. Marshall still sees a cross Channel attack as our next order of business, and he wants it as soon as possible.”