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4.

Nuclear Threats

Laray Polk: What immediate tensions do you perceive that could lead to nuclear war? How close are we?

Noam Chomsky: Actually, nuclear war has come unpleasantly close many times since 1945. There are literally dozens of occasions in which there was a significant threat of nuclear war. There was one time in 1962 when it was very close, and furthermore, it’s not just the United States. India and Pakistan have come close to nuclear war several times, and the issues remain. Both India and Pakistan are expanding their nuclear arsenals with US support. There are serious possibilities involved with Iran—not Iranian nuclear weapons, but just attacking Iran—and other things can just go wrong. It’s a very tense system, always has been. There are plenty of times when automated systems in the United States—and in Russia, it’s probably worse—have warned of a nuclear attack which would set off an automatic response except that human intervention happened to take place in time, and sometimes in a matter of minutes.[45] That’s playing with fire. That’s a low-probability event, but with low-probability events over a long period, the probability is not low.

There is another possibility that, I think, is not to be dismissed: nuclear terror. Like a dirty bomb in New York City, let’s say. It wouldn’t take tremendous facility to do that. I know US intelligence or people like Graham Allison at Harvard who works on this, they regard it as very likely in the coming years—and who knows what kind of reaction there would be to that. So, I think there are plenty of possibilities. I think it is getting worse. Just like the proliferation problem is getting worse. Take a couple of cases: In September 2009, the Security Council did pass a resolution, S/RES/1887, which was interpreted here as a resolution against Iran. In part it was, but it also called on all states to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That’s three states: India, Pakistan, and Israel. The Obama administration immediately informed India that this didn’t apply to them; it informed Israel that it doesn’t apply to them.[46]

If India expands its nuclear capacity, Pakistan almost has to; it can’t compete with India with conventional forces. Not surprisingly, Pakistan developed its nuclear weapons with indirect US support. The Reagan administration pretended they didn’t know anything about it, which of course they did.[47] India reacted to resolution 1887 by announcing that they could now produce nuclear weapons with the same yield as the superpowers.[48] A year before, the United States had signed a deal with India, which broke the pre-existing regime and enabled the US to provide them with nuclear technology—though they hadn’t signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That’s in violation of congressional legislation going back to India’s first bomb, I suppose around 1974 or so. The United States kind of rammed it through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and that opens a lot of doors. China reacted by sending nuclear technology to Pakistan. And though the claim is that the technology for India is for civilian use, that doesn’t mean much even if India doesn’t transfer that to nuclear weapons. It means they’re free to transfer what they would have spent on civilian use to nuclear weapons.[49]

And then comes this announcement in 2009 that the International Atomic Energy Agency has been repeatedly trying to get Israel to open its facilities to inspection. The US along with Europe usually has been able to block it. And more significant is the effort in the international agencies to try to move toward a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which would be quite significant.[50] It wouldn’t solve all the problems, but whatever threat Iran may be assumed to pose—and that’s a very interesting question in itself, but let’s suppose for the moment that there is a threat—it would certainly be mitigated and might be ended by a nuclear-weapon-free zone, but the US is blocking it every step of the way.[51]

Now that Iran’s reactor at Bushehr is running, the current fear is that they’re going to use the plutonium produced from the fuel cycle to make weapons. The questions raised about Iran’s possible nuclear weapons program are similar to those asked of Israel—[52]

Since the 1960s. And in fact, the Nixon administration made an unwritten agreement with Israel that it wouldn’t do anything to compel Israel, or even induce them, to drop what they call their ambiguity policy—not saying whether or not they have them.[53] That’s now very alive because there’s this regular five-year Non-Proliferation Review Conference. In 1995, under strong pressure from the Arab states, Egypt primarily, there was an agreement that they would move toward a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the Clinton administration signed on. It was reiterated in 2000. In 2005 the Bush administration just essentially undermined the whole meeting. They basically said, “Why do anything?”

It came up again in May 2010. Egypt is now speaking for the Non-Aligned Movement, 118 countries, they’re this year’s representative, and they pressed pretty hard for a move in that direction. The pressure was so strong that the United States accepted it in principle and claims to be committed to it, but Hillary Clinton said the time’s “not ripe for establishing the zone.”[54] And the administration just endorsed Israel’s position, essentially saying, “Yes, but only after a comprehensive peace agreement in the region,” which the US and Israel can delay indefinitely. So, that’s basically saying, “it’s fine, but it’s never going to happen.” And this is barely ever reported, so nobody knows about it. Just as almost nobody knows about Obama informing India and Israel that the resolutions don’t apply to them. All of this just increases the risk of nuclear war.

It’s more than that actually. You know, the threats against Iran are nontrivial and that, of course, induce them to move toward nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Obama in particular has strongly increased the offensive capacity that the US has on the island of Diego Garcia, which is a major military base they use for bombing the Middle East and Central Asia.[55] In December 2009, the navy dispatched a submarine tender for nuclear submarines in Diego Garcia. Presumably they were already there, but this is going to expand their capacity, and they certainly have the capacity to attack Iran with nuclear weapons. And he also sharply increased the development of deep-penetration bombs, a program that mostly languished under the Bush administration. As soon as Obama came in, he accelerated it, and it was quietly announced—but I think not reported here—that they put a couple of hundred of them in Diego Garcia. That’s all aimed at Iran. Those are all pretty serious threats.[56]

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45

In January 1995 Russia misidentified a Norwegian weather rocket as a US submarine-launched ballistic missile. Pres. Boris Yeltsin had the controls for a nuclear launch in hand, but decided at the last minute it had been a false alert. “As Russian capabilities continue to deteriorate, the chances of accidents only increase…. Russia’s early warning systems are ‘in a serious state of erosion and disrepair,’ making it all the more likely that a Russian president could panic and reach a different conclusion than Yeltsin did in 1995.” Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 96–97.

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46

UN Security Council Resolution 1887 was unanimously approved on September 24, 2009. Two days later, in Pittsburgh, PM Manmohan Singh told the press Pres. Obama had assured him the resolution—which calls on nonmembers of the NPT to join—wasn’t aimed at India, and that the “US commitment to carry out its obligations under the civil nuclear agreements… remains undiluted.” On October 2 Israeli officials said Obama had reassured them that the four-decade-old ambiguity policy that allows “Israel to keep a nuclear arsenal without opening it to international inspections” remained in effect. “NPT Resolution Not Directed against India: US,” Indo-Asian News Service, September 26, 2009; Eli Lake, “Obama Agrees to Keep Israel’s Nukes Secret,” Washington Times, October 2, 2009.

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47

On Reagan-Zia alliance and nuclear program, see note 3, chap. 2.

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48

James Lamont and James Blitz, “India Raises Nuclear Stake,” Financial Times, September 27, 2009.

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49

Prior to Pres. Bush’s nuclear deal with India in 2006, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) functioned as a “relatively effective nonproliferation cartel.” The NSG grew out of a secret meeting between US officials and nuclear technology suppliers in 1975 in response to India’s first nuclear detonation a year earlier. The meeting established controls on the sale of flagged items and an agreement to bar sales to non-nuclear-weapon states for use at sites outside the purview of IAEA inspection. Bush allowed the selling of nuclear reactors, fuel, and technology to a country that maintains at least eight facilities kept off-limits to inspection. As a consequence, the move compromised a secondary system—the NPT as primary—of nonproliferation checks and balances. Cirincione, Bomb Scare, 37–38.

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50

During the IAEA General Conference in 2009, back-to-back resolutions were adopted pertaining to the NPT and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Resolution 16 addresses the Middle East in general; it passed by a vote of 103–0. Resolution 17 specifically addresses Israel. It passed by a narrow margin of 49–45 with the “vote split among Western and developing nation lines.” Upon passage, chief Israeli delegate David Danieli told the chamber, “Israel will not cooperate in any matter with this resolution.” IAEA General Conference, GC(53)/RES/16 and RES/17, September 2009; Sylvia Westall, “UN Body Urges Israel to Allow Nuclear Inspection,” Reuters, September 18, 2009.

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51

A nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East was first proposed in 1962 by a group of Israeli intellectuals, the Committee for the Denuclearization of the Middle East, followed by a joint Egyptian-Iranian General Assembly resolution in 1974. The resolution has passed every year since, though numerous obstacles have prevented the zone from being enacted. “Scientists Call for Nuclear Demilitarization in the Region,” Ha’aretz (Hebrew), July 25, 1962; Nabil Fahmy and Patricia Lewis, “Possible Elements of an NWFZ Treaty in the Middle East,” Disarmament Forum, no. 2 (2011): 39–50. On the US and collapse of the 2012 Helsinki Conference, see Noam Chomsky, “The Gravest Threat to World Peace,” Truth-Out.org, January 4, 2013.

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52

In December 1960 the US government submitted five questions to Israel regarding its possible nuclear weapons program: “(1) What are present GOI (government of Israel) plans for disposing of plutonium which will be bred in new reactor? (2) Will GOI agree to adequate safeguards with respect to plutonium produced? (3) Will GOI permit qualified scientists from the IAEA or other friendly quarters visit new reactor? If so, what would be earliest time? (4) Is a third reactor in either construction or planning stage? (5) Can Israel state categorically that it has no plans for developing nuclear weapons?” Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 93–94.

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53

On September 26, 1969, a policy of Israeli nuclear ambiguity was agreed upon by Pres. Nixon and PM Golda Meir. It remained secret until revealed by journalist Aluf Benn in 1991. Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, “Bringing Israel’s Bomb Out of the Basement: Has Nuclear Ambiguity Outlived Its Shelf Life?,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2010. Cohen has drawn parallels between Israel’s policy and Iran’s possible nuclear ambitions: “It is straddling the line, and in my opinion, Iran wants to, and can, remain for some time with the status of a state that might or might not have the bomb. Iran is a state of ambiguity.” Noam Sheizaf, “Clear and Present Danger,” Ha’aretz, October 29, 2010.

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54

Louis Charbonneau, “U.S. and Other Big Powers Back Mideast Nuclear Arms Ban,” Reuters, May 5, 2010.

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55

Diego Garcia is home to one of five monitoring stations used to operate NAVSTAR GPS. Other terrestrial locations in the network include Hawaii, Colorado, Ascension Island, and Kwajalein Atoll. Implemented by the Department of Defense in 1973, NAVSTAR GPS is a radio-navigation system that utilizes satellite to ground triangulation to provide precise geospatial coordinates for both military and civilian use (i.e., vehicle and cellular map locator). The system is usually referred to in its shortened form, GPS. “The Global Positioning System,” National Academy of Sciences, 1997. The permanent eviction of the inhabitants of Diego Garcia (ca. 1973) to make way for US military operations is a continued issue of contention. Recent news of the UK government’s plan to create a marine protection area has further inflamed the issue; a leaked diplomatic cable confirmed suspicions it was a move to deny Chagossians the right of return: “BIOT’s former inhabitants would find it difficult, if not impossible, to pursue their claim for resettlement on the islands if the entire Chagos Archipelago were a marine reserve.” WikiLeaks, s.v. “Cable 09LONDON1156, HMG Floats Proposal for Marine Reserve Covering,” May 2009. On GPS and Kwajalein Atoll, see Vltchek, note 1, chap. 3.

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56

In 2009 the Pentagon sent an “urgent operational need” funding request to Congress to fast-track the development and testing of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), a thirty-thousand-pound bunker-busting bomb designed to hit underground targets. It was listed inside a ninety-three-page “reprogramming” request with hundreds of other items, and approved with little fanfare. Jonathan Karl, “Is the U.S. Preparing to Bomb Iran?,” ABC News, October 6, 2009. On shipment of bunker-busting bombs to Diego Garcia, see Rob Edwards, “Final Destination Iran?,” Herald (Scotland), March 14, 2010.