“Son,” says Mr. Neary, “I figure your folks aren’t amongst this group, or they’d be whuppin’ your butt for this performance. Now you go find ‘em and you stay with ‘em the rest of the time you’re here, or I’ll have to insist that you and your family accept a refund and vacate the meadow.”
Oh, Lord, maybe he’s never going to get the hang of being Curtis Hammond. He blinks back tears, as much because he has embarrassed his sister-become as because he’s somehow made a fool of himself.
“Mr. Neary, sir,” he pleads with utmost sincerity, “I am not some sassy-assed, spit-in-the-eye malefactor.”
‘This assurance, although it could not be more truthful or more well-intentioned, inexplicably causes Mr. Neary’s face to redden into a dark and ominous mask. “That’s enough, young man.”
In one last desperate effort to make amends, Curtis says, “Mr. Neary, sir, I’m not quite right. I’ve been told by a beautiful immensity of a lady that I’m too sweet for this world. If you asked me whether I was stupid or somethin’, I’d have to say I was stupid. I’m a not-quite-right, too-sweet, stupid Gump, is what I am.”
Old Yeller virtually spins off her back, onto all fours, judging the situation too dangerous to expose her belly any longer, and she sprints away from the dead zone even as Mr. Neary takes his first step toward Curtis.
Trusting the dog’s instincts at last, Curtis bolts after her. Fugitives again.
Chapter 39
If libraries in southern California had ever been like those portrayed in books and movies — mahogany-dark millwork, shelves rising to the ceiling, cozy little reading nooks tucked into odd corners in labyrinthine stacks — they weren’t that way anymore. All surfaces here were easy-clean paint or Formica. Shelves didn’t rise to the ceiling because the ceiling was a suspended grid of acoustic tiles punctuated by fluorescent panels that shed too much light to foster any sense of the romance of books. The shelves stood in predictable ranks, metal instead of wood, bolted to the floor for safety in an earthquake.
To Micky, the atmosphere seemed like that in a medical facility: bleak in spite of the brightness, antiseptic, marked not by the quiet of diligent study but by the silence of stoic suffering.
A significant area had been set aside for computers. All offered Internet access.
The chairs were uncomfortable. Harsh light glared off the desk. She felt at home: reminded not of the trailer she shared with Geneva, but of the home provided by the California Department of Corrections.
Other library patrons were busy at half the work stations, but Micky ignored them. She was self-conscious in the coral-pink suit that had so recently made her feel professional, fresh, and self-confident. Besides, after F. Bronson, she’d had enough of people for the day; machines would be more helpful, and better company.
On-line, feeling like a detective, she sought Preston Maddoc, but little in the way of a manhunt was required. The villain came to her on so many linked sites, she was overwhelmed with information.
From a pay phone, she’d canceled the job interview at three o’clock. So she spent the afternoon learning about Dr. Doom, and what she discovered suggested that Leilani was penned in an even darker and more escape-proof death cell than the girl had described.
The essence of Maddoc’s story was as simple as the details were outrageous. And the implications were terrifying not just for Leilani but for anyone who currently lived and breathed.
Preston Maddoc’s doctorate was in philosophy. Ten years ago, he declared himself a “bioethicist,” accepting a position with an Ivy League university, teaching ethics to future doctors.
That breed of bioethicists who call themselves “utilitarians” seek what they believe to be ethical distribution of supposedly limited medical resources by establishing standards for determining who should receive treatment and who should not. Scorning the belief in the sanctity of all human life that has guided Western medicine since Hippocrates, they argue that some human lives have greater moral and social value than others and that the authority to set these comparative values belongs rightfully to their elite group.
Once, a small but significant minority of bioethicists had rejected the utilitarians’ cold approach, but the utilitarians had won the battle and now ruled their departments in academia.
Preston Maddoc, as did most bioethicists, believed in denying medical care to the elderly — defined as over sixty — if their illness would impact the quality of their lives, even if patients believed their lives were still worth living or in fact enjoyable. If they could be fully cured, but if the rate of cure was below, say, thirty percent, many bioethicists agreed the elderly should be allowed to die anyway, without treatment, because in utilitarian terms, their age ensured they would contribute less to society than they’d take.
Incredulous, Micky read that nearly all bioethicists believed disabled infants, even those mildly disabled, should be neglected until they died. If the babies developed an infection, they should not be treated. If they developed temporary respiratory problems, breathing should not be assisted; they should suffocate. If disabled babies
have trouble eating, let ‘em starve. Disabled people were said to be burdens to society even when they could care for themselves.
Micky felt an anger brewing different from her usual destructive rage. This had nothing to do with abuses and slights that she had suffered. Her ego wasn’t involved; this anger had a cleansing purity.
She read an excerpt from the book Practical Ethics, in which Peter Singer, of Princeton University, justified killing newborns with disabilities no more severe than hemophilia: “When the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed. The loss of the happy life for the first infant is outweighed by the gain of a happier life for the second. Therefore, if the killing of the hemophiliac infant has no adverse effect on others it would be … right to kill him.”
Micky had to get up, turn away from this. Outrage had energized her. She couldn’t sit still. She walked back and forth, repeatedly flexing her hands, working off energy, trying to calm herself.
Like a child frightened by and yet morbidly drawn to stories of ghouls and monsters, she soon returned to the computer.
Singer had once suggested that if infanticide at the request of the parents will promote the interests of the family and society, then killing the child would be ethical. Further, he had stated that an infant doesn’t become a person until sometime during the first year of life, thus opening the door, on a case-by-case basis, to the idea that infanticide could be ethical long after birth.
Preston Maddoc believed that killing children was ethical up to the first indications that they were developing language skills. Say Dada or die.
Most bioethicists supported “supervised” medical experimentation on mentally disabled subjects, on the comatose, and even on unwanted infants in place of animals, arguing that self-aware animals can know anguish, while the mentally disabled, the comatose, and infants cannot.
Asking the mentally disabled what they think is, of course, not necessary, according to this philosophy, because they, like infants and certain other “minimally cognizant people,” are “nonpersons” who have no moral claim to a place in the world.
Micky wanted to start a crusade to have bioethicists declared “minimally cognizant,” for it seemed clear that they were exhibiting no human characteristics and were more obviously nonpersons than the small, the weak, and the elderly whom they would kill.
Maddoc was a leader — but only one of several — in the movement who wanted to use “cutting-edge bioethics debate and scientific research” to establish a minimum IQ necessary to lead a quality life and to be useful to society. He thought that this threshold would be “well above a Down’s syndrome IQ,” but he was quick to assure the squeamish that the establishment of a minimum IQ wasn’t intended to suggest that society should be culled of the slow-witted currently alive. Rather, it was “an exercise in clarifying our understanding of what constitutes a quality life,” toward the day when scientific advances would allow IQ to be accurately predicted in infancy.