This question of living space was also inextricably connected with the search for a resolution to the Jewish question. Until 1939, the preferred Nazi solution for German Jews entailed emigration and occasional expulsion. The outbreak of war, however, changed the situation in fundamentally radical ways. Not only did the already diminishing avenues for emigration constrict even further, but the Nazis also now found themselves faced with an even greater problem. The spectacular military triumph in Poland left them with perhaps 2 million Jews under their control, a number that promised to overwhelm the already feeble strategy of emigration. Moreover, many Germans, especially young soldiers, for the first time encountered the seemingly alien eastern Jews, the Ostjuden, who had for years been the target of scurrilous Nazi propaganda. The reality, and staggering numbers, of these strange people seemed to confirm the Nazi message that they were the biological and spiritual antithesis of German culture. Finally, and of key significance, the outbreak of war both fueled party radicals and freed the Nazi leaders from various restraints in their handling of the Jewish problem. Hitler had long defined international Jewry as the enemy of Germany, and, now that the nation found itself in a war allegedly provoked by that same Jewish conspiracy, harsh measures against Jews under German control seemed necessary. Poland thus became, as Christopher Browning has put it, a “ ‘laboratory’ for Nazi experiments in racial imperialism, an area where [the Nazis] tried to turn into reality ideological slogans such as Lebensraum.”34 This process eventually involved much trial and error, and growing frustrations, before the Nazis settled on the Final Solution.
Even as the deportations of Poles and the resettlement of Volksdeutsche began in mid-October a host of problems ensued: Poles targeted for deportation were not provided the most basic necessities of life; German officials had not anticipated likely Polish resistance; Himmler’s insistence on screening Poles for possible Germanization raised difficulties; and the whole operation threatened a serious disruption of economic life in the occupied territories. The latter objection, along with transportation shortages occasioned by the growing demands of army authorities for rolling stock to prepare the campaign in the west, resulted in a curbing of, if not a halt to, the deportations. Typical of the improvised nature of this demographic scheme, little thought had been given to what to do with the Jewish population of the affected areas. Nazi officials initially thought in terms of expelling them over the demarcation line between German- and Soviet-occupied Poland, then, after that idea failed, decided to place them in ghettos as a temporary measure until a final decision was made.35
While Poles could simply be dumped in the General Government, such a solution for Jews faced numerous obstacles, not least objections from Nazi occupation authorities such as Hans Frank. This oversight provided an opening for ambitious subordinates like Adolf Eichmann to find a more suitable long-term solution, which involved resettlement of Jews from the areas to be annexed into Germany to a reservation near Nisko in the Lublin district of southeast Poland. Concurrently with the resettlement actions under way elsewhere, Eichmann began organizing deportations of Jews. His plan foundered on many of the same difficulties as the other scheme, however, and by early 1940 the grand demographic projects had ground to a virtual standstill.36 In characteristic fashion, the Nazis had tried to do everything at the same time, without assigning priorities, with the result that inadequate resources led to limited achievements. Along with their frustration, however, Nazi officials had gained valuable understanding of the problems involved in such a complicated scheme.
Events in Poland also demonstrated how Hitler’s own radicalism could be reinforced through personal observations and contact with subordinates as well as how his prejudices could be exploited by officials pursuing ever more radical policies. Hitler’s view of Jews as an active, predatory threat had certainly been intensified by his observations from Poland, but discussions with Goebbels that autumn fanned his anti-Jewish hatreds while allowing the latter an opportunity to regain the Führer’s approval. Shortly after his humiliation in connection with Kristallnacht in November 1938, the propaganda minister had begun planning a series of films designed to instill and intensify anti-Jewish attitudes in the German public. Work had begun in 1939 on the notorious “documentary” film Der ewige Jude (The eternal Jew), which Goebbels intended as both a demonstration of the parasitical nature of the Jews and a justification for drastic measures against them.37
With the defeat of Poland, Goebbels seized the opportunity to have footage made of the detested Ostjuden in their habitat as well as to see the situation firsthand. His observations not only confirmed his own radical hatred of the Jews but exacerbated those of Hitler as well. In mid-October, Goebbels and Hitler viewed recent footage filmed in Warsaw, with the former’s impression likely mirroring that of the latter: “Footage from the ghetto film…. Images so dreadful and brutal in their details that one’s blood runs cold…. This Jewry must be destroyed.” At the end of October, Goebbels once again viewed footage with Hitler, this time of ritual slaughter, scenes that left them “deeply shaken.” A visit to Lodz a few days later only reinforced Goebbels’s impressions while also emphasizing the connection in the Nazi mind between Lebensraum and the Jewish question: “Lodz itself is a hideous city…. Drive through the ghetto. We get out and inspect everything thoroughly. It is indescribable. They are no longer humans, they are animals. Therefore we no longer have a humanitarian but rather a surgical task. One must cut here, and indeed quite radically. Otherwise Europe will perish from the Jewish disease…. This is Asia already. We will have much to do to Germanize this area.”38
Goebbels took pains to keep Hitler informed of the film’s progress and of his own escalating radicalism, both of which the Führer approved. On 2 November, Goebbels exulted, “My explanation of the Jewish problem finds his complete agreement. The Jew is a waste product.” On 19 November, he noted in his diary, “I inform the Führer about our Jew film. He gives some ideas for it…. The film is a very valuable propaganda medium for us just now.” Finally, on 5 December, he reported more extensively to Hitler on his trip to Poland, recording with satisfaction, “He listens to everything very carefully and totally shares my opinion on the Jewish and Polish question. We must exorcize the Jewish danger.”39 If, in Ian Kershaw’s famous formulation, Hitler’s subordinates were clearly “working toward the Führer” in implementing racial policy, their own radicalism could, as the example of Goebbels showed, in turn inform and affect Hitler’s views, reinforcing his radical ideological predispositions.