As 1942 gave way to 1943, an air of unreality hung over German military planning. The reflections of the OKW, set down in a memorandum of 10 December, revealed not so much a sense of strategic helplessness as a complete absence of realistic thinking. Not only must North Africa be held and the Balkans secured against a possible Allied invasion, but the Ostheer was also to launch another summer offensive in the east. Even more bizarre was the operational goaclass="underline" the OKW staff not only proposed taking Leningrad but also envisioned a large offensive that would “finally separate the Soviets from their economic sources of strength in the Caucasus,” with the ultimate goal of advancing into the Middle East. In view of the relation of forces between Germany and its enemies in early 1943, this was not merely utopian but delusional.57
Hitler himself was under no such illusions, recognizing clearly in March 1943 that the “question of personnel is our greatest worry and by far the most serious problem,” one for which no ready solution was at hand. Although Foreign Armies East calculated total Red Army losses to the end of 1942 at between 11.7 and 11.9 million men, a figure that was, if anything, low, and despite the fact that the Soviets had in 1942 lost another 1.5 million as prisoners (or over ten times the number of Germans taken at Stalingrad), its conclusion was sobering. Through ruthless mobilization measures, Gehlen’s office stressed, the Soviets would have in 1943 an available reserve of 3.4 million men as opposed to a Wehrmacht total of only 500,000. Moreover, this seven-to-one inferiority would be even greater in practice since the Red Army could concentrate all its forces against the Ostheer, while German reserves had to be stretched across all possible fronts. Nor did materiel production offer any hope of relief, for, despite the fact that German output soared—at least until the Battle of the Ruhr commenced—Soviet production was higher still and, once again, could be used entirely against the Germans. In addition, American and British production had to be weighed in the balance, as did the possibility of the opening of a second front in Europe.58
For the second key problem facing Hitler, and one no less urgent than that of personnel and production, was the growing interconnectedness of the various fighting fronts. The question of the defense of Fortress Europe not only demanded more attention from the German leadership but also eroded the dominant role of the eastern front as the great bulk of German resources could no longer be concentrated in one area. Prevention of a second front in the west was now the command of the hour: “no front,” Hitler declared in mid-May, could be allowed “to come into being on the borders of the Reich.” Just the threat of a second front, in fact, compelled the Germans, over a year before the Normandy invasion, to transfer forces from the east to other threatened areas, from Norway to France to Italy and the Balkans, while the Soviets could mass virtually all their strength against the Germans. The consequence of this was alarming; if in 1917 and 1918 a German division on the western front defended a sector of roughly two and a half miles, in the summer of 1943 on the eastern front that same division, likely with fewer men, would be covering four times the area. Sectors that in the First World War were held by a division were now being defended by a battalion. This inferiority in numbers and the German need to prepare for a possible defense against Allied attack somewhere in the west meant not only that the Soviets would be in a position to launch several offensives simultaneously in the summer of 1943, but also that any German response would of necessity be limited. Little wonder, then, that so many in the German leadership put their faith in “the higher leadership abilities and the greater worth of the individual German soldier.”59
Although Hitler was clearly aware of the difficulties facing Germany, remarking on 18 February 1943 that he could “undertake no great operations in this year… but only small strikes,” he nonetheless refused, largely for economic reasons, to countenance a large-scale withdrawal in order to free up manpower. Giving up the Donets Basin, with its steel production and vital raw materials, Hitler emphasized, would not only strengthen the Soviet opponent but also cripple German production. He raised similar objections to Manstein’s proposal for a flexible defense based on the “backhand blow,” which would invite the enemy, much as at Kharkov, to advance beyond his limits, only to be dealt a devastating defeat by a timely counterstrike. Although he certainly understood the merits of this strategy, he could not accept its prerequisite: giving up the Donets Basin. Nor, given the precarious situation facing Germany over the entirety of the eastern front, could he allow a concentration of forces in the south, which would imperil the other sectors, on the chance that the Soviets would attack precisely where the Germans wished. The counterstrike at Kharkov had worked because of a failure of intelligence, a mistake the Soviets were not likely to repeat given the exact information they possessed in the spring of 1943 about German intentions. Moreover, the Soviets themselves were preparing a backhand stroke against the Germans in the areas around Orel and Kharkov. Hitler, in fact, far from being an incompetent strategist, recognized that Germany no longer had freedom of action. The vast power differential between the two sides, the absolute importance of armaments production, and the looming threat of a second front all demanded his attention and seemed more pressing than a disagreement over an active or passive defense in the east.60
Despite the enduring fascination and exaggerated claims made about the battle at Kursk—the greatest tank battle, the turning point of the war—Operation Citadel can in no way be compared with its predecessors. Where Barbarossa and Blue both aimed at decisive strategic victories that would have defeated, or at least crippled, the Soviet Union, Citadel was little more than a grandiose spoiling attack, “only a limited offensive,” as Hitler put it, designed not to allow the initiative to slip completely from Germany’s hands. Its most important goal, as Goebbels noted, was to shorten the front and “strike a couple of blows on the Bolsheviks that will cost them a few armies, not to mention an army group.” Still, even this limited aim, as framed in Operational Order No. 5, issued on 13 March 1943, had much to offer. Planned as a pincer operation, a successful attack at the Kursk salient would shorten German lines appreciably, knock Soviet plans for an offensive off balance, and destroy large numbers of enemy forces. Victory at Kursk might even allow the Germans to focus on events in the west in 1943; after all, if the Battle of the Atlantic and the bomber war over Germany could at least be stalemated (and German failure in both would not be apparent for some months), then the threat of a second front might be greatly reduced. Aware of the obvious advantages of such an action, Manstein quickly dropped his alternative plans and pleaded for an immediate attack at Kursk. Having just bloodied the Russians at Kharkov, “Army Group Center could,” he believed, “now take Kursk without any great difficulty.” Worried about an enemy attack in the Donets area, however, Hitler rejected an immediate strike, instead ordering preparations for two smaller actions south of Kharkov as an alternative to Citadel. Thus began a period of interminable delay that, according to some, cost the Germans any possibility of even an operational success.61