46. Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend, 98–99, 320–49.
47. Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 9 January 1941, 1, pt. 1:257–58; Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 179–80.
48. Weinberg, A World at Arms, 187–89; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 100–118; Klink, “Military Concept,” 257–92; Halder, War Diary, 5 December 1940, 297–98; Förster, “Der historische Ort,” 631.
49. Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 124–32; Klink, “Military Concept,” 257–85; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 344–45; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 24–32; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 452–53; Förster, “Der historische Ort,” 633; Kroener, “Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs,” 846–48, 998.
50. Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 133–39; Klink, “Military Concept,” 292–97; van Creveld, Fighting Power, 43–61; Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 8–9; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 452–55.
51. Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend, 29–33; Cooper, The German Army, 163; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 452–55; Kroener, “The ‘Frozen Blitzkrieg,’” 146; van Creveld, Supplying War, 142–201; DiNardo, Mechanized Juggernaut? 35–54.
52. Klink, “Military Concept,” 294–97; Halder, War Diary, 28 January 1941, 314–15; Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 3 February 1941, 1, pt. 1:299; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 142–70; Kroener, “The ‘Frozen Blitzkrieg,’” 142–44.
53. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 142–70; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 432–40; Kroener, “The ‘Frozen Blitzkrieg,’” 142–44; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 29.
54. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 150–51; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 140–41; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 344–45; Halder, War Diary, 23 December 1940, 28 January 1941, 308–9, 314; Bock, War Diary, 1 February 1941, 198.
55. Klink, “Military Concept,” 260; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 138–39, 149–50, 172; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 458–60; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 146–47.
56. Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 3, 11 February 1941, 1, pt. 1:297–301, 316–19; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 143–45; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 150–54; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 345–46; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 459–60. For an assessment of Thomas’s memorandum, see Lübbers, “ ‘Ausnutzung oder Ausschlachtung?’”
57. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 213–15; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 459–60, 476–80; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 150–52, 171, and “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 181–82; Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 234–42.
Klaus Jochen Arnold and Gert C. Lübbers argue that Backe had received a “special mission” from Hitler in February 1941. See Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 616.
58. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 171–77; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 476–80; Klink, “Military Concept,” 294; Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 616–18; Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 236–42.
59. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 174–82; Förster, “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 481–90; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 479–80; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 234–40; Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 619–25; Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 238–39; TBJG, 1, 6 May 1941. See also Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 46–59, and Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord, 10–84; Aly and Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung, 365–93; Aly, “Final Solution,” 172; and Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 298.
For an argument that the meeting of 2 May 1941 rivaled that at the Wannsee on 20 January 1942 in which plans for the Final Solution were discussed, see Kay, “Germany’s Staatssekretäre,” and “Revisiting the Meeting of the Staatssekretäre.”
Johannes Hürter argues for the term hunger calculation rather than hunger policy, a point supported by Alex J. Kay, since there was no clear idea among the economic planners as to how this hunger policy was to be implemented. See Hürter, Hitlers Heerführer, 491; Kay, Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder, 206–7.
60. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 174–82, and “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 128–83; Förster, “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 481–90; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 479–80; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 234–40; Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 242.
Klaus Jochen Arnold emphasizes that, despite the considerable ideological points of agreement between Hitler and the Wehrmacht top brass, responsibility for the implementation of the hunger policy was purposely given to Goering, as head of the Four-Year Plan and Economic Command Staff East, and State Secretary Backe, of the Reich Ministry of Food. See Arnold, Die Wehrmacht und die Besatzungspolitik, 74–101, 242–67; and Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 613–26. On a number of occasions, Hitler had stressed that the army was not to be “burdened” with administration (Halder, War Diary, 5 March 1941, 327), that generals “[were], for the most part, not able to deal with and solve political questions” (TBJG, 19 August 1941), and that, with regard to the murder of Jews, “the soldier should not be burdened with these political questions” (3 July 1941, quoted in Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 620 n. 42).
61. Goebbels, “Wofür?,” quoted in Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 174 (see also 184–85); Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 135–61 (quote 141). For a more extreme, and controversial, version of this argument, see Aly, Hitlers Volksstaat (translated as Hitler’s Beneficiaries). For an earlier, less extreme assessment, see also Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, passim.
62. Domarus, ed., Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 2:1663–64; TBJG, 1 February 1941. A full-text English translation of Hitler’s speech of 30 January as recorded by the Monitoring Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation, courtesy of the Research Project for Totalitarian Communication, New School for Social Research, is available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410130a.html (accessed 29 August 2008).
63. For a comprehensive assessment of Der ewige Jude, see Hornshøj-Møller, “Der ewige Jude,” 3–39, 179–81, 309–15, “Der ewige Jude,” and “The Role of ‘Produced Reality.’” See also TBJG, 17, 24 October, 1, 8, 28 November, 18 December 1939, 9, 12 January, 6, 27 February, 4, 17 April, 9 May, 9 June, 3, 12, 25 September, 11 October 1940; Aly, “Final Solution,” 171–72; Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, 146–47; Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 2 February 1941, 94–95; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 349–51.