For interpretations that emphasize Hitler’s modernity, see Zitelmann, Hitler; and Prinz and Zitelmann, eds., Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung. See also Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, introduction, chaps. 2, 5; Smelser, “How ‘Modern’ Were the Nazis?”; Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 1–10; and Aly, Hitler’s Beneficiaries.
30. Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 462–63; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 448. See also Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, passim.
31. Jochmann, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 13 October 1941, 78; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 434; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 469–70. For a comparison of Nazi Germany’s conduct to that of historical colonial powers, see Zimmerer, “Holocaust und Kolonialismus.” For a more critical assessment of this interpretation, see Gerwarth and Malinowski, “Der Holocaust als ‘kolonialer Genozid’?” and “Hannah Arendt’s Ghosts.”
32. Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 466–76; Aly, “Final Solution,” 149–60; Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 253–55; Pohl, Von der “Judenpolitik” zum Judenmord, 89, 95–97; Schulte, Zwangsarbeit und Vernichtung, 248; Madajczyk, “Synchronismus.” On Generalplan Ost, see Madajczyk and Biernacki, eds., Generalplan Ost; Rössler and Schleiermacher, eds., Der “Generalplan Ost”; and Wasser, Himmlers Raumplanung im Osten.
33. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–56, 268–77, and “Controlled Escalation”; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 452–53; Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 141, 179; Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds., “The Good Old Days,” 28–33. See also Matthäus, Ausbildungsziel Judenmord? and Kwiet, “Erziehung zum Mord,” “From the Diary of a Killing Unit,” and “Rehearsing for Murder.”
34. Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 142–43, 151–78; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 256–59; Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 263–71; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 454–55, and Hitler: Nemesis, 463–64.
35. Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds., “The Good Old Days,” 38–54; Diary of SS-Hauptscharführer Felix Landau, 7 July 1941, in Dollinger, ed., Kain, wo ist dein Bruder? 87–88; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 256, 268–77; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 68–69; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 463–64.
36. Streit, “The German Army and the Politics of Genocide,” 5–6, and Keine Kameraden, 110–12; Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 263–69; Stahlberg, Bounden Duty, 159; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 260; Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 184, 204–14, 226, 237, 249–51, 278; Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 405–6; Messerschmidt, “Difficult Atonement,” 90–92.
While agreeing with the central theme of Wehrmacht cooperation with and participation in these criminal actions, Christian Hartmann nonetheless makes an important distinction between frontline troops and those in the rear: much the greater part of Wehrmacht crimes were committed by security divisions or units behind the front. See Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, 675–98, and “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?”
37. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 180, 189–90.
38. Kershaw, War without Garlands, 142–43; Schulte, “Korück 582,” and German Army, 69–85, 117–49; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Streit, “The German Army and the Politics of Genocide,” 8–9, and Keine Kameraden, 42–44; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’” 1211–16.
39. Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’” 1189–1234.
40. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Hitler quoted in Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 25.
On Soviet atrocities, see De Zayas, Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle, 273–77, 284; Rass, “Menschenmaterial,” 334; and Hoffmann, “The Conduct of the War through Soviet Eyes.” It has been estimated that 90–95 percent of German prisoners of war perished in 1941–1942 (De Zayas, Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle, 277).
On the propaganda uses of alleged Soviet atrocities, see generally the entries in TBJG for July 1941 (quote from entry of 17 July 1941). Two days earlier, Goebbels had asserted, “Just as every soldier returns from Poland as an anti-Semite, so they will come back from the Soviet Union as an anti-Bolshevik.”
41. Prüller, Diary of a German Soldier, 5 July 1941, 75; Richardson, ed., Sieg Heil! 3 August 1941, 122; Kershaw, War without Garlands, 136–38. See also Schulte, German Army, 117–49, 211–33.
42. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’” 1189–1234; quote from Manoschek, “Es gibt nur eines für das Judentum,” 33. See also Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 271–72. The letter was eventually displayed in the show windows of various Viennese businesses (ibid., 292 n. 62).
43. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 30–31; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’” 1189–1234; Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 45–47; Sandkühler, “Endlösung” in Galizien, 114–16; Schulte, German Army, 234–39; Diary entries of Robert Neumann, 7 July, 5, 7 October 1941, in Dollinger, ed., Kain, wo ist dein Bruder? 88, 100–101.
44. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 253–67; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’” 1189–1234; Streit, “The German Army and the Politics of Genocide,” 6–7; Förster, “Hitler Turns East,” 130.
On the complexities of the partisan war, see Anderson, “Die 62. Infanterie-Division,” and “Germans, Ukrainians and Jews”; Birn, “Two Kinds of Reality?”; Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 19–20, 24–30, 49–57, and Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, 383 (quote).
While the army’s criminal culpability as an institution is extensive, and despite the spread of racist ideology through the ranks, it is well to remember that only a strikingly small percentage of Landsers actively participated in the murders of Jews. As Christian Hartmann has argued, soldiers, especially those at the front, primarily focused on daily war tasks and the problem of survival. See Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 17–20, 31–32, 64–74. See also Pohl, “Schauplatz Ukraine,” 151, 169–71, and “Die Wehrmacht und der Mord,” 50.