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45. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 288–94; Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 587–88, 593, 609–13, 628–39; Pohl, “Einsatzgruppe C,” 73–74; Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 275–82; Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 377–79; Schulte, German Army, 224–34.

46. Wette, Die Wehrmacht, 115–17; Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 162–69; Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds., “The Good Old Days,” 141–54; Pohl, “Einsatzgruppe C,” 71–75; “Auszüge aus verschiedenen ‘Ereignismeldungen UdSSR’ über die Tätigkeit der Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, und D im Osten vom Juli 1941 bis zum März 1942,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds., “Unternehmen Barbarossa,” 314–22. See also Boll and Safrian, “Auf dem Weg nach Stalingrad,” 260–96; Rüß, “Wer war verantwortlich für das Massaker?”; and Arnold, “Die Eroberung und Behandlung der Stadt Kiew.”

47. Wette, Die Wehrmacht, 118–19; Rüß, “Wer war verantwortlich für das Massaker?” 498–506; Arnold, “Die Eroberung und Behandlung der Stadt Kiew,” 53; Klee and Dressen, eds., “Gott mit uns,” 118, 127.

48. Wette, Die Wehrmacht, 119–20; Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 164–65; Rüß, “Wer war verantwortlich für das Massaker?” 493; “Ereignismeldung UdSSR, No. 128, 3 November 1941,” in Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds., “The Good Old Days,” 68; Klee and Dressen, eds., “Gott mit uns,” 119.

49. Wette, Die Wehrmacht, 120–28; “Wer war verantwortlich für das Massaker?” 490–95; Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds., “The Good Old Days,” 63–68; “Ereignismeldung UdSSR, No. 106, 7 October 1941,” in Klee and Dressen, eds., “Gott mit uns,” 132 (see generally 117–36); Krasnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 237; Messerschmidt, “Difficult Atonement,” 92.

50. Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’” 1217–18, and “Hitler Turns East,” 130; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 259–64, 277–78; Krausnick, Hitlers Einsatzgruppen, 195–224; Anderson, “Germans, Ukrainians, and Jews,” 339–40; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 69–70; Polian, “First Victims of the Holocaust”; Fleming, Hitler and the Final Solution, 73–74; Jochmann, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 25 October 1941, 106; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 464, and Fateful Choices, 457; Streit, “The German Army and the Politics of Genocide,” 7.

51. TBJG, 8 July 1941; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 469–70, and Fateful Choices, 434–36, 455; Förster, “Securing Living Space,” 1237.

52. Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’” 1237; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 434–36; Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1:84–90.

53. “Geheime Absichtserklärungen zur künftigen Ostpolitik: Auszug aus einem Aktenvermerk von Reichsleiter M. Bormann vom 16. 7. 1941,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds., “Unternehmen Barbarossa,” 330–31; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 309–10; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 265–66; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’” 1235–36; Ueberschär, “Das Scheitern des Unternehmens ‘Barbarossa,’” 148–49; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 405.

54. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 310–11; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 455–56; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 267; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,’” 1237; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 469. See also Cüppers, Wegbereiter der Shoah; Förster, “Das andere Gesicht des Krieges,” 155–57; Birn, “Zweierlei Wirklichkeit?”; Büchler, “Himmler’s Personal Murder Brigades”; and Lozowick, “Rollbahn Mord.”

Himmler had returned to the Führer Headquarters the day before the meeting but was perhaps occupied by the news of the capture of Stalin’s son.

55. TBJG, 9 July 1941; Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, 2:204–5; Völkischer Beobachter, 24 July 1941; Herf, The Jewish Enemy, 110–11. See also Benz, “Judenvernichtung”; and Kaufman, Germany Must Perish!

56. TBJG, 24 July 1941, 3, 13, 19–20, 26, 29 August, 22 October 1941; Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, 2:205–7; Herf, The Jewish Enemy, 111–15; Benz, “Judenvernichtung,” 620–22; Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich, 31 July 1941.

Top Nazis seem to have come to believe their own propaganda about the Kaufman book or, more precisely, to have had their irrational, paranoid conspiracy fantasies confirmed. No longer merely a crank, Kaufman was elevated to a close personal adviser to Roosevelt and a decisive influence on American policy. Adolf Eichmann, e.g., suggested in his posthumously published memoirs: “Kaufman intended to bring about the complete extermination of our people…. It is probable that in our highest leadership circles, the Kaufman plan served as a stimulating factor for [our] own extermination plans.” This sense of a preventive measure fit well the Nazis’ mind-set, which typically justified their own murderous actions as simply a response to the plans of others or as just retribution for past crimes. See Aschenauer, ed., Ich, Adolf Eichmann, 177–78; Herf, The Jewish Enemy, 324 n. 87.

57. Goering’s authorization to Heydrich in Noakes and Pridham, eds., Nazism: A History, 2:1104; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 315–16; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 460, and Hitler: Nemesis, 470–71; Ueberschär, “Das Scheitern des Unternehmens ‘Barbarossa,’” 149.

58. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 277–85; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 311–17; TBJG, 11 August 1941.

59. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 311–17; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 456–58, and Hitler: Nemesis, 472–74; TBJG, 18–19 August 1941.

60. Jersak, “Die Interaktion von Kriegsverlauf und Judenvernichtung,” “A Matter of Foreign Policy,” and “Decisions to Murder and to Lie,” 304–5; Meeting between Hitler and the Spanish ambassador, 12 August 1941, in Hillgruber, Staatsmänner, 1:624 (doc. 86); Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 502.

61. TBJG, 15–20 August 1941; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 318–23; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 407–8, 460–61, and Hitler: Nemesis, 960–61 n. 75; Gerlach, “The Wannsee Conference,” 777. For a more supportive view of Jersak’s thesis, although with some reservations, see Arnold, “Hitlers Wandel im August 1941.”

62. For a good English translation of the statistical report of Karl Jäger, see Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds., “The Good Old Days,” 46–58. It is also available on the Internet at “The Jäger Report,” Einsatzgruppen Archives, http://www.einsatzgruppenarchives.com/jager.html (accessed 2 October 2008).