61. Streit, “The German Army and the Politics of Genocide,” 9; Müller, “The Failure of the Economic ‘Blitzkrieg Strategy,’” 1145–49, and “Menschenjagd,” 93; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 481–82; Herbert, “Extermination Policy,” 31–34; Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 36–42; Gerlach, Kalkulierte Mord, 265–318, and “German Economic Interests,” 215–17; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 471.
62. Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 480–84; Müller, “The Failure of the Economic ‘Blitzkrieg Strategy,’” 1161–66, and “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 185–88; Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 42; “Schreiben des Rüstungsinspekteurs Ukraine, General Leutnant Hans Leykauf, an den Chef des Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamtes im OKW, General d. Inf. Thomas, vom 2. 12. 1941,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds., “Unternehmen Barbarossa,” 338–39.
For examples of efforts by local commanders to ameliorate local civilian hunger, see Hürter, “Die Wehrmacht vor Leningrad,” 404–6. For an example of an order to release food supplies from army rear areas to the civilian population, see “Schreiben des Generalquartiermeisters Wagner an den Wirtschaftsführungsstab vom 3.8.1942,” in Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, ed., Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 305.
63. Müller, “The Failure of the Economic ‘Blitzkrieg Strategy,’” 1163–72; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 483–85; Schulte, German Army, 86–116; TBJG, 19 August 1941.
64. Müller, “The Failure of the Economic ‘Blitzkrieg Strategy,’” 1163–72; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 483–85; Schulte, German Army, 86–116; TBJG, 19 August 1941; “Die Ernäherung der Front und der Heimat. Richtlinien für die Behandlung in Frontzeitungen (Nicht zum wörtlichen Abdruck bestimmt),” OKH, 1 November 1941, in Reinhardt, Moscow—the Turning Point, 124 n. 187, 269–70.
65. Herbert, “Extermination Policy,” 37–41; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 297–300, and “Ausbildungsziel Judenmord?” 692; Rosenberg quoted in Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 581; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 320–21, and Ordinary Men, 179.
66. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 286–87; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 320–25, and “Nazi Ghettoization Policy in Poland”; Gerlach, “The Wannsee Conference,” 760, 763; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 460–61; Herbert, “Extermination Policy,” 34, 37–38, and “Labour and Extermination.”
For an early argument of the connection between the murder of the Jews and economic considerations, see Aly and Heim, “The Economics of the Final Solution.” For suggestions of a link between the murder of the Jews and the Nazi desire to reduce the Eastern European population for food-related reasons, see Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 250–52; Aly, “Final Solution,” 214–42; Kettenacker, “Hitler’s Final Solution and its Rationalization”; Gerlach, Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord, 13–30, 167–257, and “German Economic Interests”; Dieckmann, “The Killing of the Lithuanian Jews,” 253–66; Herbert, “Extermination Policy,” 31–34.
67. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 323–25; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 476–81. See also Witte, “Two Decisions.”
68. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 325–27; Gerlach, “The Wannsee Conference,” 763–64; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 462–63.
69. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 328–30, 333–34; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 462–63; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 304–5; Müller, “The Failure of the Economic ‘Blitzkrieg Strategy,’” 1137.
70. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 392–98; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 304–5; Gerlach, “The Wannsee Conference,” 766–71.
71. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 328–30, 353–54, 396–98; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 356; Gerlach, “The Wannsee Conference,” 769–71; Müller, “The Failure of the Economic ‘Blitzkrieg Strategy,’” 1137.
72. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 354–58, 365–68; Gerlach, “The Wannsee Conference,” 762–63; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 483–87; van Pelt and Dwork, Auschwitz, 279–83, 292–93; Allen, “ ‘The Devil in the Details,’” 199–201; Pressac, “Machinery of Mass Murder,” 198–201.
73. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 362–69.
74. Ibid., 366–73, 416–23; Jochmann, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 17, 21, 25 October 1941, 90–91, 96–99, 106; Gerlach, “Failure of Plans,” 60–64, and Kalkulierte Morde, 650–53; Aly, “Final Solution,” 223–25.
75. Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 464–66, and Hitler: Nemesis, 487–91; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 416–19; Jochmann, Monologe im Führerhauptquartier, 5 November, 2 December 1941, 125–26, 130–31, 148; Domarus, ed., Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 2:1772–73, 1781; TBJG, 13 December 1941.
Christian Gerlach sees Hitler’s 12 December speech as marking the fundamental shift from a policy of locally driven murder campaigns, justified on the basis of specific situations, to a centrally ordered policy of genocide. This is an overstatement of the significance of the speech from the point of view of decisionmaking, but, certainly, it had a clarifying effect on the party leadership. See Gerlach, “The Wannsee Conference.”
76. Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 465–67, and Hitler: Nemesis, 490–94; Gerlach, “The Wannsee Conference,” 780–86; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 372–73, 398–415, 540 n. 120; Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 440, 448, 456, 466–82, 514–15.
77. Gerlach, “The Wannsee Conference,” 780–81, 790, 793–800; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 465–67, and Hitler: Nemesis, 490–94; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 408–15.
78. Gerlach, “The Wannsee Conference,” 780–81, 790, 793–800; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 465–67, and Hitler: Nemesis, 490–94; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 408–15; Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 440, 448, 456, 466–82, 514–15; Sandkühler, “Anti-Jewish Policy,” 115, 118–19; Kaienburg, “Jüdische Arbeitslager,” 19–20. Tooze (The Wages of Destruction, 476, 751 n. 46) maintains that, at Wannsee, Heydrich clung to the idea of working Jews to death on road construction and not killing them through gassing or shooting. See also Roseman, The Villa, the Lake, the Meeting.