55. Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 605–11; Sereny, Albert Speer, 420–21.
56. Evans, The Third Reich at War, 371–72; Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 317–18; Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 323–45; Wegner, “Defensive ohne Strategie,” 197; Overmans, Deutsche militärische Verluste, 238.
57. Wegner, “Von Stalingrad nach Kursk,” 33, and “Defensive ohne Strategie,” 198–99.
58. Wegner, “Von Stalingrad nach Kursk,” 11–14, 19–28, 65, 74, “Defensive ohne Strategie,” 199–200, and “Das Ende der Strategie,” 212–19.
59. Wegner, “Von Stalingrad nach Kursk,” 28–41, “Defensive ohne Strategie,” 202–5, and “Das Ende der Strategie,” 221–26.
60. Wegner, “Von Stalingrad nach Kursk,” 61–66, and “Defensive ohne Strategie,” 200–201; Frieser, “Schlagen aus der Nachhand,” 107–10; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 375; Mulligan, “Spies, Ciphers, and ‘Zitadelle.’”
61. Wegner, “Von Stalingrad nach Kursk,” 62, 68–69, and “Defensive ohne Strategie,” 200–201; TBJG, 25 June, 5 July 1943; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 372–73.
62. Wegner, “Von Stalingrad nach Kursk,” 68–70; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 376–78; Klink, Das Gesetz des Handelns, 60; “Operationsbefehl Nr. 6,” in Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 15 April 1943, 3, pt. 6:1425–27.
63. Wegner, “Von Stalingrad nach Kursk,” 70–76; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 376–78.
64. Wegner, “Von Stalingrad nach Kursk,” 70–76; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 376–78; Frieser, “Schlagen aus der Nachhand,” 111–13; Guderian, Panzer Leader, 306–7. As early as 2 March, Goebbels declared in his diary that the difficult relations between Hitler and his generals were the result of the fact that they no longer believed in him.
65. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 307–10; Wegner, “Von Stalingrad nach Kursk,” 76–77, and “Defensive ohne Strategie,” 201; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 378; TBJG, 7 May 1943; Klink, Das Gesetz des Handelns, 163–64; Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 5 July 1943, 3, pt. 6:749; Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 139–40.
66. Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 378–81; Klink, Das Gesetz des Handelns, 165–66; Wegner, “Von Stalingrad nach Kursk,” 72–73, 77–79.
67. Guderian, Panzer Leader, 308–11; Wegner, “Von Stalingrad nach Kursk,” 77–79; Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 5 July 1943, 3, pt. 6:750; TBJG, 25 June 1943; Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 333–34; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 591; Manstein, Lost Victories, 447.
68. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 82–103.
69. Ibid.; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 133–35. See, as well, the statistical assessment in Zetterling and Frankson, Kursk 1943, 58–67, in which the total number of Tigers taking part in the offensive is put at 146. Zetterling and Frankson concur with the figure of 200 Panthers, most under the control of the Grossdeutschland Division; thus, the Second SS Panzer Corps had no Panthers. The overwhelming majority of German AFVs, over 85 percent of the total, were Panzer IIIs and IVs and the Sturmgeschütz (assault gun) III.
70. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 82–103.
71. Ibid., 104–16.
72. Ibid., 98, 106–8; Glantz and House, The Battle of Kursk, 64.
73. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 108–9; Glantz and House, The Battle of Kursk, 93; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 135–36.
74. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 109–11; Glantz and House, The Battle of Kursk, 115–17; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 136.
75. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 111–12; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 136–37.
76. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 87, 93, 100, 112–14; Guderian, Panzer Leader, 310–11. See also Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction, 281–90.
77. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 114–16; Glantz and House, The Battle of Kursk, 102–3, and When Titans Clashed, 165–66.
78. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 117–19; Glantz and House, The Battle of Kursk, 147, 152, 336; Manstein, Lost Victories, 448.
79. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 119–20, and “Schlagen aus der Nachhand,” 124–25; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 381–82.
80. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 120–22, 132–33, and “Schlagen aus der Nachhand,” 120–22; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 381–82. Even the careful calculations of historians such as Frieser and Töppel have resulted in some confusion. In his earlier work (“Schlagen aus der Nachhand”), Frieser suggests that the Second SS Panzer Corps had 273 operational tanks on 12 July, while, in his later work (“Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” “Der Rückschlag des Pendels,” and “Der Zusammenbruch im Osten”), taking into account tanks in maintenance, he has corrected the figure to 211 operational tanks. Töppel, meanwhile, claims 236 operational tanks while agreeing with Frieser’s total of 58 assault guns and 43 tank destroyers. See, as well, Zetterling and Frankson, Kursk 1943, 102–10.
81. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 123–25, 134, and “Schlagen aus der Nachhand,” 125–26; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 383.
82. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 125–27; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 383.
83. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 121, 129–39; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 384–87, 393–95; Zetterling and Frankson, Kursk 1943, 134. The elite Grossdeutschland Division possessed the great majority of Army Group South’s Panthers.
84. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 139–42; Wegner, “Das Ende der Strategie,” 226, and “Defensive ohne Strategie,” 201; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 387–89; Manstein, Lost Victories, 448–49.
85. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 142–47, and “Schlage aus der Nachhand,” 132; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 387–92.
86. TBJG, 19 July 1943; Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 148–72; Magenheimer, Hitler’s War, 192; Töppel, “Die Schlacht bei Kursk,” 393–97; Glantz and House, The Battle of Kursk, 135, 274; Sokolov, “The Battle for Kursk,” 278 (on the entire Eastern Front the Germans lost 71,231 men killed in July). See also Sokolov, “The Cost of War”; and Zetterling and Frankson, Kursk 1943, 111–31, 145–52. As Frieser notes, in all of World War II, the Germans produced 25,000 battle tanks, exclusive of assault guns and tank destroyers, while the Allies churned out more than 200,000 (“Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 171).
87. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 158–72; Zetterling and Frankson, “Eastern Front Battles,” 190–92, and Kursk 1943, 132–44.
88. Frieser, “Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,” 173–85.
89. Ibid., 185–86; Wegner, “Die Aporie des Krieges,” 219–20; Glantz and House, The Battle of Kursk, 232; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 138–39.