“Experience tells us – very.”
Another tense silence.
“If what you’re saying is true, Sir Jeffery, we must act swiftly,” said the PM, breaking the silence. “It seems to me we have little choice. Al-Qaeda won’t give a damn about hitting targets here or in America – all they want is to rule the world at any price. But would the North Koreans risk the sort of retaliation we would deal them if they were planning to do that?” he questioned, his clear blue eyes conveying dignity and compassion. He had a reputation for a no-nonsense, pragmatic approach.
“The regime is under pressure over the nuclear issue, despite Kim Jong-Un’s promises,” said Michael Trafford. His heavily hooded brown eyes stared hard at the PM. “The U.S. has cut aid considerably as we all know. Acute shortage of foreign aid is slowly strangling what little economy they have left. The population is starving. I believe they might well take the risk.”
Sir Jeffery responded. “According to the North Korean being held in Seoul, the delivery of the sub and its missiles has taken place; he doesn’t know to whom, nor does he know to where. I’m inclined to believe that, knowing the Korean interrogation methods.”
“The Americans and ourselves monitor all Russian and Chinese-manufactured submarines capable of firing missiles,” said Engels, a short, dapper man with dark hair greying at the temples. He stood out in his immaculate naval uniform in contrast to the others in sober suits.
“Who else has nuclear submarine capabilities?” asked Trafford.
“Ourselves of course; the Americans, Russia, India, China and the French,” answered Engels. “China has three in her fleet, France four and Russia a total of fourteen at the last count. We endeavour to keep track of all foreign submarines, especially nuclear,” he concluded.
“Unfortunately,” snapped Trafford, “we don’t know which. This go-between negotiates only delivery dates and payout terms; he’s obviously not in the loop for detail, otherwise we would at least know the payload, nuclear or bio. More importantly we would know the target. For all we know, this sub with its clutch of missiles could be on its way to our shores as we speak. An experienced crew would be needed too, capable of operating the sub and the missile systems.” He looked intently at the PM. “We need to interrogate this man ourselves – and quick. Tell the South Koreans to hand him over.”
“Easier said than done, Michael,” the PM replied. “They would want to know how we found out about this man. No matter what diplomatic strings we pull it will take weeks, if not months, to get him out. We do not have the time. Besides, I would not put it past the South Koreans to eliminate him just to avoid extradition to us.” He looked at the intelligence chief for confirmation, which he got.
Trafford nodded his acceptance.
“Can we account for all of the subs?” questioned David Regis, a tall, grey-haired, distinguished-looking man.
“Not all Russian subs,” Engels replied. “Several are out, but we have a good idea of their whereabouts. Those at home bases are regularly monitored by ourselves and the Americans. Anyhow, I understand all were out before the deal referred to in this report was made.”
“How long is the normal stay time at a home base?” Regis questioned.
“Depends on a number of things; not least of which would be their maintenance programs,” Engels answered. “The newer subs – maybe two or three months; the older ones, six months or more. The Russians have had three of their Delta III’s in covered pens in Rybachiy, on the Kamchatka Peninsula, for over a year now. They are either undergoing repairs or in the process of being decommissioned. This is not unusual; they are gradually building their fleet.”
“How many Delta III’s are still in service?” Regis asked.
“Five altogether,” Engels shot back. “We know that the K449, K496 and K433 are penned at Rybachiy – K223 and K211 are out on active duty in the north Pacific.”
“Could it be one of those last two?” the PM asked.
“I doubt it. The Americans have been monitoring their movements for the last six months, patrolling the Alaskan coastline between their return to base for provisions. The latest report we have indicates they are still up there.”
“The three in Rybachiy,” Regis pressed. “Are they the longest Russian nuclear subs to have stayed in the base at any one time?”
“Yes, confirmed by satellite.”
“How can the satellites verify, if the subs are in covered pens?” Regis pressed.
“As Rybachiy is Russia’s largest nuclear sub base and home to the Pacific Fleet, it’s kept under surveillance by the Americans, who share the results with us.”
“Do they use a geo sat?”
“No; orbital – once every twelve hours.”
Regis nodded and looked at the others. “One of the Deltas could have slipped away between orbits.”
“Do we have signatures of the three?” questioned Trafford.
“We do,” replied the admiral, then he turned to the PM. “Every engine makes a specific noise, which is referred to by all navies as a ‘signature’. We and the Americans have a data base covering every other known submarine in service, including Russian, to keep track of where they are in the oceans and to log movements of particular types of submarines. This base is constantly updated whenever the opportunity arises, especially during the cat and mouse games played out in the oceans around the world.”
“From now on, all Russian subs encountered are to be regarded as hostile, especially if the signature of any of the three now in Rybachiy is confirmed,” said the PM firmly.
“Take out a Russian and we could start a war,” said Regis.
“They didn’t when America sunk K-129,” said Engels.
“Was that the rogue Russian sub that was supposedly going to launch missiles at Pearl Harbour?” questioned the PM.
“Yes, sir, according to unofficial channels.”
“Presumably they didn’t retaliate then because they were the perpetrators,” the PM offered. “Here, if that sub was sold to the Koreans, the Russians are doing the same thing, only indirectly. They would have nothing to gain and everything to lose if we managed to disable. I would gamble, with our island at stake, that Dimitriev would not risk starting a Third World War on that basis.”
“We could expect some kind of a move against us. It’s more than speculation the Russians sunk the USS Scorpion off the Azores in retaliation,” said the admiral.
“If the Deltas are waiting to be scrapped,” said Trafford, “and knowing the Russian Navy’s currently streamlining their Pacific sub fleet, I would not rule out an ‘under the table’ deal by regional controllers. We know the consolidation is causing hardship to redundant crews; it leaves men idle, who need to feed families.” The minister of defence paused to collect his thoughts and looked at the PM. “A call to President Dimitriev might clarify things.”
“Forget that,” shot the PM. “Dimitriev will give nothing away. They may now call themselves a democratic Russian Federation, but the mentality of the old Soviet Union is still firmly in place, believe me. Besides, I would have to explain why. Not only would that make the Russians fully aware of our situation, but it would also give them the excuse to increase their submarine activity. Not to mention surface ships in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans which could put serious pressure on our own naval resources in those areas and, I might add, compromise our own efforts to locate and disable this submarine.”
The commander-in-chief, Engels, agreed.
Then, as if an afterthought, the PM added, “Dimitriev probably would not be too unhappy to see London blown away or, for that matter, any American city.”
Trafford came back, ignoring that last comment, “But, if a sub has been illegally sold to the North Koreans by rogue elements of the Russian Navy’s eastern high command, the Kremlin would also like to locate and destroy, I’m sure, to avoid the consequences, should the sub’s, and thus al-Qaeda’s, intentions succeed. Having them search for their own sub could be a help more than a hindrance. We have to stop that sub by whatever means available, even if it means enlisting the help of the Russians.”