M. C. The triple discipline of spiritual exercises is intended to lead me towards the inner transformation of my way of seeing, and eventually, to restore me ns nn integrnl and integrated part of the cosmos. According to this
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theory, my task is to discipline my desires, my inclinations, and my assent.
The last two domains correspond respectively to ethics - I must observe my duties toward my fellow citizens - and to logic or epistemology: I must accept as true only that which is freed from my subjective prejudices.
All this seems feasible enough. But as far as the discipline of desire is concerned: it is surely true that the majority of our unhappiness comes from our unsatisfied desires; this was taught by the Buddha, among others. But is it really possible for me to discipline my desires; that is, to persuade myself by means of rational considerations no longer to desire a particular object?
Let's take sexual desire as an example. If I feel desire for a woman, it is perfectly possible for me to tell myself that I will not act according to "'J' desire; in other words, that I will not attempt to satisfy my desire. But can I really go further than that, and, in the presence of the desired object, command myself not to desire it at{v longer? I have difficulties with this point.
P. H. Can purely rational considerations be effective against passion or sexual desire? Here we return to the very idea of spiritual exercises.
What's interesting about the idea of spiritual exercises is precisely that it is nor a matter of a purely rational consideration, but the putting in action of all kinds of means, intended to act upon one's self. Imagination and affectivity play a capital role here: we must represent to ourselves in vivid colors the dangers of such-and-such a passion, and use striking formulations of ideas in order to exhort ourselves. We must also create habits, and fortify ourselves by preparing ourselves against hardships in advance. In Epicurean communities, people help one another, admit their weaknesses to each other, and warn others of such-andsuch a dangerous tendency which is beginning to manifest itself in them.
All these techniques can be useful in crisis situations. Yet we must not allow them to make us forget that what is most important is the profound orientation of our lives, the fundamental choice of a life, which engages us passionately. The problem is not so much to repress such-and-such a passion, as it is to learn to see things "from above," in the grandiose perspective of universal nature and of humanity, compared to which many passions may appear ridiculously insignificant. It is then that rational knowledge may become force and will, and thereby become extremely efficacious.
M. C. On May 22, 1 99 1 , you gave your last lecture at the College de France.
After some three decades of teaching, the last words you pronounced in public were: "In the last analysis, we can scarcely talk about what is most important."
This seems paradoxical . After a lifetime devoted to humanistic studies, have you finally come to the conclusion of the Neoplatonist philosopher Damascius,13 who wrote "What will be the limit of our discourse, if it is nut an impotent silence, and the admission of our absolute lack of knowledge concerning those things about which we mny never gnin knowlcdl(c, Hince they ore inncce1111iblc11?
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P.H. You're alluding to the last words of my last class: "In the final analysis, we can scarcely talk about what is most important." I was saying that about Plotinus, for whom the most important thing was not his teaching, but the unutterable experience of union with the One. For Plotinus, abstract teaching could allude to this experience, but could not lead to it. Only asceticism and a moral life could truly prepare the soul for such a union (and here again, we find the same opposition between philosophical discourse and the philosophical life).
Obviously, however, when I used this phrase, I was hinting at my own experience as a teacher and my experience of life. I wasn't only talking about the experience of the ineffable among the Neoplatonists, but about a more general experience.
Everything which is "technical" in the broad sense of the term, whether we arc talking about the exact sciences or the humanistic sciences, is perfectly able to be communicated by teaching or conversation. But everything that touches the domain of the existential - which is what is most important for human beings - for instance, our feeling of existence, our impressions when faced by death, our perception of nature, our sensations, and a fortiori the mystical experience, is not directly communicable. The phrases we use to describe them are conventional and banal; we realize this when we try to console someone over the loss of a loved one. That's why it often happens that a poem or a biography are more philosophical than a philosophical treatise, simply because they allow us to glimpse this unsayable in an indirect way. Here again, we find the kind of mysticism evoked in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: "There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical."
NOTES
[In April-May 1992, M. Hadot was kind enough to respond to some questions I had asked him during the course of the preparation of this translation. What follows is a translation of our exchange. All notes arc my own. - Trans.]
1 [Etienne Gilson, author of many highly influential works on Medieval thought; cf. History of Cliristian Philosophy in tile Middle Ages, New York 1955.]
2 [Emile Brehier, the first modem editor and translator of Plotinus, also wrote important works on Stoicism, and a three-volume History of Pliilosophy which was, for many decades, the standard reference work on the subject in France.]
3 Uean Wahl, expert on Existentialism, was the author of such works as Etudes kierkegaardiem1es ("Studies on Kierkegaard"), 3rd edn, Paris 1967.]
4 [Maurice de Gandillac, a specialist on Neoplatonism, was author of important works on Plotinus (la s11gesse de Plotin, Paris 1966), and Nicolas of Cusa, among others.]
5 LJean Hyppolite was the translator and exegete of Hegel (Genest et Structure de la Pl1e110111bwl0Kit• tie /'esprit tie Hegel, Paris 1946), who exercised a great influence un French Marxi11m. I
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6 [3rd edn, Paris 1 989. An English translation is in preparation.]
7 [2 vols, Paris 1 968.]
8 [P. Henry, Plolin ti /'Ocrident. Firmicus Maltrnus, Marius Virtorinus, Saini Augustin ti Marrobe (= Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense, Etudes et Documents 1 5), Louvain 1934.]
9 [The Practical School of Higher Studies, of which the fifth section is the Section of Religious Sciences. Hadot had as his colleagues at this institution such eminent scholars as Qaude Levi-Strauss, Georges Dumezil, Henry Corbin, Henri-Charles Puech, and the great Hellenist AndrC-Jean Festugiere, to name but a few.]
10 [Ambroist de Milan, Apologie tie David, intro. Latin text, notes and index Pierre Hadot, trans. Marius Cordier (= Sources Chretiennes 239), Paris 1 977.) 11 ["Power and Wisdom," Paris 1 970.]