Hence we begin with a fundamental existential choice on behalf of a style of life that consists of certain practices, activities, and conduct that are precisely what Hadot calls "spiritual exercises." This style of life is given concrete form either in the order of inner discourse and of spiritual activity: meditation, dialogue with oneself, examination of conscience, exercises of the imagination, such as the view from above on the cosmos or the earth, or in the order of action and of daily behavior, like the mastery of oneself, indifference towards ill.different things, the fulfilment of the duties of social life in Stoicism, the discipline of desires in Epicurcanism.191
Philosophical discourse, of oneself with oneself and of oneself with others, will, of course, be needed to justify and communicate these spiritual exercises, to represent the fundamental existential attitude, but philosophy itself consists primarily in choosing and living the attitude.
Hadot recognizes that this ancient understanding of philosophy can appear very far removed from the way in which we now understand the nature of philosophy. He has pointed to three aspects of the evolution of the representation of philosophy that have contributed to our current understanding of it as a purely theoretical, abstract activity, and to our identific.ation of it with philosophical discourse alone. The first aspect, which Hadot has called "a natural inclination of the philosophical mind" and "connatural to the philosopher," is the "constant tendency that the philosopher always has, even in Antiquity, to satisfy himself with discourse, with the conceptual architecture that he has constructed, without putting into question his own life." 192
This tendency, which was already criticized in antiquity, has been said by Hadot to be "the perpetual danger of philosophy" - the philosopher is always tempted to take refuge in, to shut himself up in, the "reassuring universe of concepts and of discourse instead of going beyond discourse in order to take upon himself the risk of the radical transformation of himself." 193 To this tendency is opposed the equally natural inclination of the philosophical mind to Wllnl lo examine itself, tu w11111 to learn how to live the philosophical life.
32
Introduction
Faced with the overwhelming reality of life, with worries, anxiety, suffering, death, philosophical discourse can appear to be nothing but "empty chattering and a derisive luxury," mere words when what is needed is a new attitude towards life, one which will produce inner freedom, tranquillity, happiness. 194
It is at these moments that our contrary natural inclinations will be felt to be most acutely opposed to one another. We will then be forced to ask, "What is finally most beneficial to the human being as a human being? Is it to discourse on language, or on being and non-being? Or is it not rather to learn how to live a human life?" 195 Yet despite our "elementary need" for this philosophical consciousness and way of life, the history of philosophy also testifies unambiguously to the powerful tendency of our "self-satisfaction with theoretical discourse. " 196
A second aspect that helps to account for the changed understanding and representation of philosophy in the modern world has to do with the historical evolution of philosophy, especially with the relation between philosophy and Christianity. Although in early Christianity, especially the monastic movements, Christianity itself was presented as a philosophia, a way of life in conformity with the divine Logos, as the Middle Ages developed, one witnessed a "total separation" of ancient spiritual exercises, which were no longer considered a part of philosophy but were integrated into Christian spirituality, and philosophy itself, which became a "simple theoretical tool" at the service of theology, an ancilla tl1eo/ogiae.191 Philosophy's role was now to provide theology with the "conceptual, logical, physical and metaphysical materials it needed," and the "Faculty of Arts became no more than a preparation for the Faculty of Theology." 198 Philosophical speculation thus became a purely abstract and theoretical activity, which was set strictly apart from theological thought and religious practice and spirituality. l'l'J
No longer a way of life, philosophy became a conceptual construction, a servant of theology, and the idea of philosophy as a system began to appear.200
A third aspect underlying our modem representation of philosophy is of a sociological nature, and can be traced back to the functioning of the university, as it was created by the medieval church. One central feature of the university is that it is an institution made up of professors who train other professors, of specialists who learn how to train other specialists. Unlike in antiquity, when philosophical teaching was directed towards the human being so as to form him as a human being, the modern university forms professionals who teach future professionals, and thus philosophy, rather than proposing an art of living, is presented above all as a "technical language reserved for specialists." 201 As Hadot says, in "modern university philosophy, philosophy is obviously no longer a way of life, a kind of life, unless it is the kind of life of the professor of philosophy." 2112 This sociological requirement of profossionalism, this situation of scholasticism, fncilitnl'cs nnd rcinforccN the wnd·
Introduction
33
ency to take refuge in the "comfortable universe of concepts and of discourses"; 203 it gives this natural tendency a social basis J and impetus, encouraging the display of a specialized technical language, as if philosophical depth were exhausted by one's ability to make use of conceptual abstractions and by one's skill at demonstrating the truth and falsity of various propositions.
Thus Hadot has provided three reasons, which one could think of as, respectively, philosophical, historical, and sociological, that help to account for the representation of philosophy as a purely theoretical activity, and for the reduction of philosophy to philosophical discourse. But he has not overlooked the fact that one can find elements of the ancient representation of philosophy throughout the history of philosophy, that certain of the
"existential aspects of ancient philosophy" have been constantly rediscovered.:!GI Among the philosophers he has named as exhibiting this ancient representation are Abelard and the Renaissance humanists, such as Petrarch and Erasmus. We might think here of the latter's remark with respect to his Enchiridion Mi/itis Christiani: "Let this book lead to a theological life rather than theological disputation." 205 Hadot has repeatedly pointed to Montaigne's Essays, especially "That to Philosophise is to Learn How to Die," as embodying the ancient exercise of philosophy, referring to the Essays as "the breviary of ancient philosophy, the manual of the art of living." ™ Among modern philosophers, Hadot has singled out certain aspects of Descartes'
Meditations, particularly D<..-scartes' advice that one invest some months or at least weeks meditating on his first and second Meditations, which Hadot says ultimately shows that for Descartes "evidence can only be perceived thanks to a spiritual exercise." 207 Hadot also mentions Spinoza's Ethics, and its emphasis on teaching us how to radically transform ourselves, to accede to beatitude, to approach the ideal of the sage, as well as Shaftesbury's remarkable Exercises, inspired by the spiritual exercises of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. 268 He has indicated, too, the continuation of the ancient idea of philosophy in the French philosophes of the eighteenth century, and in Kant's ideas of the interest of reason and the primacy of the practical. 209 In more recent times, we can find the spirit of the ancient philosopher's demand that we radically change our way of living and of seeing the world in Goethe, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard, and, in different ways, in the young Hegelians and Marx.210 In the twentieth century, Hadot points to Bergson, to Wittgenstein, to Foucault, and to certain aspects of phenomenology and existentialism as embodying the ancient attitude, practices, and sense of what philosophy means.21 1 And recently, Hadot has taken up Thoreau's Walden, finding in his decision to live in the woods Thoreau's undertaking of a philosophical act. 212 This constant reoccurrence of the ancient experience of phih111ophy, side by side with the tendency to understand philosophy as a cnnccptunl Hlrucr urc, :in 11hHl rnc1 discourse, shows how complex and even