The contemplation mentioned by Seneca is, moreover, a kind of unitive contemplation. In order to perceive the world, we must, as it were, perceive our uni()! with the world, by means of an exercise of concentration on the present moment. Similarly, in order to recognize wisdom, we must, so to speak, go into training for wisdom. We can know a thing only by becoming similar to our object. Thus, by a total conversion, we can render ourselves open to the world and to wisdom. This is why Seneca was just as stupefied and filled with ecstasy by the spectacle of wisdom as he was by the spectacle of the world. For him, in both instances, it was a case of a discovery obtained by dint of an interior transformation and complete change in his way of seeing and living.
In the final analysis, both the world as perceived in the conseiousness of the sage, and the sage's consciousness itself, plunged in the totality of the world, are revealed to the lover of wisdom in one single, unique movement.
NOTES
B. Groethuysen, Anthropologie philosophique, Paris 1 952, rcpr. 1980, p. 80.
2 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 4, 23,
3 Ibid 3, 2.
4 Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 66, 6.
5 E. Hoffmann, "Epikur," in M. Dessoir, ed., Die Geschichte der Philosophie, vol.
I, W icshn<lcn 1 925, p. 223.
(1 l .uc1'l'l i11-, 011 1/11· N111111·r 11./' 111i11xs, 3, I <> 1 7, 28 -30.
262
Themes
7 M. Merleau-Ponty, La Phenomenologit dt la perception, Paris 1 945, pp. ii-iii.
8 M. Merleau-Ponty, Elogt de la philosoph� ti aulres essais, Paris 1953, pp. 285-6.
Cf. E. Husserl, "Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phiinomenologiscen Ursprung der Rliumlichkeit der Natur" (= Umsturz der Kopeinkanischen Lehre), in Marvin Faber, ed., Philosophical Essays in Memory of E. Husserl, Cambridge MA 1 940, pp. 309-25.
9 Merleau-Ponty, La Phenomenologit, p. xvi.
10 H. Bergson, La Pensee el It mouvanl, Paris 1 946, pp. 1 52f.
1 1 [Cf. P. Hadot's important article "Conversion" in En,ydopaedia Universalis, pp. 979-81 . - Trans.]
12 J. Ritter, Subju1ivitiit. Suhs Aufiiilu, Frankfurt 1 974.
13 Cited in Ritter, Subjtlttivitllt, p. 1 55.
14 ["Logical truth" versus "aesthetic truth." - Trans.]
15 Immanuel Kant, Critique of'Judgement, §29 (general remark).
16 ["Letters on Landscape-painting." They may be found in French translation in C.D. Friedrich and C.G. Carus, De la peinture de paysage, Paris 1988. - Trans.]
17 P. Klee, Theorie de /'art modeme, Paris 1964, repr. 1 985, pp. 42-6.
18 ["La 11aturt naluranle importe advantage au peintrt que la nature naturee." I have translated nature naturanlt back into its Latin form, in which, issuing from Scholastic philosophy, it was made famous by Spinoza (cf. Ethics, I, 29).
According to Lalande's Vo,abulaire ttchnique et 'ritique de la philosophit (Paris 1 988, 1 6th edn, p. 673), natura naturans traditionally designates God, insofar as he is creator and principle of all action; while 11atura naturata is "the totality of beings and laws he has created." Klee's meaning is that the artist is more interested in the dynamics of creative processes than in the visible world as end-result of these processes. - Trans.]
19 Cf. J. Gasquet, Cezanne, Paris 1 988, p. 1 54.
20 R. Caillois, Esthetique gb1eralisee, Paris 1 962, p. 8.
21 M. Merleau-Ponty, "L'oeil et l'esprit," Les Temps Modemes 27 ( 1961 ), pp. 2 1 7, 219.
22 This idea was borrowed from Klee; cf. Klee, Theorie, p. 34.
23 Merleau-Ponty, la Phenomtnologie, p. viii.
24 Seneca, Letters to Ludlius, 64, 6.
25 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, 2, 1023-5, 1030-9. Similar remarks can be found in Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, 3, 38, 96; Seneca, Natural Questions, 7, I ; Augustine, On the Usefulness of Belief, 1 6, 34.
26 Rainer Maina Rilke, Duino Elegies, Eighth Elegy.
27 ["Musings of a Solitary Stroller," written between 1 776 and Rousseau's death in 1 n8. - Trans.)
28 J .-J. Rousseau 1 964, 7th Promenade, p. 1 26.
29 Ibid, 5th Promenade, p. 102.
30 See above.
3 1 Marcus Aurelius, Meditatio11s, 1 2, 3, 3--4; 7, 29, 3; 3, 1 2, I .
32 Horace, Epistle, I , 4, 13.
33 M . Gigante, Richerd1e Fil11Jemee, Naples 1 983, 1>1>. 1 8 1 , 2 1 5- 1 (,, 34 Horace, OJrs, 2, H1, 25.
The Sage and 1he World
263
35 William Blake, "Auguries of Innocence" in Complete Writings 111ith Variant Readings, ed. Geoffrey Keynes, London 1 972, p. 435, 1 -5.
36 ["Like a new spectator." - Trans.]
37 [Cf. P. Hadot, "Remarques sur la notion de <C physis l!> et de nature," in Hermineutique el ontologie: Hommage ti Pie"e-Aubenque, Paris 1990, pp. 1-15. -
Trans.]
38 "Nous co-naissons au monde." The phrase is that of Paul Claude!, Ari Poitique, Paris 1946, pp. 54ff.
39 Cf. above.
40 Cf. Ritter, Subjelttiviliil, p. 1 5 1 .
1 1
Philosophy as a Way of Life
Every person - whether Greek or Barbarian - who is in training for wisdom, leading a blameless, irreproachable life, chooses neither to commit injustice nor return it unto others, but to avoid the company of busybodies, and hold in contempt the places where they spend their time - courts, councils, marketplaces, assemblies - in short, every kind of meeting or reunion of thoughtless people. As their goal is a life of peace and serenity, they contemplate nature and everything found within her: they attentively explore the earth, the sea, the air, the sky, and every nature found therein. In thought, they accompany the moon, the sun, and the rotations of the other stars, whether fixed or wandering.
Their bodies remain on earth, but they give wings to their souls, so that, rising into the ether, they may observe the powers which dwell there, as is fitting for those who have truly become citizens of the world. Such people consider the whole world as their city, and its citizens are the companions of wisdom; they have received their civic rights from virtue, which has been entrusted with presiding over the universal commonwealth. Thus, filled with every excellence, they are accustomed no longer to take account of physical discomforts or exterior evils, and they train themselves to be indifferent to indifferent things; they are armed against both pleasures and desires, and, in short, they always strive to keep themselves above passions . . . they do not give in under the blows of fate, because they have calculated its attacks in advance (for foresight makes easier to bear even the most difficult of the things that happen against our will; since then the mind no longer supposes what happens to be strange and novel, but its perception of them is dulled, as if it had to do with old and worn-out things). It is obvious that people such as these, who find their joy in virtue, celebrate a festival their whole life long. To be sure, there is only a small number of such people; they arc like embers of wisdom kept smouldering in our cities, so that virtue may not be altogether sn uffed out 111ul d i!111ppe11r from our ritl'C. But if only
Philosophy as a Way of Life
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people everywhere felt the same way as this small number, and became as nature meant for them to be: blameless, irreproachable, and lovers of wisdom, rejoicing in the beautiful just because it is beautiful, and considering that there is no other good besides it . . . then our cities would be brimful of happiness. They would know nothing of the things that cause grief and fear, but would be so filled with the causes of joy and well-being that there would be no single moment in which they would not lead a life full of joyful laughter; indeed, the whole cycle of the year would be a festival for them.1