In this passage from Philo of Alexandria, inspired by Stoicism, one of the fundamental aspects of philosophy in the Hellenistic and Roman eras comes clearly to the forefront. During this period, philosophy was a way of life. This is not only to say that it was a specific type of moral conduct; we can easily see the role played in the passage from Philo by the contemplation of nature.
Rather, it means that philosophy was a mode of existing-in-the-world, which had to be practiced at each instant, and the goal of which was to transform the whole of the individual's life.
For the ancients, the mere word philo-sophia
the love of wisdom - was
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enough to express this conception of philosophy. In the Symposium, Plato had shown that Socrates, symbol of the philosopher, could be identified with Eros, the son of Poros (expedient) and of Penia (poverty). Eros lacked wisdom, but he did know how to acquire it. 2 Philosophy thus took on the form of an exercise of the thought, will, and the totality of one's being, the goal of which was to achieve a state practically inaccessible to mankind: wisdom. Philosophy was a method of spiritual progress which demanded a radical conversion and transformation of the individual's way of being.
Thus, philosophy was a way of life, both in its exercise and effort to achieve wisdom, and in its goal, wisdom itself. For real wisdom docs not merely cause us to know: it makes us "be" in a different way. Both the grandeur and the paradox of ancient philosophy are that it was, at one and the same time, conscious of the fact that wisdom is inaccessible, and convinced of the necessity of pursuing spiritual progress. In the words of Qµintillian : "We must . . . strive after that which is highest, as many of the ancient<> did. Even though they believed that no sage had ever yet been found, they nevertheless continued to teach the precepts of wisdom." ·1 The ancients knew that they would never be able to realize wisdom within themselves as a stable, definitive state, but they at least hoped to accede to it in certain privileged moments, and wisdom was the transcendent norm which guided their action.
Wisdom, then, was a way of life which brought peace of mind (alaraxia), inner freedom (11u1arkeia), and a cosmic consciousness. First and foremost, philrnmphy Jll'l'Mcrllcd itself as n therapeutic, intended to cure mankind's
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Themes
anguish. This concept is stated explicitly in Xenocrates; and in Epicurus:5
"We must not suppose that any other object is to be gained from the knowledge of the phenomena of the sky . . . than peace of mind and a sure confidence." This was also a prominent idea for the Stoics6 and for the Skeptics, apropos of whom Sextus Empiricus7 utilizes the following splendid image:
Apelles, the famous painter, wished to reproduce the foam from a horse's mouth in a painting. He was not able to get it right, and decided to give up. So, he threw the sponge he used to wipe his brushes against the painting. When the sponge hit the painting, it produced nothing other than an imitation of a horse's foam. In the same way, the Skeptics start off like the other philosophers, seeking peace of mind in firmness and confidence in their judgments. When they do not achieve it, they suspend their judgment. No sooner do they they do this than, by pure chance, peace of mind accompanies the suspension of judgment, like a shadow follows a body.
Philosophy presented itself as a method for achieving independence and inner freedom (autarkeia), that state in which the ego depends only upon itself. We encounter this theme in Socrates,8 among the Cynics, in Aristotle
- for whom only the contemplative life is independent9 - in Epicurus,10 and among the Stoics. 1 1 Although their methodologies differ, we find in all philosophical schools the same awareness of the power of the human self to free itself from everything which is alien to it, even if, as in the case of the Skeptics, it does so via the mere refusal to make any decision .
In Epicureanism and in Stoicism, cosmic consciousness was added to these fundamental dispositions. By "cosmic consciousness," we mean the consciousness that we are a part of the cosmos, and the consequent dilation of our self throughout the infinity of universal nature. In the words of Epicurus'
disciple Metrodorus: "Remember that, although you are mortal and have only a limited life-span, yet you have risen, through the contemplation of nature, to the infinity of space and time, and you have seen all the past and all the future." 12 According to Marcus Aurelius: "The rational soul . . . travels through the whole universe and the void that surrounds it . . . it reaches out into the boundless extent of infinity, and it examines and contemplates the periodic rebirth of all things. " 13 At each instant, the ancient sage was conscious of living in the cosmos, and he placed himself in harmony with the cosmos.
In order better to understand in what way ancient philosophy could be a way of life, it is perhaps necessary to have recourse to the dist inct ion proposed by the Stoics, 1� between discourse a/10111 philosophy and pllilosopliy its1.•(/: For the Stoics, the parts of philosophy physici;, cthicH, nnd logic W(�rc nor, in
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fact, parts of philosophy itself, but rather parts of philosophical discourse. By this they meant that when it comes to teaching philosophy, it is necessary to set forth a theory of logic, a theory of physics, and a theory of ethics. The exigencies of discourse, both logical and pedagogical, require that these distinctions be made. But philosophy itself - that is, the philosophical way of life - is no longer a theory divided into parts, but a unitary act, which consists in living logic, physics, and ethics. In this case, we no longer study logical theory - that is, the theory of speaking and thinking well - we simply think and speak well. We no longer engage in theory about the physical world, but we contemplate the cosmos. We no longer theorize about moral action, but we act in a correct and just way.
Discourse aboul philosophy is not the same thing as philosophy. Polemon, one of the heads of the Old Academy, used to say:
we should exercise ourselves with realities, not with dialectical speculations, like a man who has devoured some textbook on harmonics, but has never put his knowledge into practice. Likewise, we must not be like those who can astonish their onlookers by their skill in syllogistic argumentation, but who, when it comes to their own lives, contradict their own teachings. 15
Five centuries later, Epictetus echoed this view: A carpenter does not come up to you and say, "Listen to me discourse about the art of carpentry,'' but he makes a contract for a house and builds it . . . . Do the same thing yourself. Eat like a man, drink like a man . . . get married, have children, take part in civic life, learn how to put up with insults, and tolerate other people. 16
We can immediately foresee the consequences of this distinction, formulated by the Stoics but admitted by the majority of philosophers, concerning the relationship between theory and practice. An Epicurean saying puts it clearly: "Vain is the word of that philosopher which does not heal any suffering of man." 11 Philosophical theories are in the service of the philosophical life. That is why, in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, they were reduced to a theoretical, systematic, highly concentrated nucleus, capable of exercising a strong psychological effect, and easy enough to handle so that it might always be kept close at hand (procheiro11).18 Philosophical discourse was not systematic because it wanted to provide a total, systematic explanation of the whole of reality. Rather, it was systematic in order that it might provide the mind with a small number of principles, tightly linked together, which derived greater persuasive force and mnemonic effectiveness precisely from suc:h systcm111ii111ion. Short sayings summed up, sometimes in striking form,