It soon became clear, when the trial began, that the psychiatrists’ conclusions did not suit Judge Kostin either. As a military judge, employed by the Ministry of Defense, Kostin was beholden to the military establishment for his living accommodations, salary, and any prospects of promotion. So Judge Kostin’s apartment and pay would have to come from the same headquarters to which the accused, Colonel Budanov, was subordinate. Also, by the time Budanov came to trial, political circumstances in Russia had begun to change. The Kremlin had gradually stopped playing at democracy and worrying about the “dictatorship of law.” In consequence, all those who had fought in Chechnya were declared heroes, irrespective of what they had done there. The president began dishing out medals and orders right, left, and center, assuring those involved in the war that the state would never betray them. These highly charged words meant that the government intended to be lenient toward those guilty of war crimes in Chechnya, to the point of forgiving the most sordid offenses, and that any prosecutor trying to bring criminal proceedings against federal military personnel should pipe down.
Stories from the state-controlled television channels explained how scrupulously Budanov had fulfilled his duty, and General Shamanov was continually in evidence making patriotic speeches in praise of his comrade in arms. The claim that the eighteen-year-old Chechen girl whom the colonel had murdered was a sniper was no longer subject to doubt. Nobody now recalled that neither the investigation nor Budanov’s counsel had been able to find a shred of evidence to suggest that Elza Kungaeva had had anything to do with IAFs.
The politically inspired brainwashing of the Russian population was going full tilt, paving the way for Budanov’s acquittal.
At this very moment, the court in Rostov-on-Don, stricken by doubt as to the competence of the experts who had carried out the first two psychiatric reports, commissioned a new one. This time it was a joint military and civilian enterprise, in Moscow, moreover, uniting the efforts of the Central Forensic Medical Laboratory of the Ministry of Defense and the Serbsky State Research Center for Social and Forensic Psychiatry, popularly known as the Serbsky Institute.
The Serbsky’s reputation in Russia dates from Soviet times, when dissidents would be certified insane. The doctors of the Serbsky Institute were invariably conscientious in carrying out the tasks they were allotted by the KGB. It was to the Serbsky Institute that Budanov was sent. When the decision became common knowledge, there were few doubts as to why the state research center had been chosen. Everything possible was being done to free Budanov of criminal responsibility, his supporters—and his opponents—said.
The official reasons for commissioning a third report were given by the court as “imprecision, contradictoriness and factual incompleteness”; in addition, “new and more accurate data” had appeared that were important for “determining Budanov’s true mental state.”
No matter that a series of episodes described to the new commission had never happened. Because the information favored the colonel, it was put before the experts, who then treated it as incontrovertible.
Not to mince words, this was blatant falsification and the Serbsky experts’ response was tailored to produce the requisite image of a hero.
According to Budanov, his was a difficult birth…. According to the testimony of his mother and sister, he was vulnerable and liable to flare up in response to a slight. He would respond coarsely or start a fight. He was particularly sensitive toward unfair remarks and in such cases always tried to defend the weak, those smaller than himself, and the poor….
Budanov’s service references show him in an exceptionally favorable light. He was disciplined, effective and tenacious. In January 1995, during the first military campaign in Chechnya, while taking part in combat operations, Budanov suffered a concussion, losing consciousness for a short time. He did not seek medical attention. According to his mother and sister, after he returned from the first Chechen war, Budanov’s personality and behavior changed. He became more nervous and irritable…. In his subsections Budanov created a spirit of intolerance of shortcomings and passivity. He had a highly developed sense of responsibility….
None of his comrades has noticed mental aberrations in Budanov. He has never been under the observation of a psychiatrist or neuropathologist.
Budanov testifies that when his regiment arrived in Chechnya… , it was involved almost constantly in combat operations. In October and again in November 1999, Budanov suffered a concussion with loss of consciousness. After this he began to suffer incessantly from headaches and dizziness with loss of vision. He became unable to tolerate sudden loud noises, became liable to flare up, lacking in restraint and irritable. He suffered mood swings, with outbursts of rage. He committed acts which he later regretted.
Budanov testifies that the most severe fighting was in the Argun Ravine from December 24, 1999, to February 14, 2000. From January 12 to 21, the regiment lost nine officers and three other ranks. Many of these were killed, Budanov testifies, by a shot to the head from a sniper. On January 17, 2000, Budanov’s comrade Captain Razmakhnin died at the hands of a sniper….
Budanov was extremely upset by the fact that the majority of officers in his regiment had died not in open battle but at the hands of a sniper. He said he would return home only after they had “wiped out the last fighter.”
On February 15, without completing his leave, Budanov returned to Chechnya. His mother and sister testify that Budanov looked in on them… and had changed beyond recognition. He smoked constantly, hardly spoke and “flew into a rage over nothing at all.” He could not sit still. Showing photographs of those who had died and of their graves, he wept. They had not seen him in such a state before.
Budanov led attacks himself, his rifle in his hands, and took part in man-to-man combat. After the battles in the Argun Ravine, he tried personally to retrieve the bodies of those who had died. After the death of officers and soldiers of the regiment on Hill 950, Budanov blamed himself and was in a state of constant depression. He might strike subordinates or hurl ashtrays at them. In mid-March 2000, having demanded that his tent should be tidied, he threw a grenade into the stove….
From mid-February 2000, the regiment was deployed in the vicinity of Tangi. Budanov was ordered to carry out intelligence and search measures, lay ambushes, carry out supplementary passport checks of the inhabitants of the village, and detain suspects.
Budanov and those under his command commented that at that time the situation was very confused, and it was impossible to tell friend from foe or where the front line was….
The report continued with a highly variant account of events on the night of March 26 and concluded by noting, “When questioned,… Budanov explained the contradictions in his statements by saying that he had been in a very bad state.
“On the basis of the above, the commission has come to the conclusion that Budanov was not responsible for his actions, on the grounds of diminished responsibility…. The acts of the victim, Kungaeva, were one of the factors causing Budanov’s temporary mental breakdown…. There is no conclusive evidence regarding Budanov’s being in a state of intoxication….
“Budanov… should be kept under observation and treated by a psychiatrist on an outpatient basis. Category C: Partially fit for military service.”