BRINGING UKRAINE BACK INTO THE RUSSIAN ORBIT
The second and most important point of the Kremlin’s hidden agenda is the incorporation of Ukraine into the Eurasian Union. For the Kremlin the Eurasian Union is a new instrument to bring Ukraine back into its orbit.[38] This is also the reason that the Kremlin has a great interest in attracting Moldova, which, in March 2012, was promised lower consumer prices (of up to 30 percent) for gas and oil, and a “big market (comparable with the EU) for Moldovan products.” It was also offered more beneficial conditions for Moldavan workers in countries of the Customs Union if it would adhere to the Customs Union, which functions as the entrance to the Eurasian Union.[39] Moldova’s membership of the Eurasian Union would, in fact, see Ukraine encircled by three member states of the Eurasian Union: Russia, Belarus, and Moldova, thereby making Ukraine’s membership of this organization more logical and an eventual future membership of Ukraine of the EU more problematic. The Kremlin’s Moldova policy is, therefore, an integral part of its Eurasian Union project. There seems to exist a clear will in the Kremlin—in case the Moldovan leadership cannot be convinced to join the Eurasian Union and is opting instead for EU membership—to split the country and make the breakaway province of Transnistria independent along the lines of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On July 31, 2012, speaking in the Nashi Seliger camp, Putin said that Transnistria is entitled to self-determination. This “reference to self-determination is a novel one in Moscow’s rhetoric about the Transnistria conflict,” warned Vladimir Socor.[40] Putin’s declaration was followed by the reappointment on August 2, 2012, of deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin to the additional post of special representative of the Russian President for Transnistria (Rogozin had already been appointed in March 2012 to this post by Putin’s predecessor, Dmitry Medvedev). On the same day, Rogozin received Transnistria’s leader Yevgeny Shevchuk in Moscow. When Rogozin and Shevchuk made a declaration after the meeting, Russia’s flag and Transnistria’s “state flag” were displayed on an equal footing—a clear sign of Russian support for Transnistrian separatism. “Moscow’s July 31 and August 2 statements,” wrote Vladimir Socor, “add further elements of de-recognition [of Moldova’s territorial integrity], firming up suggestions for Transnistria’s ‘self-determination’ and acknowledging its ‘state’ attributes (territory, flag).”[41] Moscow’s support for Transnistrian separatism is directly linked with the Kremlin’s Eurasian project. “Moscow declared its intention to build a ‘Eurasian economic region’ in Transnistria aiming to prevent the weakening of Moscow’s control over Tiraspol, in a direct response to EU and Moldova’s efforts to attract Transnistria through economic cooperation.”[42]
Part II
The “Internal War”
Consolidation of Power
Chapter 6
Russia as a “Pluralist” One-Party State
When Yeltsin told Putin in the summer of 1999 that he had chosen him to be his successor and Putin had to prepare for the presidential elections of 2000, Putin was upset. “I don’t like election campaigns,” he said. “I really don’t. I don’t know how to run them, and I don’t like them.”[1] This exclamation would, in fact, become the profession of faith of Putin’s regime, because the realization of Putin’s imperial project was dependent on two conditions. The first of these was the unhampered continuation of his regime in order to be able to realize his long-term projects. The second condition was the necessity of upholding a formal democratic façade to facilitate the acceptance of his regime in the West, thus avoiding the West mobilizing against the emergence of a new “Russian danger.” This meant that he would strictly adhere to the letter (though not the spirit) of the constitution. He would maintain the external characteristics of a democratic regime, such as elections and a free press, but at the same time he would do anything to avoid an alternation of power from taking place, which is the litmus proof of democratic governance. The repression of opposition forces in Russia, therefore, was considered a necessary condition for the continuation of his regime. Winning this “internal war” was for Putin a precondition for winning his first war: the reconstruction of the empire. How Putin conducted this “internal war” we will analyze in this section.
A ONE-PARTY STATE WITH FOUR PARTIES?
Each time visitors from the West questioned the reality of Russian political pluralism, Putin reacted with visible irritation. During the Valdai conference in September 2009, for instance, a Western participant asked: “To what extent do you think the Western model for political and economic development would suit Russia? Or do you think Russia needs to adopt some other model, which would better suit local historical, geographical and geopolitical realities?” Putin answered—not amused—in a brusque tone: “Russia’s fundamental political and economic system is fully in line with international standards. If we are discussing the political system, I am referring to free election(s) and (an) effective multi-party system.”[2] Apparently, the Russian leadership did not consider reestablishing a one-party system to be a sensible strategy. The historical precedents—not only in fascist countries, but also the experience with the communist party in the former Soviet Union—had too negative an image.
EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST “PLURALISM”: A MODEL FOR PUTIN?
The former communist regime legitimized the existing one-party system by referring to the emergence of a “classless society” in which the old capitalist class cleavages would no longer exist. Interestingly, even in the former communist bloc there were still some countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic, which did not follow the Soviet example, but maintained (quasi-)pluralist systems. In East Germany, for instance, alongside the SED, the official communist party, there existed four other political “parties.”[3] However, these parties were not allowed to compete with each other or with the communist party, nor to participate in elections as independent bodies. Candidates from all parties appeared on a prefabricated list of the so-called “National Front”[4] under the aegis of the communist party, and in the (obligatory) elections the only act expected from voters was to throw this list in the ballot box.[5] Putin lived and worked as a KGB agent in Dresden in the German Democratic Republic between 1985 and 1991. Asked about his activities there, he answered that he “looked for information about political parties, the tendencies inside these parties, their leaders. I examined today’s leaders and the possible leaders of tomorrow and the promotion of people to certain posts in the parties and the government.”[6] Putin might have been impressed by the astuteness of East Germany’s pseudo-pluralism.
38
This part of the Kremlin’s hidden agenda is also emphasized by Marlène Laruelle, who wrote: “Putin’s Eurasian Union project is aimed mainly at Central Asia, less at the South Caucasus,
39
“Posol RF: Moldaviya i Tamozhennyy soyuz: vozvrat v proshloe ili proryv v budushchee?”
40
Vladimir Socor, “Putin Suggests Transnistria Self-Determination, Rogozin Displays Transnistria Flag,”
42
George Niculescu, “The Myths and Realities of Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Economic Union,”
2
“Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Met with Members of the Sixth Valdai Discussion Club,”
3
These were the Christian-Democratic Union, the Liberal-Democratic Party of Germany, the National-Democratic Party of Germany, and the Democratic Peasants Party of Germany.
4
Apart from the political parties, also representatives of communist mass organizations (youth and women’s organizations, the communist trade union FDGB, etc.) were also on the National Front’s list.
5
As a member of a delegation of the Dutch Social-Democratic Party, I personally had the opportunity to visit, on June 14, 1981, a polling station at the Alexanderplatz in East-Berlin, during the elections of the
6
Vladimir Putin,